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With effect from 1st April 2005, UK law was amended such that gamete donors must 
now consent to their identity being released to their donor offspring, should they 
request it after the age of eighteen. This qualitative study investigates the views and 
experiences of those donating in this new context. Drawing primarily on twenty-four 
in-depth interviews with donors, supplemented by twenty staff interviews and 
observation in two fertility clinics, I examine how donors make sense of their role in 
relation to offspring, recipients and the wider community. I argue that donors make 
sense of their role as “biological” parents to offspring through creative reference to 
kinship repertoires, drawing on their own experiences of “doing family.” However, 
crucially, kinship connections are always qualified in some way to show that they are 
not quite family to donor offspring, and certainly not their “real” parent. Often this 
discursive work involved emphasising their relationship to recipients or the wider 
community (rather than offspring), framing the donation as a gift or a public act. In 
addition, donors drew on their kinship expertise to dilute, reshape or “re-route” their 
connection to offspring. Ultimately, this is a thesis about the limiting work involved 
in “doing kinship.” I demonstrate that donors did this limiting work in highly 
creative ways, not restricted to forgetting or ignoring connections.  Instead, I show 







With effect from 1st April 2005, UK law was amended such that sperm and egg 
donors must now consent to their identity being released to their donor offspring, 
should they request it after the age of eighteen. This is the first research study to 
investigate the views and experiences of those donating in this new context. I 
interviewed twenty-four donors and twenty staff in fertility clinics and also 
shadowed staff in two UK fertility clinics in order to examine how donors make 
sense of their role in relation to offspring, recipients and the wider community. I 
argue that donors make sense of their role as biological parents to offspring by 
borrowing selected ideas and practices which we associate with families, including 
frequent comparisons with their own family relationships. However, they were 
always careful to qualify these references to make clear that they did not see 
themselves as family to their offspring in any straightforward sense, and certainly not 
their “real” parent. Often this involved emphasising the ways in which their donation 
connected them to their recipients or the wider community (rather than offspring), 
thereby framing the donation as a gift or a public act. In addition, donors drew on 
their experiential knowledge of the ways in which familial connections could be 
created and curtailed in order to renegotiate the meaning of their connection to 
offspring and distance themselves from a parental role. Ultimately, this is a thesis 
about the limiting work involved in constructing families. I demonstrate that donors 
did this limiting work in highly creative ways, not restricted to forgetting or ignoring 
connections.  Instead, I show that not constructing kinship claims can be as active a 
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Who are identity-release donors and why research their experiences? 
With effect from the 1st April 2005, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) 
Act 1990 was amended giving donor-conceived offspring the right to identifying 
information about their gamete donor. Whilst previously donor anonymity was the 
norm, donors in UK licenced clinics have since been required to consent to their 
name and last known address being made available to any offspring who request it, 
after they reach the age of eighteen. Such men and women therefore donate with the 
prospect of future contact with their donor offspring. In recent decades, identity-
release legislation has been introduced in jurisdictions around the world, including 
Canada, New Zealand, Austria and The Netherlands (Blyth and Frith 2009). The 
legislative change in the UK followed lobbying by donor-conceived persons and 
those advocating for them, such as social workers and ethicists. They made the 
argument that donor offspring, like adopted persons, had a “right to know their 
biological identity,” arguing that this information could be necessary for their 
ontological security (for example Daniels 1995; Freeman 1996; McGee, Brakman, 
and Gurmankin 2001; see Frith 2001 for a full discussion). Smart (2009; 2010) 
suggests that identity-release legislation, alongside more open adoption practices, can 
be seen as part of a wider idealisation of openness regarding “genetic truths” 
(sometimes legally enforced). The keeping of reproductive secrets is now 
increasingly seen as damaging to the emotional wellbeing of individuals and to the 
family relationships in which they are embedded.  
 
Identity-release donors therefore donate in a markedly different legal-ethical context 
to previous anonymous donors. The newly established rights of donor-conceived 
offspring to identify and potentially contact their donor, and the ethic of openness in 
which it is embedded, give rise to a socially significant category of “donor parent.” 
Whilst the law is clear that gamete donors have no parental rights or responsibilities, 
their relationship to offspring is portrayed as meaningful, not something that should 
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be ignored or screened out, as was expected of previous anonymous donors (Speirs 
2008). Under the new regulatory regime, “good donors” are those who are willing to 
be identified and open to contact from their offspring (Graham, Mohr, and Bourne 
2016). Indeed, this is the only “type” of donor now permitted in UK clinics. We 
cannot assume that these identity-release donors will understand donation, and their 
role as donors, in the same way as previous anonymous donors. We already know 
that there are demographic differences between the previous cohort of anonymous 
donors and those coming forward in this changed legislative context. Identity-release 
donors, particularly sperm donors, tend to be older and are more likely to have 
children of their own (Daniels 2007b). However, as yet, we know very little about 
the views and experiences of these donors, particularly how they make sense of their 
role as “donor parents” (if indeed this is a term they use). This study addresses this 
knowledge gap. 
 
Advancing our knowledge and understanding of these men and women’s experiences 
is valuable, both practically and theoretically. Filling the knowledge gap is crucial in 
order that appropriate support services can be put in place for donors, donor-
conceived persons and their respective families. In addition, if research can identify 
challenges faced by identity-release donors which could then be addressed through 
changes to policy or practice, then more donors may come forward to donate, thus 
alleviating the current shortfall of UK donors in relation to potential recipients At a 
theoretical level, understanding the experiences of identity-release donors also 
provides a means of exploring how “biological” substance and reproductive 
processes are negotiated in the ways we enact and imagine our relationships to 
others. Specifically, my research shows how “biological” processes and substances 
can be made socially meaningful in ways which do not straightforwardly map onto 
established kinship roles.  
 
Research questions and approach 
This study examines how identity-release donors make sense of gamete donation. 
What kind of act do they think they are engaging in? How do they see their role, in 
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relation to offspring, recipients and relevant others? It also analyses the ways in 
which donors’ understandings of their actions are shaped by the social contexts in 
which they donate. I take  a broad view with regard to the “contexts” which are 
relevant here, seeking to examine how discourses and practices, both within and 
outwith the environment of the clinc, shape the ways in which donors make sense of 
donation. More specifically, I consider the role of regulation, and the ways in which 
this is interpreted through clinic practices and information literature, the (material 
and social) procedures through which sperm and egg are donated, stored and 
transferred between bodies and wider cultural discourses relating specifically to 
gamete donation and also to kinship, genetics, gifts and bodily donation more 
broadly. As my literature review demonstrates, these factors have all been shown to 
be salient in shaping the meaning of bodily donation more generaly and it is 
necessary to take account of them in order to fully address my explanatory research 
aims. 
 
The specific research questions which guided the study were: 
1. How do UK identity-release gamete donors view and experience donation? 
a) How do donors describe the role of a gamete donor?  
b) Has the meaning of donation changed for donors over the life-course, if so 
how?  
c) How do donors describe their motivations?  
d) How do donors describe the donation process, in and out of clinic?  
e) How do donors describe their role in relation to (potential) donor-
conceived child(ren)?  
f) How do donors describe their role in relation to recipient(s)?  
g) How do donors feel about the possibility of contact from donor offspring?  
h) How do donors expect they should or would react if they were contacted 
by donor offspring or recipients? 




a) What kinds of experiences and cultural discourses do donors draw on in 
order to make sense of donation and their role?  
b) What are the similarities and differences in the views of different donors 
and how might these be explained? 
c) With whom, and how, do donors discuss their donation?  
d) How do clinic staff view the act of gamete donation and the role of 
donors?  
e) What differences (if any) exist in the way clinic staff perceive different 
donors (i.e. men/women, parent/childless, younger/older) or different types of 
donation (known, patient, volunteer)?  
f) How do clinic staff interact with donors?  
 
Given my exploratory and explanatory aims, I have taken a qualitative approach. I 
conducted in-depth interviews with 24 donors, eliciting rich data on their experiences 
of donation. Simultaneously, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork and 20 staff 
interviews in two fertility clinics with a view to understanding more about the clinic 
environments in which donors donated. 
 
My argument 
My research shows that identity-release donors donate in the context of contradictory 
pressures to both connect with, and distance themselves from, offspring and the 
recipient’s family. On the one hand, my participants had invested in the idea that 
donor offspring might have a need to one day meet their donor. Therefore, they could 
not simply dismiss their connection to offspring as socially insignificant. On the 
other hand, the donors I spoke to were very keen to avoid “treading on [the] toes” of 
the recipients. They were aware that, in light of an ideal of two-parent families and a 
perception of “natural” ties as enduring in contrast to their fragile “social” 
equivalent, their presence could be perceived as a threat to the status of recipients as 
the “real” parents. Too much interest in recipients and offspring could also be seen as 
inappropriate according to the norms of gift giving – gifts, properly given ought to be 
entirely given up. Being a “good” identity-release donor therefore meant balancing 
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these two imperatives – acknowledging the significance of their connection to 
offspring whilst taking steps to protect the statuses of the recipient(s) as the only 
“real” parents. 
 
My findings demonstrate the remarkable creativity of donors negotiating these two 
pressures. In order to make sense of their connection to offspring, they often drew on 
their own experiences of “doing family” (Morgan 1996). They thought about what 
families ordinarily do and what these practices provide for themselves and others 
(such as looking for resemblances, passing on family histories or providing a sense 
of belonging) and adapted this knowledge to make sense of their relationship to 
offspring. Donors deconstructed their own kinship experiences to articulate what it 
was they might offer their offspring, trying to extract particular ways of “doing 
family” which might appropriately be offered by one’s genetic or donor parent. 
However, these kinship references were always qualified in order to make clear that 
the relationship they imagined with offspring did not map (in any straightforward 
way) onto an established kinship role and they certainly did not see themselves as the 
“real” parents.  
 
My thesis offers a detailed analysis of the ways in which my donor participants 
qualify their potentially kin-like connection with offspring. It is in this way that I 
seek to contribute to our existing understanding of the ways in which kinship is both 
constructed and limited. In recent decades, sociologists of the family (Morgan 1996; 
Mason 2008; Finch 2007) and anthropologists of kinship (Carsten 2000a; 2004; 
Franklin and McKinnon 2000) have talked about family as something which is 
produced and reproduced through everyday practices. These social scientists have 
demonstrated the diverse ways in which kinship connections are constructed through 
reference to various processes and substances, which may or may not include those 
defined as “biological” (Thompson 2005; Weeks, Heaphy, and Donovan 2001; 
Edwards 2000; Mason 2008; Nordqvist 2014; Melhuus 2012; Howell 2006). In this 
thesis, I demonstrate that not constructing kinship, not doing family, can be equally 
as active and creative a process. The donors I interviewed distanced themselves from 
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a kinship (specifically, parental) connection to offspring in various ways, not 
restricted to screening out or ignoring the significance of “biology.” They did this 
limiting work by drawing on alternative or concurrent ways of viewing gamete 
donation – as a public act (akin to blood donation or charity) or as a personal gift 
connecting them to a specific recipient. In addition, they used humour, drew on 
physical and temporal distance, assigned kinning
1
 agency to others and drew 
boundaries between their own families and the recipients. In these ways, donors 
diluted, reframed and “re-routed” their connection to offspring, protecting the 
kinship space of the recipient, whilst not dismissing the social significance of their 
relationship to offspring. As I will demonstrate, these different ways of qualifying 
kinship were not equally available to all. In particular donors’ gender and their pre-
existing relationship to recipients (if any), shaped the ways in which they tended to 
talk about their donations in relation to recipients and the wider community. This in 
turn, influenced the discursive strategies available to them to manage their 
connection to offspring. 
 
Chapter outlines 
In Chapter Two, I begin with some context, examining the medical and regulatory 
histories of gamete donation in the UK. I describe the procedures by which gamete 
donations are procured and transferred to patients seeking fertility treatment and I 
trace the development of UK regulations governing sperm and egg donation. In 
particular, I show how initial practices of secrecy have, to some extent, been replaced 
by identity-release legislation and the encouragement of recipients to disclose their 
children’s donor-conceived status. I also describe how regulations regarding 
payments have changed over recent decades. Finally, I analyse the numbers of men 
and women coming forward to donate gametes and how these have changed in 
relation to legislative and regulatory changes, regarding anonymity and payment. I 
show that the impact of such changes on donor numbers has been neither predictable 
                                                 
1
 I borrow the concept of “kinning” from Signe Howell to describe the process by which a person is 
“brought into significant and permanent relationship” with others (2006, 63). 
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nor straightforward. Hence the need for research, including this study, to examine 
how donors themselves make sense of donating under particular regulatory regimes.  
 
Chapter Three reviews existing research and theory relevant to my study. I explain 
how previous scholarship has informed my research questions, demonstrate how my 
own study addresses previously unanswered questions and introduce concepts and 
theories pertinent to my own analysis. The chapter begins with a discussion of prior 
research and theory on the topic of bodily donation, including blood and organ, as 
well as gamete, donation. I use this literature to demonstrate a fundamental premise 
of my project – that bodily donations have no intrinsic meaning. Instead, the ways in 
which they are understood are shaped by the cultural (as well as material) worlds in 
which they take place. I show that legal regulations and organisational practices, as 
well as the material-symbolic properties of bodily substances, shape how such 
actions are made meaningful. A review of this literature also demonstrates the 
ubiquity of “the gift” in cultural discourses about bodily donation. I argue that the 
ubiquity of gift rhetoric masks divergent discourses about the social significance of 
gift giving – how gifts are expected to be given and with what consequences. I 
outline different theories of gift giving, including the ideal of the “pure” gift (J. Parry 
1986; Laidlaw 2000; Derrida 1992), a conception of gifts as personal, relational 
activities (Mauss 1990) and, what I call, “communal gifts” – those given to the 
community at large (Titmuss 1973). I argue that these are best understood as gift 
discourses – meaningful ways of talking about gifts or constructing our actions as 
altruistic. I suggest that each has cultural saliency but one or other discourse may be 
more or less available depending on what is being given, in what context and by 
whom. These discourses on giving are a key part of the cultural context in which my 
donor participants donate and, as my analysis demonstrates, shape how they 
understand their donation and their role as donors.  
 
The second half of Chapter Three reviews the anthropological and sociological 
literature on kinship, focussing on the ways in which “biological” processes and 
substances are negotiated in our constructions of kin. Previous studies suggest that, 
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when it comes to defining kin, selected “biological” processes and substances can be 
made to matter or they can be screened out by “social” practices, such as caring for a 
child. However, in the course of this review, what also becomes clear is the 
contradictory cultural context in which donors make sense of their role and the 
substance they donate. Cultural beliefs about the significance of “natural” ties both 
encourage and discourage donors to activate their connection to offspring. On the 
one hand, “natural” connections are idealised as automatic and enduring and so, as 
previous studies with gamete donors have demonstrated, they may be hard to screen 
out entirely and indeed this may not be straightforwardly desired, even if such 
connections are seen as socially or emotionally problematic. In addition, studies with 
adopted and donor-conceived persons suggest that knowledge about, or contact with, 
genetic parents may be perceived as beneficial in order to make sense of their 
identities and to provide a means of routing themselves in time and place. On the 
other hand, genetic parents may be seen as a threat to the status of social parents, 
particularly in light of an ideal of exclusive, two-parent families. In this chapter, I 
describe the few existing studies which have examined cases where donors negotiate 
these dual pressures, by neither screening out nor straightforwardly activating the 
kinship significance of their “biological” connection, but instead renegotiate the 
meaning of genetic relatedness. My own research contributes to this small body of 
literature, showing how “biology” can be made to matter in ways which do not map, 
in any straightforward way, onto established kinship roles.  
 
In Chapter Four, I detail the methodology through which I collected and analysed the 
data presented in this thesis. I explain the decisions I made throughout the research 
process, including the ways in which the study was designed in theory, as well as the 
way it was carried out in practice. I explain why a qualitative approach was 
necessary to address my research questions and specifically why I elected to conduct 
in-depth interviews with donor participants in order to examine the discourses and 
experiences they drew on to make sense of their role. I sought to contextualise their 
narratives by conducting ethnographic fieldwork at the two clinics where my donors 
were predominantly recruited, as well as interviewing staff there. I go on to detail 
how the research sites were selected, how participants were recruited and the 
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demographics of my resulting sample of 24 donors and 20 staff. I analyse my 
experiences of conducting interviews and fieldwork, as well as data analysis, 
highlighting the challenges I faced along the way and the ways in which these have 
shaped the knowledge I produced. In addition, I examine ethical issues associated 
with the project and how I sought to address them. I conclude the chapter, by 
examining the inevitable limitations of my decisions and the consequences they have 
for the transferability of my research.  
 
Chapters Five to Eight analyse the findings of my study and address my initial 
research questions. Across all of these chapters, I use my interview data to examine 
how participants made sense of their role as donors, therefore addressing research 
question (RQ) 1(a), with each chapter focussing on the donor’s (often imagined) role 
in relation to particular groups. In chapter five, I analyse how they positioned 
themselves in relation to recipients (RQ 1(c) and 1(f)). Chapter six examines how 
donors spoke about themlseves in relation to the health care system and wider 
community (RQ 1(c) and 1(d)) and chapters seven and eight focus on their imagined 
relationships to (potential) offspring (RQ 1(b), 1(e), 1(g) and 1(h)). Drawing on staff 
interviews and fieldwork in the clinics, as well donor interview data, each of these 
chapters demonstrates how donors’ views are shaped by practices in the clinic (RQ 
2(d), 2(e) and 2(f)) and interactions with others beyond the clinic (RQ 2(c)), as well 
as wider cultural discourses (RQ 2(a)). Where appropriate, I explore similarities and 
differences in the experiences of different donors (RQ 2(b)), for example between 
sperm and egg donors or known and unknown donors, with a view to explaining how 
these discourses and practices (both within and beyond the clinic) might have shaped 
their views and experiences in particular ways. 
 
Chapter Five looks at the ways in which donors narrated their role in relation to 
recipients. I show that donors frequently framed their donation as a “communal gift” 
– a civic act of sharing their surplus with those in need. In this way, they constructed 
a connection with recipients that was indirect; these were gifts to a generalised group 
of people in need. However, I go on to show that many donors (the vast majority, egg 
26 
 
donors) also framed their donation as a personal, relational gift which connected 
them to their specific recipient. Some sought to personalise or extend this connection 
by seeking further information about, or desiring to meet, their recipient. However, 
all my donor participants were limited in their ability to construct these kinds of 
personal connections with recipients. I show that clinic practices and anonymity, as 
well as a wider cultural ideology of the “pure gift” discouraged such connection 
making. In addition, the desire to give recipient’s a “normal” experience of 
parenthood meant many donors felt some distance was best, in order to avoid 
“treading on [the] toes” of the recipient. I argue that male donors faced particular 
barriers to constructing personal connections with recipients; they were aware that, 
due to the particular stigma attached to donor insemination and male infertility, they 
might be seen as a particular threat to male recipients and so they tended to keep 
their distance, discursively as well as physically. 
 
In Chapter Six, I consider how donors positioned themselves in relation to the 
healthcare system and the wider community. Following from the previous chapter, I 
show that all donors, at various points, sought to portray their donations as 
“communal gifts” – ways of doing their bit for the wider community, akin to 
volunteering or blood donation. In order to maintain this position, they made a 
distinction between what they were doing - donating to help others - and what others 
might, but should not, be doing – donating “for the money.” This distinction was 
perceived as crucial because of the potential for future contact with offspring and the 
possibility that they might have to explain their motivations. However, as this 
chapter demonstrates, not doing it “for the money,” did not necessarily imply that no 
payment could be offered to, or accepted by, donors. Some donors took the nuanced 
view  that some payment could be accepted by donors, without undermining the 
altruistic spirit in which it was undertaken. Others believed that the acceptance of 
any payment at all would taint the gift they had given. I show that these two views 
were gendered with several men either declining payments offered or re-donating 
them to charity. I argue that this gendered trend is, in part, a product of male donors’ 
reliance on a “pure gift” ideology (including absolute opposition to market exchange) 
in order to present their donation as an altruistic act. Egg donors relied less 
27 
 
exclusively on such a framework to present their donations as altruistic. As explained 
in the previous chapter, female donors were more able to draw on a discourse of gifts 
as personal, relational activities to present their donations as other-oriented. In the 
final sections of the chapter, I suggest that, on the whole, donors’ experiences in the 
clinic supported their narrative of gamete donation as a communal gift. This was 
enhanced when donors felt they were in partnership with clinic staff, evidenced by 
their friendliness and gratitude, with some donors taking on an ambassadorial role in 
relation to gamete donor recruitment. However, donors’ portrayals of donation as a 
civic act could be undermined by interactions, both within and without the clinic. 
This occurred when clinic staff failed to recognise their actions as altruistic – either 
treating them as any other patient or implying they were financially motivated. 
Outside the clinics, donors sometimes faced similar assumptions from those who 
knew about their donations. This was particularly the case for sperm donors due to a 
continued stereotype of (student) sperm donors donating for “beer money.” 
 
Chapters Seven and Eight examine how donors talked about their relationship to 
offspring. In Chapter Seven, I examine the ways in which they made this connection 
meaningful, imagining how their relationship might be enacted if they were to meet 
in the future. All the donors I interviewed were open to contact with their offspring 
(if that was what they wanted in the future) and all but one were supportive of the 
abolition of anonymity, frequently citing donor offspring’s “right to know where 
they came from.” Although my participants often found it difficult to predict or 
articulate how these relationships might play out, I am able to identify five key roles 
which they imagined they might play in relation to offspring: a bio-identity resource 
(someone who could help them to understand their own identity) a narrative support 
(someone who could help them to extend or embed their life story), a link to a larger 
web of potential relations, a latent instant emotional connection and (in cases of 
known donation) a relationship that was “just as it would have been” had they not 
been donor-conceived. I show that, in conceptualising their role, donors often drew 
on their own experiences of “doing family,” particularly drawing comparisons with 
their own experiences of parent-child relationships. They deconstructed their own 
kinship experiences and attempted to extract particular aspects of these relationships 
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which might appropriately be offered by one’s genetic or donor parent. However, 
crucially, these kinship references were always qualified in some way. Donors were 
very clear that they were not the “real” parents – that was a role they reserved 
exclusively for recipients.  
 
Chapter Eight builds upon the previous chapter’s closing remarks, examining the 
creative ways in which donors went about qualifying their kinship references. I show 
that, rather than simply dismissing the significance of their connection to offspring, 
donors went about qualifying kinship in various active ways – diluting, reshaping 
and “re-routing” their tie to offspring. I show how they qualified the intimacy of their 
familial comparisons by concurrently presenting gamete donation as a public act, 
often compared with blood donation. They also diluted their connection to offspring 
by “re-routing” this link via others – the recipients or their own children. These two 
discursive strategies relied upon donors evoking their connection to the wider 
community and recipients, respectively. Donors’ ability to construct a connection 
with their specific recipient therefore shaped the availability of “re-routing” as a 
qualifying strategy, with no male donors taking this narrative approach. I also 
demonstrate the ways in which donors used their kinship expertise, their experiential 
knowledge of family relations, to do this limiting work and, particularly, to distance 
themselves from a parental role. Drawing on decisions to complete their families or 
experience of family traditions, donors constructed boundaries between “their” 
family and “our” family. They used humour to parody and undermine any reading of 
their role in relationship to offspring as a parental one. Often drawing on discourses 
of “bonding,” they created and referenced physical and temporal space between them 
and their offspring, thus foreclosing any possibility of a parent-child connection. 
Finally, they assigned kinning power to offspring and recipients in order to make it 
clear that they were not themselves making a kinship claim.  
 
In the final chapter, I emphasise that the ways in which donors qualified their 
connection to offspring often drew on their imagined relationship to recipients and 
the wider community, portraying their donation as a personal gift and/or a public act. 
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In this way, I bring together my analysis in the preceding chapters, showing how 
donors’ narratives about their relationships to recipients, the wider community and 
offspring are all mutually implicated. The ways in which they talked about their 
relationship to one of these groups both constrained and enabled particular ways of 
talking about their relationship to the others. The result is that different donor “types” 
(whether they were known/unknown, male/female, parents/non-parents) had varied 
access to particular discursive strategies for qualifying kinship. As well as analysing 
the transferability, limitations and policy-implications of my findings, this final 
chapter discusses the theoretical contribution this study seeks to make to work in the 
sociology of the family and the new kinship studies in anthropology. Specifically, 
this thesis offers an analysis of ways in which kinship possibilities are actively and 
deliberately qualified in practice. I show that this discursive work is highly creative 
and goes beyond gradual processes of forgetting ties or screening out potential 











 June 1978, baby Louise was born to Lesley and John Brown in Oldham 
General Hospital. Her birth was the first to result from in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) of 
human embryos and preceded the rapid expansion of IVF technologies and the 
fertility industry. The technique, pioneered by scientist Robert (Bob) Edwards and 
clinician Patrick Steptoe, involves careful monitoring of oocyte development (via 
transvaginal ultrasound and/or blood tests) and the subsequent extraction of one of 
more mature oocytes from a woman’s ovaries. Patients are usually sedated for this 
short surgical procedure whereby a needle is inserted through the wall of the vagina 
and into the ovarian follicles. Patients can normally return home the same day whilst 
embryologists incubate, fertilise and monitor the eggs retrieved in a laboratory, most 
commonly using the sperm of the patient’s partner. One or more embryos, selected in 
accordance with the embryologists’ assessments of quality, are then implanted into 
the patient’s uterus, three to five days following fertilisation.  
 
Since Louise’s birth, IVF protocols have been developed which use various 
hormonal regimes to stimulate the production of multiple oocytes in a single cycle. 
Although some medical professionals and scientists have since called for a return to 
“natural” IVF (where no drugs are administered) (Matsuura et al. 2008; Pelinck et al. 
2002), these “stimulated cycles” remain the norm and IVF patients are normally 
prescribed a series of drugs with the aim of yielding multiple oocytes during egg 
retrieval and therefore increasing the overall chances of pregnancy. Further 
technological innovations have been developed with the aim of improving pregnancy 
and live birth rates: Time-lapse monitoring may now be used by embryologists to 
monitor embryo development and select those most likely to develop in the womb 
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(Campbell et al. 2013; Herrero and Meseguer 2013). New cryopreservation 
techniques have also been developed with the result that surplus embryos, stored and 
later thawed, have a higher chance of implanting when used in subsequent treatment 
(Loutradi et al. 2008).  
 
IVF is now a common medical treatment and a multi-million pound business. The 
latest statistics published by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(HFEA 2016) show that, in 2014, more than 52,000 women in the UK received over 
67,000 cycles of IVF, across 82 licenced clinics. Close to 6 out of 10 of these cycles 
were privately funded (HFEA 2016), with a typical cycle costing £3000 (HFEA 
2007). Despite its proliferation and the many refinements that have been made since 
the late 1970s, the probability remains low that any individual treatment cycle will 
result in a live birth. The most recent HFEA report (HFEA 2016) calculates that, in 
the UK in 2013, the percentage of IVF treatment cycles using the patient’s fresh 
oocytes which resulted in a live birth was 26.5%. However, success rates are highly 
variable in accordance with the age of the patient. Older women are less likely to 
either conceive or carry a pregnancy to term. Women aged 18-34 have a 32.8% 
chance of giving birth to a live baby, this declines to 13.7% for those aged 40-42. 
The figures are lower still for older women, 4.9% and 2% respectively for those in 
the “43-44” and “45 and over” age categories. 
 
With the development of IVF technology, egg donation, distinct from traditional 
surrogacy
2
 becomes a technical-medical (though not automatically a legal, social or 
ethical) possibility. When donated oocytes are used, the tasks of IVF are shared 
between donor and recipient. Egg donors undertake the initial stages (hormonal 
regimes, monitoring and minor surgery) in order that eggs can be retrieved and 
fertilised. The resulting embryos are then implanted into the uterus of the intended 
recipient. The first live birth from donated eggs was in 1984 in Australia, six years 
                                                 
2
 Traditional surrogacy refers to the practice of a surrogate mother gestating a foetus, conceived 
using her own egg and the sperm of the intended father. 
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after the birth of Louise Brown, though it was not until the early 1990s that egg 
donation programmes began to appear in the UK (Katz 1993). In recent decades, it 
has become an established treatment option for women and couples experiencing 
infertility in the UK. The latest figures show that approximately 4% of  fresh IVF 
cycles use donated eggs (HFEA 2014). IVF using donated oocytes has higher rates of 
success than treatment undertaken using the patient’s own, with a particularly 
marked differences between success rates in women over 35. In 2013, the overall live 
birth rate for an IVF cycle with fresh donated eggs was 32%. However, success rates 
are much less variable according to age, when compared with “standard” IVF, with 
34.8% and 29.3% respectively of women in the 43-44 and the 45+ categories giving 
birth to a live baby following treatment with donated eggs  (HFEA 2016).  
 
The use of donated sperm to treat infertility has a much longer history. The first 
reports of donor insemination (DI) date back to the late nineteenth century (Haimes 
and Daniels 1998), though not until 1945 were the first reports published in the 
medical literature (Barton, Walker, and Wiesner 1945). At this time, church leaders 
condemned the practice for its association with masturbation, adultery and 
illegitimacy and there were calls for the practice to be outlawed (Richards 2016). For 
decades, donor insemination was practiced under a cloak of secrecy and records were 
often destroyed or minimally kept (Frith 2001). It was only after the development of 
IVF and the passing of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act (1990) 
that gamete donation (sperm and egg) was legitimised as a medical treatment for 
infertility.  
 
In many ways, the practice has changed remarkably little, despite its incorporation 
into legitimate medical practice. Donors produce semen by masturbation and then, 
timing insemination with predicted ovulation, semen is introduced into the vagina, 
cervix or uterus. One key difference between early and contemporary practices of DI 
is that, since the 1970s, it has become standard practice to freeze sperm for use at a 
later date (Richards 2016). In the UK, licenced clinics must now freeze and 
quarantine sperm for a minimum of six months. After this time, the donor should be 
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re-tested for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) before their semen can be used for 
fertility treatment (HFEA 2012a). UK clinics usually ask sperm donors to donate on 
a regular basis (weekly or fortnightly is the norm) for several months in order to 
build up a store of samples which can then be quarantined for the designated period 
(National Gamete Donation Trust 2016). Another development is that intrauterine 
insemination (IUI), rather than intracervical (ICI) or intravaginal (IVI), insemination 
is now the norm in licenced clinics. In this procedure, sperm is washed and 
concentrated before being inserted via a catheter directly into the uterus. Outside of 
clinics, or where it is preferred by patients (it is often cheaper than IUI), ICI or IVI 
may be performed. Where this is the case, it is not necessary to first purify the semen 
of bacteria. 
 
DI remains an established treatment for couples experiencing male-factor infertility 
or where the male partner has a genetic disorder, and is also used to achieve 
pregnancy for same-sex couples and single women (HFEA 2014). In 2013, a total of 
4,628 donor insemination cycles were performed in the UK (HFEA 2016). The most 
recent statistics show that donor insemination in clinics has a live birth rate of 11.2% 
per cycle, rising to 14.6% in “stimulated” cycles, where the female recipient takes 
drugs to boost egg production. Donated sperm may also be used in IVF cycles where 
female and male factor infertility have been diagnosed or where previous DI cycles 
have proved unsuccessful. In 2013, 5% of  all IVF cycles used donated sperm 
(HFEA 2014), with a live birth rate of 23.% (HFEA 2016).  
 
Overall, the number of patients treated with DI has declined since the 1990s (HFEA 
2012b). This is likely due to the development of intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
(ICSI) as a treatment for some male factor fertility problems. This procedure is 
combined with IVF and involves the selection and injection of a single sperm 
directly into the egg thus circumventing the difficulties associated with low 
concentrations or poor motility of sperm. However, whilst women with a male 
partner remain the largest group of DI patients, the numbers of same-sex couples and 
single women treated using donor sperm has been steadily increasing in the last 
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decade (HFEA 2016). In 2013, 956 DI cycles in UK clinics were used to treat 
women who registered as single and 1,533 for women who registered with a female 




As technical-medical practices, egg donation and donor insemination are no more 
complicated than IVF and artificial insemination (AI). However, in legal, ethical and 
social terms, gamete donation raises many issues beyond those associated with 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) more widely.  How should donors be 
recruited? Should they be paid? Who should be permitted access to treatment with 
donated gametes? How many offspring should be created with donated gametes? 
Should donor offspring be informed of the circumstances of their conception? Should 
donor offspring be able to contact their donor? These questions have been the subject 
of ethical discussions, parliamentary debates and legal regulation over the decades.  
 
Following the recommendations of the Warnock Report (1984), the HFE Act (1990) 
legitimised gamete donation in the UK but it did so under particular conditions, 
which arguably maintained the appearance of a hetero-normative nuclear family 
(Sheldon 2005). Donor anonymity was a condition of treatment in licensed clinics, 
donors’ details were not recorded on birth certificates and only minimal non-
identifying information was made available to recipients or donor-conceived 
children. Although secrecy was not actively encouraged, neither was it discouraged 
(Donovan 2006) and was made possible through the definitions and recording of the 
mother as the gestational mother, and the father as the mother’s husband or partner 
during treatment, whether or not these were also the genetic parents. 
 
The legal-regulatory context to gamete donation has since changed in several ways. 
The particular change which precipitated this study was the removal of absolute 
anonymity for donors. With effect from the 1st April 2005, the HFE Act (1990) was 
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amended giving donor conceived children the right to access identifying information 
about their donor parent(s), once they reach the age of eighteen. The law is not 
retrospective and so previous donors have the right to remain anonymous. However, 
since April 2005, all donors at UK clinics must now, by law, consent to their identity 
being released in the future. Similar laws have been passed in a series of Western 
jurisdictions in recent decades, beginning with Sweden in 1985, Austria and Victoria, 
Australia in the 1990s and several others, including New Zealand, Norway and 
Canada, since the new millennium (Blyth and Frith 2009). This seems to be an 
important break with the secrecy of past practices.  
 
This amendment to the HFE Act followed a review of the law brought about by the 
campaigning of donor-conceived persons and those advocating on their behalf, such 
as social workers and ethicists. They argued that donor-conceived offspring had a 
“right to know their biological identity” and that such knowledge could be necessary 
for their emotional wellbeing (Daniels 1995; Freeman 1996; McGee, Brakman, and 
Gurmankin 2001; see also Frith 2001 for a full discussion of these debates). Often 
they drew on discourses of human rights, specifically the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989), particularly article seven: the right to know one’s 
parents (Frith 2001; Melhuus 2012). Their argument was also advanced through 
comparison with the experiences of adopted people (Turner 1993; Blyth et al. 2001; 
McWhinnie 1996; see Melhuus and Howell 2009 for detailed discussion of 
Norwegian context). Advocates for openness suggested that donor-conceived persons 
did, or might, experience feelings of “genealogical bewilderment,” a term coined by 
Sants (1964), referring to psychological damage experienced by adopted persons, 
resulting from not knowing one’s genetic history.  
 
 
With the introduction of identity-release legislation, these arguments seem to have 
been successful. However, the change should not be overstated. An identity-release 
system is not the same as an open-identity one. Donor conceived children can only 
access identifying information in adulthood and will only be able to do so if they are 
aware of their donor conception. Although openness is now encouraged by the 
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HFEA (HFEA 2012a) and the British Infertility Counselling Association (Crawshaw 
et al. 2012), research suggests that many gamete recipients do not disclose donor 
conception to their children. Although there does seem to be an increase in recipients 
choosing, or at least considering disclosure (Crawshaw 2008), research suggests 
most UK gamete recipients have not done so by the time their children are aged 
seven, with a significant minority intending not to in the future (Readings et al. 
2011). These findings are confirmed in a recent systematic review of studies carried 
out internationally (Tallandini et al. 2016). In addition, donors have no rights to 
identifying information about their offspring and only since 2009 have they been 
able to access minimal information about the sex and birth year of any offspring 
(HFEA 2012c). Anonymity has not been dispelled, it has instead become temporary 
and conditional, subject to the decisions of recipients and donor-conceived offspring.  
 
That said, current donors donate with the prospect of future contact with a donor-
conceived child and perhaps the recipient(s) of their donation. Even for those 
donating to someone they already know, it is socially significant that they donate in a 
context where the rights of donor-conceived children to know their donor parent(s) 
are enshrined in law. These two circumstances make identity-release donation a 
markedly different undertaking from anonymous donation. 
 
Although my particular interest in gamete donors was precipitated by the 
introduction of identity-release legislation, there have been other regulatory changes 
since the HFE Act (1990) was written into law. Perhaps the most significant is the 
removal of the infamous “need for a father” clause. The HFE Act (1990) arguably 
encouraged, or certainly provided legal recourse for, discrimination against same-sex 
couples and single women seeking fertility treatment. The act stated that “a woman 
shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of the 
welfare of the child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need 
of that child for a father)” (1990, section 13). The HFE Act (2008) removed the 
bracketed clause and stated that female partners to women undergoing treatment 
should be treated as their male counterparts; married female or civil partners are now 
automatically designated as a second legal parent, alongside the gestational mother. 
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In the absence of a civil partnership or marriage, parental status can be obtained by 
consent of both parties (as with unmarried male partners). 
 
Payment regimes for gamete donors are varied across the world and in the UK have 
been subject to change over time. When it was first set up, the HFEA permitted 
payments of £15 per donation plus expenses to both egg and sperm donors (HFEA 
1992). In 2004, the EU Tissues and Cells Directive ruled that donation should be 
voluntary and human tissues or cells should not be bought and sold. In line with this 
directive, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ruled in 2005 that 
gamete donors could only claim for expenses incurred, up to a maximum of £250 for 
a full course of sperm or egg donation (HFEA 2005). However, the EU directive has 
been subject to wide interpretation in other jurisdictions (see Pennings, Klitzman, 
and Zeggers-Hochschild) and since 1st April 2012 was reinterpreted in the UK; fixed 
compensation payments (as opposed to claimed expenses) can now be paid to egg 
donors (£750) and sperm donors (£35 per visit to the clinic
3
) (HFEA 2012a). In 
addition, benefit-in-kind payments in the form of egg-sharing schemes have been 
permitted since the HFEA’s formation (Blyth 2002). Such schemes allow women 
seeking private IVF treatment to be offered reduced cost treatment (typically half 
price) in exchange for donating a proportion of their eggs for another’s treatment. 
Although some may perceive fixed payments and egg sharing as constituting 
financial incentives to donors, the HFEA is clear that payment to donors is prohibited 
and “advertising or publicity…should not refer to the possibility of financial gain or 
similar advantage, although it may refer to compensation” (HFEA 2012a).  
 
Donor numbers 
Proposals for regulatory change over the years have sparked much speculation about 
the potential impact on donor numbers. Clinicians and other stakeholders have 
variously argued that potential donors, particularly male donors, would be dissuaded 
                                                 
3
 Note that payments to sperm donors are generally paid as a lump sum of approximately £400 at 
the end of a programme of donation, once they have been re-tested for STDs. 
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by limiting payments (Cook and Golombok 1995; Ahuja et al. 1998; Lui et al. 1995) 
or undermining their anonymity (Lui et al. 1995). However, the latest figures show 
that, overall, the numbers of donors registered in UK clinics has actually increased 
since identity-release legislation was introduced. In 2004, 89 sperm and 1,107 egg, 
donors were newly registered in UK clinics. In 2013, this had risen to 387 sperm and 
1,636 egg donors (HFEA 2014).
4
  Interestingly, the 2013 figures, supported by the 
results of a survey of UK clinics (HFEA 2014), show that, since fixed payments were 
introduced for gamete donors, the number of sperm donors has slightly declined, 
whilst the number of non-patient egg donors has increased. These statistics 
demonstrate that payment regimes and identity-release legislation do not necessarily 
have the predicted impact on numbers. The relationship between regulation and 
donor recruitment is far from straightforward and seemingly complicated by gender. 
We therefore need to better understand how donors and potential donors make sense 
of the regulatory contexts in which they donate. What do identity-release legislation 
and payment mean to them? This is a key aim of this study. 
  
                                                 
4
 Note that I have included only sperm donors who registered at UK clinics, excluding those donors 
whose donations were imported into the UK (imported donor sperm accounted for nearly a third of 
the total number of donors registered in the UK in 2013) (HFEA 2016). The comparable data was not 
available for egg donors and so the statistics quoted reflect the total number of egg donors 
registered, including any imports. However, it should be noted that imports make up a much smaller 
proportion of UK egg donor registrations (recent statistics estimate 5% (HFEA 2012b), probably in 






In this chapter, I examine existing research and theory which has informed my study. 
My aims are threefold: First, to demonstrate how existing scholarship has informed 
my research questions. Second, to show how my thesis fills empirical gaps in the 
literature and extends theoretical thinking, and third, to introduce and explain 
concepts and theories which are pertinent to my own analysis, and to which I refer 
when discussing my own findings. The first half of this chapter situates research on 
gamete donation within the wider literature on bodily donation, particularly 
focussing on studies of organ and blood donation.
5
 I analyse how such practices are 
understood and how their meaning is shaped by the material and cultural worlds in 
which they take place. In the second half, I examine sociological, anthropological 
and socio-legal studies of the family and kinship. Here my focus is on the procreative 
consequences of gamete donation. With particular attention to research on 
technologically assisted reproduction, as well as other “non-traditional” family 
forms, I analyse the social significance of “biological” or “genetic” relatedness.  
 
I begin by explaining a fundamental premise of my research questions: that bodily 
donation has no fixed, intrinsic meaning. Instead, the way in which people make 
sense of such practices is shaped by the social-cultural contexts in which they take 
place. These include legal regulations, public and medical discourses about bodily 
donation and the practices of organisations who procure and transfer bodily 
substances, as well as the material and symbolic properties of bodily substances. 
Research shows that bodily donation is frequently (though not exclusively) framed as 
a gift. However, the social significance of giving or receiving such gifts is highly 
varied between persons and contexts. I show that bodily donation is variously 
                                                 
5
 I focus on organ and blood donation partly because these were comparisons often drawn by my 
participants and partly because studies of organ and blood donation predominate in the wider 
literature on bodily donation. 
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constructed as a “pure” gift (once given it is entirely alienated from the donor), a 
“relational gift” (something which connects donor and recipient) and a “communal 
gift” (an act of good citizenship). I suggest that we think of these as different gift 
discourses – ways of constructing particular actions as altruistic, which each have 
cultural saliency. Depending on the act described or the identities of donors and 
recipients, particular discourses may be seen as more or less available. Regulatory 
systems, organisational practices and the material and symbolic properties of the 
substance donated seem to encourage or discourage particular ways of understanding 
the “gift” of bodily donation. The concept of different gift discourses and their 
relative availability to different actors in different contexts has informed my analysis. 
In Chapters Five and Six I show how these different discourses both constrain and 
enable donors in making sense of their donation. 
 
Of course, a key factor shaping how gamete donation is perceived by donors and 
others are the particular material and symbolic properties of gametes as procreative 
substance. In the second half of this chapter, I review the literature on kinship, 
sociology of the family and  socio-legal studies of the family, with the aim of 
understanding the relationship “biology” or “genetics” has with Euro-American 
understandings and experiences of family. The first thing which  becomes clear is the 
remarkable flexibility people employ in constructing kinship claims; “biological” ties 
can be attributed high importance or screened out of kinship significance through an 
emphasis on the “social” ties created through care and love. Furthermore, what is 
categorised as “biological” is highly contingent. The gametes that donors donate 
therefore have no automatic or inevitable kinship significance. However, that is not 
to say their procreative materiality can be easily dismissed by those implicated in 
donor conception, nor that this is necessarily desired. As I demonstrate, gamete 
donors donate in the context of contradictory messages to both connect with and 
distance themselves from their offspring and the recipient family. On the one hand, 
“natural” ties continue to be idealised as automatic and enduring. Knowledge about, 
or contact with, genetic relatives may be seen as beneficial, sometimes crucial, to 
people’s emotional wellbeing. On the other hand, “biological” parents have often 
been perceived as a threat to social parents who lack a “biological” connection with 
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their child, particularly in light of the ideal of a two-parent, exclusive family. In 
demonstrating how donors negotiate these pressures, I contribute to an emerging 
field of research which shows how “biological” connections are neither screened out 
nor straightforwardly activated as a basis for kinship. Drawing on a small number of 
previous studies, I show how some donors construct this connection as meaningful 
though not necessarily familial. I highlight how the meaning of this connection is 
negotiated with others and subject to change over time. Within this small field of 
research, no previous studies have yet examined how men and women, donating in 
the context of identity-release legislation, make sense of their role.  
 
Constructing bodily donation as a (particular kind of) gift 
The social significance of bodily donation is shaped by the social and regulatory 
contexts in which it takes place. This point was first made my Richard Titmuss 
(1973) in his seminal work, The Gift Relationship. He argues that organisational 
practices, specifically the availability of payments, shape the kind of act blood 
donation is seen to be. He advocates a voluntary system on the basis that such a 
system encourages a view of blood donation as a gift. I discuss his work in more 
detail later in this chapter, including exactly what kind of gift is implied by the 
system he advocates. For now, I use his work to make one simple point: it is not 
inevitable that blood donation, or any other form of bodily donation, should be 
described and perceived as any particular kind of act, a gift or otherwise. Instead, as 
Titmuss highlights, such practices are constructed as particular kinds of acts in the 
context of organisational practices. Whilst Titmuss focusses on the availability of 
payment, Healy (2006) develops this line of thinking by also highlighting the role 
procurement organisations play in providing narratives to make sense of donation – 
specifically the development of  the “gift of life” narrative in relation to organ 
donation in the late 1970s. 
 
It is perhaps a sign of Titmuss’ influence that donations of bodily substances are 
frequently described as gifts and donors as altruistically motivated. As Daniels 
(1998) has highlighted, the very term “donation” is morally loaded, implying 
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altruistic intention. The “donation” suffix and accompanying gift rhetoric is 
ubiquitous in recruitment literature for organ, blood and gamete donors, the “gift of 
life” being a commonly used trope (Healy 2004; 2006; Lock 2002; Orobitg and 
Salazar 2005). However, in this review and in the study more widely, I do more than 
identify when the language of gifting is used and also explore how and why such 
terms are used and what they imply about the donor’s role, particularly in relation to 
recipients. What does it mean to say that bodily donations are gifts or that they have 
been (or should be) given altruistically?  
 
There are several examples in the literature on bodily donation where the language of 
gifting is used by facilitators of bodily donation in order to emphasise the voluntary, 
uncoerced nature of participation and the absence of any return for donations. As the 
New Zealand health care practitioners interviewed by Shaw explain, the concept of 
“a gift” is a helpful term to describe organ donation because it suggests other-
oriented motivations and distances the practice from any personal gain or 
commercialisation (2008; 2015). Tutton (2002; 2004) also notes that a conception of 
gifts as one-way, given without obligation or expectation of reciprocation is 
commonly used by ethics committees, medical councils and research institutes with 
an interest in procuring donations. Such articulations of “the gift” are expedient 
means of procuring the necessary bodily tissues in a way which, since it is voluntary, 
is deemed ethical, whilst simultaneously requiring no return to donors. As Waldby 
and Mitchell (2006) argue, informed voluntary consent procedures serve to alienate 
donated bodily tissues from the donor, without the perceived ethical risks of 
exploitation or costs of reciprocation.  
 
The language of gift-giving is also adopted by donors to describe feeling 
disconnected from the bodily substance donated or, we might argue, in order to 
create such disconnections. Waldby at al.’s (2004) interview study of Australian 
blood donors and recipients found many donors viewed the blood they donated as 
entirely alienated. As the following citation from one blood donor demonstrates, the 
language of “gifts” and “giving” can be used as a discursive means of producing or 
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reinforcing a sense of disconnection from that which is donated: “Because it’s not 
yours any more, you give it away, it’s like giving your car away. You give it away, 
it’s gone” (p.1467). Donors in the same study referenced the anonymity of the blood 
donation system to distance themselves from their donation and the recipient(s). 
 
In the literature on gamete donation, there is some evidence that donors and 
recipients think about donation as a similarly alienated gift, or that they believe that 
such disconnection is preferable. In her ethnographic study of egg donation in a 
London clinic, Konrad argues that, for many recipients, “anonymity was seen to 
preserve the form of the true gift” because, since they were unknown, their donation 
could be thought of as “completely ‘voluntary’” (2005, 138). Several recipients in 
this study had refused offers of eggs from sisters or sisters-in-law, believing that gifts 
from someone so close could be problematic, perhaps because the recipient would 
feel forever indebted or the donor would not be able to let go. Some of the donors 
also viewed anonymity as consistent with the proper way of giving gifts – they had 
renounced all rights in their eggs when they were gifted and, as such, they shouldn’t 
expect any further information about the recipients (Konrad 2005). Donors in her 
study often described their donations as freely given and a few used the idiom of the 
gift to emphasise their subsequent disconnection from their eggs and any resulting 
child – a gift once given can neither be given or taken back (2005, 100). 
 
Such findings seem to reflect a wider Western ideology of the “pure” (J. Parry 1986) 
or “free” (Laidlaw 2000) gift. Parry (1986) describes how an idealisation of pure 
altruism develops in parallel with market economies in which individuals are 
presumed to behave in an entirely self-interested manner. Selfless giving and selfish 
economic exchange are two sides of the same coin, both premised on the existence of 
bounded individuals whose interests can be neatly separated from those of others. 
Parry, and others (Laidlaw 2000; Parry and Bloch 1989), have highlighted the 
Western origins of this pure gift ideology and criticised the imposition of a gift-
giving/commercial exchange dichotomy on societies where such strong oppositions 
are not made. Furthermore, as a series of authors have highlighted (Derrida 1992; 
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Scheper-Hughes 2007; J. Parry 1986), we should remember that pure altruism is 
inevitably an ideal rather than a lived reality. As Derrida (1992) argued, a gift, in the 
“purest” sense, is an impossibility because acknowledgement from others, or even 
from oneself, would constitute reciprocation. Ultimately, the impossibility of the 
pure gift derives from our connectedness to others – our own interests and desires are 
bound up with those of others in our social worlds. As impossible as it may be to 
realise, the idealistic power of the pure gift is evident in the narratives of donors. As 
the examples cited previously and my own findings suggest, donors both mobilise, 
and are subject to, this particular discourse on the “correct” way to give.  
 
However, the pure gift has often proved a poor model for the ways in which people 
experience giving and receiving gifts in practice, and this seems particularly to be the 
case for donors and recipients of bodily substance. Even those studies from which I 
have thus far only cited examples of pure gift rhetoric, also contain apparently 
contradictory notions of gift-giving. Bodily donors and recipients frequently do not 
think of their gift as a pure and disconnected act of altruism, as the medical-ethical 
model arguably encourages (Tutton 2002; 2004; Shaw 2008; 2015), but instead the 
gift is often conceptualised as relational, creative of social ties between donor and 
recipient. This is particularly evident in studies of organ transplantation. Fox and 
Swazey’s (1992) analysis of organ transplantation in the USA, found that organ 
recipients often felt obligated to reciprocate for the gift of an organ. This could lead 
to, what the authors term, “the tyranny of the gift” whereby recipients feel distressed 
at their inability to repay the debt they feel to the donor and their families  Studies in 
the USA have shown that organ recipients often feel a sense of connection to their 
donor and/or the donor’s family and, despite the anonymous system of 
transplantation, often desired more information about them, fantasising about them in 
order to fill gaps in their knowledge (Fox and Swazey 1992; Sharp 1995). Sharp 
(1995) reports that recipients sometimes articulate the responsibility they feel 
towards their donor’s families using kinship terms. Similarly, in-depth interview 
studies with the families of UK deceased organ donors found they often also desired 
more information about recipients (Haddow 2005) and recognition that their 




Many survey studies with both egg and sperm donors have found that they cite, 
either entirely or partially, altruistic motivations for donating (Daniels et al. 2005; 
Daniels, Lewis, and Curson 1997; Ahuja, Mostyn, and Simons 1997; Cook and 
Golombok 1995; Kalfoglou and Gittelsohn 2000) (see also Daniels 2007 literature 
review). However, few studies have investigated how exactly they mobilise the 
concept of “gift-giving”. Shaw’s qualitative research in New Zealand (2007; 2008) 
and Konrad’s (2005) ethnographic study of a London fertility clinic are two 
significant exceptions. Both these studies found varied and nuanced views and 
experiences of egg donation as a gift. Shaw reports several conversations with egg 
donors in which they described feelings of connectedness to recipients. In the 
examples she cites, donors were often dissatisfied with the impersonal nature of the 
donation system (they wanted to put a face to their recipient) and were disappointed 
at the lack of acknowledgement or reciprocity for their gift (Shaw 2008). Konrad’s 
(2005) study found that even those donors most strongly advocating distance from 
recipients wanted to know if a pregnancy had been achieved. Surveys of anonymous 
egg donors also found many wished to know the outcome of their donation (see 
Daniels 2007a). This knowledge (ideally of a positive test result) is, Konrad argues, a 
form of return gift and restricting access to this information left some donors with a 
feeling of dissatisfaction or, for one woman, the feeling that “there’s something 
missing.”  
 
Perhaps the clearest examples of bodily donation at odds with the pure gift model are 
cases where donors and recipients are known to one another, particularly as family 
members. Gill and Lowes (2008) conducted a longitudinal interview study with 
donor and recipient pairs (all family relations) involved in kidney transplantation in 
England. Their findings show that for these patients, the gift is embedded within their 
pre-existing relationships. All donors described the decision to donate as easy and 
automatic. They often described the desire to help the recipient as a normal and 
natural product of their relationship to the recipient (Gill and Lowes 2008, 1611; see 
also Sanner 2003). Their own interests could not be neatly separated from the 
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recipient’s since the latter’s wellbeing was crucial to their own happiness. Donors 
described feeling pride in seeing the impact their donation had had on the recipient’s 
life and the authors conceptualise this as a form of symbolic reward, in addition to 
the gratitude they receive from recipients. 
 
Similar experiences are reported in the limited literature on known gamete donation, 
as well as this study. An in-depth interview study of three sister-to-sister egg 
donations in Canada found that donors were motivated by their relationship with, and 
empathy for, their sister (Winter and Daniluk 2004). This, perhaps unsurprising, 
finding that known donors are motivated by their relationship to the recipient, is 
confirmed in a recent literature review of egg donors’ motivations (Purewal and van 
den Akker 2009). Despite some concerns regarding medical risks and the fear of 
failure, Winter and Daniluk’s (2004) participants described the donation experience 
in positive terms, as one which had strengthened their relationship with the sister and 
also made them feel closer to their brother-in-law.  
 
It has been suggested that there is a darker side to known donation. Drawing on her 
experience as Director of Organs Watch, Scheper-Hughes (2007) analyses examples 
where obligations to give or to reciprocate are perceived or experienced as 
oppressive. She describes one case where a male recipient assumes that his sister 
will, and should, repeatedly donate blood marrow, despite their emotionally distant 
relationship and the risks and disruption entailed to her own life. She also reports 
cases where donors exert control over their recipients following transplantation, 
believing that they should behave in ways which show they are deserving of the 
organ donated or demonstrate sufficient care for the “donor’s” organ (2007, 509). 
These examples are explained in relation to the same “tyranny of the gift” which I 
previously described in relation to deceased organ donation – the gift which has been 
given is too great and too unique to ever be repaid and so the recipient feels forever 
indebted to the donor. Whilst the cases Scheper-Hughes describes are alarming, it 
should be noted that they appear to have been deliberately selected to illustrate 
ethical difficulties with living organ transplantation. More systematically selected 
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samples of living donors and recipients report neutral or positive changes in the 
relationship between donors and recipients (Gill and Lowes 2008; Sanner 2003).  
 
Whether experienced positively or negatively, recipients and donors seem to draw on 
an alternative (impure) discourse about gift giving when they express feelings of 
connectedness, the obligation to give, the need to reciprocate or a desire to meet the 
other. Despite its origins in a study of “traditional,” non-market economies, Mauss’ 
(1990 [1954]) theory of the social significance of gift-giving has commonly been 
applied in order to make sense of such experiences (for example: Fox and Swazey 
1992; Gill and Lowes 2008; Shaw 2007; 2008). Mauss argued that in many so-called 
“archaic” societies, social solidarity is produced and reproduced through reciprocal 
gift exchange practices which create ties between individuals and groups. Members 
of these communities are obligated to give, to receive and to reciprocate. Crucially, 
return gifts are not considered as exact returns and so further obligations to give, 
receive and reciprocate are created. Unlike the pure gift, which is conceived as 
entirely alienated, given up to the recipient, the Maussian gift retains a symbolic 
connection to the donor, which he calls the “spirit of the gift.” Seen through Mauss’ 
theoretical lens, gift-giving is a relational and personal act which is simultaneously 
other-oriented and self-interested. The studies cited previously suggest that donors 
and recipients of bodily substance often reference this idea, that gifts create social 
bonds, in order to make sense of their experiences. 
 
Various authors have borrowed aspects of Mauss’ theory to make sense of their 
findings that organ donors, their families and recipients sometimes feel connections 
with, expect reciprocation or experience obligations toward one another (Gill and 
Lowes 2008; Sharp 1995; Fox and Swazey 2002). Perhaps the most widely-known 
application of Mauss’ theory is Titmuss’ The Gift Relationship, a comparative study 
of blood procurement systems in the UK and the USA. Titmuss (1973) compares the 
outcomes of a market system of blood procurement in the USA with a voluntary 
donation system in the UK, advocating the latter on the basis that such systems are 
safer for patients and promote social solidarity in large urban communities. Making a 
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significant modification to Mauss’ theory, Titmuss argued that under conditions of 
anonymity, the gift of donated blood promotes social solidarity because recipients 
and potential recipients (who could theoretically be anyone) feel obligated to 
reciprocate, not to individual donors (whose identity was unknown) but to the 
community as a whole. The obligations and social ties which are fundamental to 
Mauss’ theorisation of the gift are then generalised to the whole community rather 
than characterising relationships between particular donors and recipients.  
 
Titmuss’ theorisation of the gift resonates with some of the finding from studies of 
organ and blood donors. Sharp’s (1995) study, for example, found that organ 
recipients often felt obligated to “give back” to the community at large, as well as, or 
instead of, their particular donor. As a result, several of her interviewees described 
taking up voluntary work as a way to achieve this. Valentine’s (2005) interviews 
with Australian blood donors and those excluded from donating also confirm 
Titmuss’ predictions. With reference to her participants’ experiences, Valentine 
argues that blood donation is viewed as a duty of good citizens, a way of 
demonstrating one’s identity as a member of a given community. In line with 
Titmuss’ view of the blood donor as an altruistic stranger, her participants reported 
that donors could be “anybody or anywhere” (Valentine 2005, 119). These 
respondents, like many of my own, seem to draw on a discourse of “Titmussian” gift 
relationships (which I call a “communal gift” discourse) to make sense of giving or 
receiving bodily donations. Gifts given and received in this sense are perceived to 
reinforce people’s sense of belonging within the community as a whole, rather than 
connecting them to specific individuals. 
 
Thus far, I have described theories of the idealised pure gift, gifts as relational and 
personal activities and gifts as public or civic acts, and illustrated how they are 
realised in the practice of bodily donation. Each of these models of gifts has been 
criticised for its failure to account for the practices and experiences of those 
implicated in practices of donation and transfer. Waldby and Mitchell (2006), for 
example, demonstrate that Titmuss’ argument (that a gift system in blood donation 
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creates a sense of imagined community among strangers) is a product of its time, 
based on a post-war welfare-state vision of a national community. They argue that 
his model does not reflect the reality of tissue economies in globalised, neo-liberal 
societies where the boundaries between nation states and public/private domains are 
increasingly fluid (2006, 13–24). Their work highlights the contextualised and 
mutable status of donated tissue by tracing the social trajectories of tissues given as 
gifts, later to be exchanged as commodities (Waldby and Mitchell 2006). Others 
have critiqued the pure gift model embedded in medical discourses around organ 
donation for the way in which it obscures feelings of obligations and indebtedness 
(Sothern and Dickinson 2011; Shaw 2015) and glosses over the emotional and 
physical challenges faced by (often still very ill) recipients in incorporating the 
donor’s organ within their bodies  (Shildrick et al. 2009). 
 
These constitute legitimate criticisms of each model of gifting if these theories are 
construed as universal models of what gifts are, or how they are experienced and 
perceived. However, it is not my intention to suggest that any one of these models is 
the “correct” one. None represents what is always meant by “the gift” nor how gift-
giving is always practiced, not even if we restrict our thinking to just one form of 
bodily donation. Instead, I suggest they are best thought of as gift discourses and it is 
in this way that they are valuable to me in making sense of my own interview data. 
Each represents a way of talking about gift giving that has cultural saliency. So, it 
makes social sense to say that we feel obligated to give something back (to the 
community at large or to a specific person) if we receive a gift, just as it also makes 
sense to state that a gift, once given, is entirely the recipients and we shouldn’t 
expect anything in return. These are meaningful ways of talking about gifts and, 
importantly, by talking about our motivations in these terms, we construct exchanges 
and transfers as gifts. These gift discourses form an important part of the cultural 
context in which my participants donated gametes. I therefore return to the concepts 
of pure, relational and communal gifts when analysing my findings, particularly 
when I discuss how donors made sense of their role in relation to recipients (Chapter 




As my own findings confirm, these gift discourses both restrain and enable particular 
ways of talking about bodily donation. Furthermore, they are neither equally 
available to all, nor equally applicable in every context. In this way, they have very 
material consequences, influencing who gives, to whom and how. As Healy (2004) 
argues, different kinds of acts may be constructed as altruistic in different ways and 
different people may be expected to enact each kind. He notes the gendered 
associations of one-off acts of heroism, in contrast with the obligated altruism of 
mothering. Routinised giving can render altruism invisible and, as Mongoven (2003) 
argues, these acts are most often expected from women, particularly when acting in 
relation to family members. Mongoven’s observation would explain the greater 
numbers of women (especially as mothers or wives) acting as living donors 
(Scheper-Hughes 2007; Zimmerman et al. 2000). As my analysis demonstrates, in 
the case of identity-release gamete donation, the donor’s identity (particularly 
gender) and their relationship to the recipient influence the ways in which donors can 
talk about their donations as particular kinds of gifts.  
 
The relationship between gifts and payment 
As I have demonstrated, bodily donation is often described as a gift and much less 
commonly as an economic exchange. In fact, procurement systems which are 
premised on monetary incentives often raise ethical concerns (Murray 1987; Cohen 
1999; Roberts and Throsby 2008; Sauer 1997; Joralemon and Cox 2003). I explore 
why bodily donation for financial incentives so often raises such objections later in 
this chapter. Here, I examine the relationship between money and gifts. I show that 
despite our tendency to view the social realms of money and gifts as mutually 
exclusive, in fact, the meaning of money is dynamic and, in some cases, paid gifts 
are a socially viable possibility. 
 
Although the EU Tissues and Cells Directive 2004 states that human tissues and 
cells, should not be bought and sold, this ruling has been subject to wide 
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interpretation in relation to gametes. Fixed “compensation” payments and sometimes 
“performance related” variable payments are paid to gamete donors in Denmark, 
Spain and other countries, including the UK (Pennings, Klitzman, and Zeggers-
Hochschild). In addition, in the USA, gametes are bought and sold in unregulated 
markets, with college students often targeted as potential donors  (Holland 2001; 
Almeling 2007). Many survey studies in the UK and elsewhere have found that, 
where they are available, both egg and sperm donors cite financial incentives 
(including payment in kind for egg share donors) as part of their motivation for 
donating (Schover, Rothmann, and Collins 1992; Lui et al. 1995; Partrick et al. 2001; 
Kalfoglou and Gittelsohn 2000), and some surveys of paid sperm donors have found 
that they would not donate if they were unpaid or paid less (Lui et al. 1995; Lui and 
Weaver 1996). However, as Almeling’s (2006; 2007; 2011; see also Ragoné 1994; 
Orobitg and Salazar 2005) research demonstrates, the presence of monetary 
payments does not necessarily imply that donation will be understood as an 
economic exchange nor preclude the construction of gamete donation as a gift. Her 
comparative ethnographic study of egg and sperm banks in the USA found that, 
despite the greater sums paid to egg donors, female donors were expected to portray 
their donation as a gift, whereas male donors were encouraged to view the process as 
a job. Donors generally conformed to these gendered scripts (Almeling 2011) and 
potential donors whose stated motivations did not match these expectations were 
viewed with suspicion and sometimes excluded from donating.  
 
Parry and Bloch’s (1989) work, and others that have subsequently developed their 
analysis (for example Zelizer 1994; Guyer 1995), provide a helpful means of 
understanding this variation in the meaning of payments to sperm and egg donors in 
different contexts. These authors argue that money has no fixed meaning or effect on 
social relations but Western cultural discourses fetishise money, depicting it as 
corrosive of social ties, inevitably rationalising and de-personalising interactions in 
which it is implicated. Parry and Bloch (1989) link this fetishisation with our 
ideological opposition of the gift (conceived as “free” or “pure”) and commodity 
exchange. Money, as a condensed symbol of selfish market exchange, is 




However, Parry and Bloch also demonstrate that social practices can symbolically 
transform money, its meaning renegotiated in ways which enable its incorporation 
into spheres of social action oriented towards the long-term reproduction of the 
social order, rather than short-term personal gain. Zelizer (1994) applies their 
argument in a Western context, examining how money is transformed in the USA. 
Using a wide-range of documents from the period 1870-1939, she demonstrates how 
earmarking funds, creating special currencies and talking about money in particular 
ways transforms supposedly fungible money such that it becomes all manner of 
things, from gifts to alimony, which produce and maintain distinct kinds of social 
relations, including those which we think of as highly personal such as close 
friendships and kin. Zelizer’s insights help to explain the way in which payments to 
sperm donors can be framed as earnings whereas payments to egg donors are 
perceived to be consistent with altruistic motivations (Almeling 2006). I use 
Zelizer’s concept of earmarking to show how the donors I interviewed were also 
subject to these gendered assumptions about the meaning of payments made to sperm 
and egg donors, with the former being perceived as earnings. However, as Chapter 
Six demonstrates, rather than adopting this narrative and seeing sperm donation as a 
job, the men I interviewed strongly rejected such a view, sometimes rejecting 
payments offered to them and arguing that people should not donate gametes for 
financial motivations.   
 
The role of regulatory frameworks, procurement practices and the 
material-symbolic properties of bodies in shaping the meaning of 
donation 
Thus far, I have demonstrated that bodily donation is very often (though not always) 
framed as a gift. However, there is huge variety and apparent contradiction in the 
ways in which such gift-giving is described and experienced. Money has no 
straightforward connection with a conception of bodily donation as a gift; payments 
may be incorporated within gift narratives or referenced to present donation as a job 
or financially motivated exchange. For some donors and recipients, bodily tissues, 
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once gifted, no longer bear any connection with themselves and they may view such 
alienation as beneficial. For many others, bodily gifts create social ties between 
persons and set in train relationships of obligation and reciprocation. What is more, 
the significance of bodily gifts is often nuanced and complex; sometimes participants 
describe gifts in ambivalent or contradictory ways, alienation may be partial and the 
desire for distance or connection may be limited or contingent.  
 
How then should we make sense of such complexity? The discussion so far has 
already shown or implied several explanatory factors. Different kinds of gifts or 
exchanges may be expected or experienced depending on the gender of the donor, 
any pre-existing relationship between the donor and the recipient and the type of 
substance being donated. In the following three sections, I analyse three explanatory 
factors which seem to shape how bodily donation has been understood in previous 
studies, and which are also pertinent to my own findings: first, the regulatory 
frameworks in which donation is embedded, second, the procedures through which 
substances are procured and transferred and, third, the material and symbolic 
properties of that which is donated.  
 
Bodily donation takes place within a multiplicity of legal and regulatory frameworks. 
Healy argues that organ and blood donors “use the model implied by the system” to 
make decisions and articulate their actions (2006, 10). So voluntary systems attract 
people who are prepared to donate without payment and encourage people to 
articulate their motivations in terms of gift-giving; paid systems are more likely to 
attract those who articulate their motivations as financial. There is evidence that this 
is also the case for gamete donors. Where payment is available, survey studies have 
shown that donors may cite financial incentives as, at least part of, their motivation 
for donating (Schover, Rothmann, and Collins 1992; Lui et al. 1995; Partrick et al. 
2001; Kalfoglou and Gittelsohn 2000), including those acting, or considering acting, 
as egg-share donors (Ahuja et al. 1998; Rapport 2003). When payment is 
unavailable, donors describe their motivations as altruistic (Purewal and van den 
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Akker 2009; Byrd, Sidebotham, and Lieberman 2002; Craft et al. 2005; Jordan, 
Belar, and Williams 2004; Daniels, Curson, and Lewis 1996).  
 
We might similarly imagine that when gamete donation systems are anonymous they 
attract donors who feel disconnected from recipients and donor offspring and/or that 
anonymous systems encourage them to experience and articulate their relationship in 
these ways. There is some evidence that this is the case. A UK survey of 39 egg and 
34 sperm donors, donating prior to identity-release legislation, found that neither 
group desired contact with recipients or donor-offspring (Fielding et al. 1998). This 
survey included a small number of egg donors (n=7) who already knew their 
recipients – they too, preferred to keep their identity a secret from their offspring. 
Khamsi et al. (1997) report similar survey findings with 10 known egg donors in 
Canada, 80% of whom had decided (with recipients) not to disclose their status to 
any offspring conceived. A small number of survey studies have been conducted 
with gamete donors, donating under identity-release conditions in Sweden (Lampic, 
Skoog Svanberg, and Sydsjö 2014; Daniels, Kramer, and Perez-y-Perez 2012). These 
surveys, of 205 and 164 donors respectively, both find that the vast majority of 
identity-release donors are open to contact with their offspring and support disclosure 
of their donor-conceived status. These studies support Healy’s assertion that 
regulatory systems attract and construct the model of donor and donation implied by 
the system – payment attracts donors who articulate their motivations as (at least 
partly) financial; identity-release systems attract and create donors who feel, at least 
neutral if not positively, about meeting their offspring. 
 
However, regulatory frameworks are not reliable predictors of the ways donors or 
recipients view and experience bodily donation. As previously described, the 
presence of payments to gamete donors does not necessarily preclude donors from 
describing their donations as gifts (Almeling 2006; 2007). And, as the many 
examples, given in this chapter show, anonymous systems of bodily donation do not 
necessarily create donors and recipients who feel disconnected from one another. As 
well as the qualitative insights offered by Konrad’s and Shaw’s work, several 
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surveys of anonymous egg and sperm donors have found nuanced and varied views 
on contact with donor offspring and recipients. Recent literature reviews of research 
with sperm (Daniels 2007b) and egg donors (Daniels 2007a; Purewal and van den 
Akker 2009) demonstrate that, whilst some anonymous donors stated that they would 
not donate under more open conditions, some would be open to contact with 
offspring. These findings show that legislation does not determine the ways in which 
donation is understood and also suggests that the social norms regarding anonymity 
and disclosure were shifting prior to the introduction of identity-release legislation, 
with openness becoming more acceptable to greater numbers of donors.  
 
In addition to legal regulation, the meaning of bodily donation is shaped by the 
practices of procurement organisations (such as hospitals and tissue banks). Healy 
(2006) argues that we need to analyse the role these social organisations play in 
making bodily donation a logistically, as well as socially, viable act. He writes that 
organ, as well as blood and plasma, procurement organisations play an important role 
in making donation, of a particular kind, logistically and practically possible. The 
activities of organisations which facilitate the transfer of bodily substance play an 
important role in shaping the way those transfers are understood. Applying this 
assertion to blood donation, Waldby et al.’s donor participants often drew on the 
processes of banking, fractioning and distilling of blood by blood banks to account 
for the way in which their blood could become depersonalised (2004: 1469). The 
authors argue that this characteristic of blood donation may, in part, explain why 
blood donors are more likely than organ donors (and their families) to detach from 
their donations, more likely to view them as entirely alienated once extracted. In 
addition, blood donors are geographically and temporally separated from recipients 
whereas organ donors and recipients may be aware that patients in the same hospital 
could (at least theoretically) be the other party in the transplantation (Sharp, 1995).  
 
These findings have implications for this study. Sperm donations are procured via 
masturbation which, whilst being medically risk free, entails social risks of disgust or 
ridicule (Kirkman 2004b; Mohr 2016). In contrast, egg donation is a medically 
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invasive procedure entailing small but not insignificant risks of ovarian hyper-
stimulation and, in rare cases, infection or haemorrhage, as well as some reports of 
increased risk of cancer (Bandera et al. 1995; Ahuja et al. 1996). These medical risks 
and the possibility of women experiencing pain or discomfort have been invoked by 
those who view unpaid egg donation as exploitative (Ahuja, Simons, and Edwards 
1999; Cooper and Waldby 2014). In addition, the HFEA Code of Practice (2012a) 
dictates that donated sperm should be frozen and quarantined for a minimum of six 
months. After this time, the donor should be re-tested for sexually transmitted 
diseases after which time the vials can be released for use in fertility treatment with 
up to ten families. In contrast, eggs tend to be used immediately after retrieval. Egg 
donors are matched with one (sometimes two) recipients who undergo treatment 
concurrently with the donor. These are important factors which I consider when 
explaining my own findings on gamete donors views and experiences. However, I 
wish to emphasise that the way in which these processes are invoked by donors to 
make sense of donation is varied. The processes of procurement and transfer do not 
determine how the donation is understood, but provide discursive resources which 
donors use selectively and creatively to narrate gamete donation as a particular kind 
of gift.  
 
The specific material and symbolic properties of the substance donated is also a 
significant factor shaping how “gifts” of bodily tissues and cells are understood and 
this in part, explains the wide variation in views and experiences of donors and 
recipients. Donations of bodily substance are often accorded a special significance 
due to their close association with the donor as a person. Whilst some people, 
drawing on a Western dualistic (arguably medicalised) discourse of embodiment (see 
Shilling 2003; Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987), make a symbolic disconnection 
between donated substances and the person from whom it originated, others are less 
willing or able to separate the two. However, although no definitive categorisation is 




Medical professionals involved in organ donation appear to adopt a dualistic 
discourse of embodiment when they objectify the organs of deceased donors. 
Interviewed by Sharp, transplant specialists described organs as “mere muscles, 
pumps, filters or bits of flesh” (Sharp 1995, 377). By objectifying bodily tissues, 
medical professionals draw a discursive line between the self and the body. Since the 
person the donor was is no longer here, they have no further need of these “parts.” 
Selfhood is seen to reside elsewhere, perhaps in the mind or soul of that person, now 
passed away.  
 
Some donors and recipients do seem to disassociate themselves from the bodily 
substance donated. Lock found that just under half of the organ recipients she 
interviewed had a very “matter of fact” attitude to organ donation (2002, 310). 
Haddow’s interview study of organ donors’ families in Scotland found some 
expressed quite clear separations between bodies and persons, one participant 
referring to organs as “parts” from a “broken car” (2005, 102). Waldby et al. report 
that approximately half of the Australian blood donors they interviewed considered 
that “blood, once donated, no longer referred to the donor in any meaningful way” 
(Waldby et al. 2004, 1467). The belief that blood bore any personal or moral traits of 
the donor or that these could be transmitted in any way was held only by a small 
group (ibid). In these examples, donors and recipients mobilise a discourse, arguably 
borrowed from Western medicine, to discursively separate themselves (or other 
selves) from their bodies or substance donated. An approach which was also adopted 
at certain points in my participants’ narratives.  
 
However, many studies have also found that donated bodily substances are not so 
alienable from the self.  Instead, bodily substances are often portrayed as a special 
kind of gift, one which is viewed as particularly intimate or personal. The families of 
organ donors may celebrate the possibility that a part of their loved one “lives on” in 
another (Sharp 1995). Similarly, organ recipients sometimes imagine that traits of 
their donor have been passed on through their organ, or as Sharp puts it, experience a 
“transformation of the self” (1995). Valentine’s blood donor participants, for 
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example, described blood donation as “giving away something of yourself” (2005, 
118).  For this reason, they considered blood donation to be a more precious, more 
intimate gift than donations of money or labour. Similarly, Høeyer’s (2002) 
interview participants, who had volunteered to provide blood samples and survey 
information for a Swedish biobank, reported that the giving of blood felt like giving 
something of the self. Although several stated that they understood the equal 
importance of the questionnaire in research terms, they considered the blood a more 
profound contribution.  
 
Because it is more directly and closely associated with the self, the gift of blood has a 
different ethical status from the gift of time and information, implicit in the decision 
to respond to the questionnaire (Høyer 2002). In order to secure ethical approval and 
gain the trust of would-be participants, the private company who wished to conduct 
research using this genetic material/information made it clear that they did not “own” 
the blood. Instead a local (public) university and the county council were appointed 
custodians. Høyer’s (2002) interviews with company staff and contributors to the 
biobank found both emphasised that bodily substances (blood or DNA) should not be 
bought and sold – such a possibility was morally repellent. Company staff were clear 
that they sold information, not blood or genes. My own participants reiterated this 
idea that bodily substances should not be bought and sold as commodities. 
 
The material and symbolic properties of bodily substances influence the extent to 
which they are seen as separate or separable from the person from whom they 
originated. Blood, for example, appears more easily alienable from selves than 
organs. Studies with blood donors and recipients less frequently report feelings of 
“intercorporeality” (Weiss 1999; Waldby et al. 2004). I have already mentioned the 
influence of the way in which blood is processed, stored and redistributed but this 
finding is likely also a product of the material and symbolic properties of each 
substance. Blood is both replenishable and liquid and therefore may represent less of 
a threat to bodily integrity, more easily transferred and incorporated into other selves 
(Waldby et al., 2004: 1469). In contrast, organs, particularly the eyes but also the 
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heart and lungs, seem to carry greater associations with identity than other solid 
organs, such as the liver and kidneys. Donor families sometimes refuse, or consider 
refusing, donations of hearts (Fulton, Fulton, and Simmons 1977) or eyes (Haddow 
2005; Sque and Payne 1996) and recipients more often describe profound 
transformations of identity in relation to heart and lung transplants (Sharp 1995). 
Such symbolism is hugely connected to the material properties of these organs. A 
person’s eyes are a visible aspect of their appearance, part of the way they are 
recognisable. Hearts and lungs can be heard working (Sharp, 1995: 372) and we 
experience their functioning more directly than other organs. We can feel if we are 
struggling to breathe or if our heart is beating too fast, whereas we are generally 
unaware of the functioning of our livers or kidneys, except when they fail to work as 
expected. It is therefore unsurprising that recipients would more readily associate 
these kinds of transplants with a “transformation of self” (Sharp 1995).  
 
If we acknowledge that the material and symbolic properties of bodily substances 
impact on the ways in which their transfer is understood, what significance does this 
have for gamete donation? Egg and sperm have distinctive material properties but the 
ways in which these are understood cannot be separated from the gendered social 
contexts in which we construct knowledge about them. Martin’s analysis of medical 
textbooks and journals demonstrates how supposedly factual accounts of gametes 
import gender stereotypes. She shows how sperm and egg are imbued with masculine 
and feminine properties, the former depicted as an active “hero” on a mission to find 
the passive egg, described in one memorable example as “a dormant bride, awaiting 
her mate’s magic kiss” (1991, 490). Martin also notes the frequently negative 
depictions of women’s reproductive processes, particularly menstruation, as 
“wasteful” in contrast to awe-inspired narratives of men’s ability to produce millions 
of sperm in each ejaculation. Wheatley’s research in a Danish sperm bank 
demonstrates how donors import these gendered stereotypes into their narratives of 
sperm donation, referring to their sperm as “good soldiers” facing the battlefield of 




Martin’s and Wheatley’s studies demonstrate that we cannot think about the material 
properties of gametes as distinct from their social-symbolic meanings. That said, I do 
not wish to deny that egg and sperm have physical properties and that these are likely 
to shape the ways in which donors make sense of donation. Sperm is replenishable 
whereas the number of eggs produced by a woman, though very large, is finite and 
established by birth. In my analysis, I consider how and why donors reference these 
material properties in order to negotiate their role as donors. The point is that 
whether and how such properties are made to matter will be shaped by the gendered 
social worlds in which donation takes place.  
 
Clearly of huge significance to this project is the fact that, under particular 
circumstances, egg and sperm have the potential to create (genetically related) new 
life. In the next half of the chapter I look at the social significance of gametes as a 
procreative substance. 
 
The social significance of “biological” or “genetic” connections 
I now turn my attention to the cultural significance of sperm and eggs as procreative 
substances and transmitters of genetic information. Drawing on anthropological, 
sociological and socio-legal literature, I explore the relationship “biology” and 
“genetics” have with our understandings and experiences of family.  
 
Since the 1990s, sociology of the family and anthropology of kinship have taken, 
what has been referred to, as a “relational” turn. The new kinship/family studies 
begin from people’s everyday experiences. For this group of researchers, “family” is 
something we do rather than something we automatically are, according to some pre-
ordained structure. Families are continually constituted and re-constituted through 
(often every day, even mundane) “family practices” (Morgan 1996), which include 
both discursive work and non-verbal action. In this project, I assume the same model 
of family or kinship; I explore how the donors themselves define and enact family. I 
do not assume that “biology” or “genetics” automatically create a particular social 
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relationship between donors and any donor offspring. That said, I am not suggesting 
that people are somehow “free” to create and discontinue personal relationships just 
as they choose (as Giddens 1992 and; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2015 seem to 
imply). Following critics of the individualisation thesis
6
 (for example Jamieson 1999; 
Smart and Shipman 2004), I recognise that the construction of kinship is a relational, 
interactive process, which is negotiated with others, in the context of legal, cultural 
and material pressures. The procreative properties of the gametes and associated 
discourses of the “biological” and “genetic” therefore have to be negotiated by 
donors and, as the following review demonstrates, such properties are intricately 
linked with Euro-American beliefs about kinship, although not in any straightforward 
way. 
 
My analysis has been informed by Edwards and Strathern’s (2000) theorisation of 
English kinship. In “Including our own,” the authors argue that, for the English, 
kinship claims may be mobilised with references to discourses of the “biological” or 
the “social” or, to put it another way, through “being born” or “being bred” (Edwards 
2000).  Depending on the context, people may reference either or both discourse in 
constructing kinship connections. One may be used to reinforce the other or they 
may be played off against one another. So biological ties may be strengthened by 
social links or diluted or negated by their absence. In some ways, this theory is 
similar to a model of American kinship proposed several decades earlier by David 
Schneider (1968). He argues that kinship, as a symbolic system, is characterised by 
the distinction between “code” and “substance” (1968: 25). Relatives can be defined 
via the domain of nature or substance, law or code-for-conduct or both. However, as 
I will go on to demonstrate, the new kinship studies have gone beyond Schneider’s 
model in important ways. 
 
                                                 
6
 I use the term “individualisation thesis” here, in a similar way to Jamieson (1999) and Smart and 
Shipman (2004), to refer to a body of (almost entirely theoretical) work in Sociology (see Bauman 
2003; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2015; Giddens 1992) which argues that personal relationships in 
late modernity are increasingly fluid and fragile, subject to the choices and desires of individuals. 
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Edwards and Strathern’s (2000) theorisation of kinship rings true when we examine 
research on the users of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) in the UK and 
other Western contexts. So, for example, qualitative research with (largely 
anonymous) gamete donors has found that they tend to play down their genetic 
connection with offspring and emphasise the importance of intention and care in 
defining the “real” parents (Konrad 2005; Kirkman 2008; Kirkman 2004a; Kirkman 
2004b; Riggs and Scholz 2011; Orobitg and Salazar 2005; Mohr 2015; Wheatley 
2016). Donors compared their contribution, “a few cells” (Kirkman 2003, 7), with 
the nurturance involved in gestating and caring for a baby in order to make it clear 
that these were not their children. Another common finding was that, for donors, 
kinship was not dependent on biology. As an Australian sperm donor interviewed by 
Riggs and Scholz explains, “my biological relationship to any child that could be 
born was largely irrelevant” (2011, 54). These studies would all suggest that, in 
relationship to kinship, particularly parenthood, whether “biology” matters (or not) is 
highly context dependent. 
 
However, to really make sense of how kinship is constructed in these contexts, we 
need to account for the discursive nature of this “biology” - which may or may not 
matter. This is where the new kinship studies move beyond Schneider’s model of 
kinship (1968). Schneider argued that, people’s statements about “substance” or 
“blood,” refer to a Western folk understandings of the biological facts of human 
reproduction (Collier and Yanagisako 1987; Carsten 2004): “Blood” ties are 
“whatever the biogenetic relationship is…whatever science discovers” (Schneider 
1968, 23). More recent studies have shown that the relationship between 
categorisations of “biological” or “blood” and our understandings of the scientific 
“facts” of reproduction is far from straightforward. In practice, as demonstrated in a 
recent collection of ethnographic work, the processes and substances categorised as 
“biological” or “blood” are broad and indeterminate (Edwards and Salazar 2009, 12).  
 
Thompson’s (2001; 2005) ethnographic study of a US fertility clinic documents a 
process of “strategic naturalising” whereby particular aspects of biology are selected 
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as relevant or not in defining kin. She focusses on more complex uses of 
reproductive technologies, involving various combinations of surrogacy, IVF, sperm 
and egg donation. She found that those involved (whether as future social parents, 
donors or surrogates), included or excluded different processes and substances from 
the category of “biological” and therefore as relevant to the creation of kin, 
dependent on their particular circumstances. For example, those using gestational 
surrogates would emphasise their biological genetic connection to the child, whilst 
those using gamete donors would emphasise their biological, and therefore 
emotional, connection to the foetus via pregnancy (Thompson 2001, 180). Her 
participants concurrently de-emphasised genetic or gestational connections which did 
not reinforce the position of the intended parents as the “real” parents, particularly 
where this might imply kinship relationships that were potentially difficult to 
negotiate or had incestuous connotations (Thompson, 2001).  
 
On several occasions, participants also “naturalised” what would ordinarily be 
perceived as social factors, creating a “biological” connection with the child who 
would be conceived. For example, Thompson describes how choosing a donor with a 
similar upbringings, ethnicity, religion or appearance to the intended parent could be 
used by recipients to construct “biological” connections with a potential child (2001, 
180). These examples from Thompson's ethnography could be perceived as unique 
case – an unusual reaction to an unusual situation. For those of us not in that 
situation, it perhaps seems clear that these things are not biological at all. That is 
precisely why these findings are so intriguing. However, Thompson's work actually 
highlights a more pervasive ambiguity about what is categorised as “natural” or 
‘biological.’ 
 
Pregnancy is perhaps the best example of a reproductive process portrayed as both 
biological and social. In Bestard’s (2009) research, a Spanish woman who used ova 
donation to conceive spoke about the importance of pregnancy as a means of passing 
on substance to her child and so identifying herself in her child: “Therefore the child 
resembles her and she thinks in terms of continuity” (Bestard 2009, 25). The 
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biological significance of pregnancy is here emphasised and the boundaries between 
gestation and genetic endowment are blurred 
 
In contrast, Ragoné’s (1994) ethnographic study of surrogacy in the USA shows how 
surrogates de-emphasise the biological significance of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not 
seen to confer a “natural” bond with the child. Instead the social context to their 
pregnancy is emphasised, particularly the desire of the commissioning parents to 
have a child, their future nurturance and the concept of gift-giving (Ragoné, 1994: 
76). The surrogates she interviewed typically stated that they were “only carrying the 
baby” (1994, 76), depicting themselves as vessels for the biological substances of 
others. Teman’s (2003) research on surrogacy in Israel similarly shows how 
surrogates draw on the medical manipulation of their bodies to construct these 
pregnancies as “artificial,” in comparison with previous (or imagined) “natural” 
gestation of their own children. Referencing the injections of hormones, designed to 
“supress [their own] biological system,” prior to the implantation of an embryo, 
surrogates presented their own bodies, including the hormones they subsequently 
produced during pregnancy, as temporarily “artificial.” Such artificial bodies were 
not seen to give rise to the “natural” maternal feelings they usually associated with 
pregnancy.  
 
Arguably, the use of new reproductive technologies increases the opportunity for 
selective “biologisation” in the construction of kinship since the reproductive process 
is now increasingly fragmented. That fragmentation may occur through the 
experience of IVF in which conception is portrayed as an “obstacle course” in which 
ova production, extraction, fertilisation and implantation are seen as achievements in 
themselves (Franklin 1997, 107). Fragmentation may also occur through the division 
of reproductive tasks between multiple persons, for example donors, surrogates, 
medical staff as well as the intended social parents (Konrad 2005). Different parts of 
the reproductive process can therefore be emphasised or de-emphasised for different 
purposes. Many authors have also argued that the rapid development of reproductive 
technologies creates increased ambiguity about what is now considered “natural” 
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(Franklin, Lury, and Stacey 2000; Franklin 2001; Haraway 1991). Franklin, for 
example, describes how IVF technology is “naturalised” as just a “helping hand” to 
nature and comparisons drawn between the uncertainty of unassisted and assisted 
reproduction (1997, 94).  
 
The examples I have cited so far would seem to suggest that supposedly biological 
ties can be explained away – dismissed as unimportant in relation to social ties or 
constructed as artificial and therefore irrelevant from a kinship perspective. 
Certainly, the donors I interviewed activated selected processes which they defined 
as “natural” or “biological” (such as gestation) and screened out others (their genetic 
contribution) when it came to assigning parenthood. However, for the donors I 
interviewed, as well as “non-biological” parents, the everyday reality is often not so 
unconstrained. In our constructions of kinship, “nature” seems to have a privileged 
position. Biological ties are presumed to be automatic and enduring. Even where the 
quality of the relationship may be poor, they can never be entirely terminated. As 




This privileging of “biological” ties and the limits of strategic naturalising are 
evident in discourses surrounding adoption. A recent literature review of the social 
scientific literature on adoption found it was still often framed as a “last alternative” 
for those experiencing infertility to become parents (Fisher 2003; see also Logan 
2013). As Judith Modell (1994) argues, adoption rests on a paradox. Whilst the 
“legal fiction” of adoptive kinship would seem to challenge a biogenetic basis for 
kinship, since the adopting parents are configured “as if” they were the biological 
parents, the biological framework is upheld. This finding that the biological remains 
the “frame of reference” is reiterated in Signe Howell’s (2006) ethnography of 
transnational adoption by Norwegians. For the adoptive parents she interviewed, a 
                                                 
7
 Examples of children divorcing their parents are perhaps the exception that proves the rule, 
notable for their rarity and seen to go against the “natural” order of things.   
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lack of biological relatedness remained something to be overcome in the process of 
“kinning” their adopted children.  
 
There are parallels here with research with users of reproductive technologies, 
including recipients of donated gametes, for whom bio-genetic parenthood often 
remains the frame of reference. Studies have found that, for couples who are 
involuntarily childless, their primary aim is to have a child who is bio-genetically 
related to both intended parents. IVF, ICSI and AI are therefore generally preferred 
and attempted first, before donor-assisted conception or adoption (Becker 2000; 
Melhuus 2012; Logan 2013). When donated gametes are used, recipients emphasise 
that genetics are irrelevant to their own family relationships but they often also frame 
the lack of genetic connection with their child as something “missing” (Hargreaves 
2006; Grace and Daniels 2007; Nordqvist and Smart 2014). Nordqvist’s (2016) 
research found that non-genetic parents sometimes tried to “make up” for this 
lacking in other ways (i.e. by being a particularly involved father). Nordqvist and 
Smart’s (2014) UK study found that genetic parents sometimes described feeling 
guilty for the (secret) pleasure they took in their genetic connectedness to their 
children, which their partners could not participate in. A similar commitment to 
equality is also evident in Melhuus’ ethnographic research with Norwegian couples 
who identified as involuntarily childless. Many of her participants opted for 
transnational adoption over DI as means of becoming parents. However this decision 
did not imply an outright rejection of the biological as a basis to kinship but instead 
reflected a belief that the child should belong equally to both parents (in line with a 
model of 50:50 genetic contribution), with biological or genetic ties being a key way 
in which such belonging could be constructed. (Melhuus 2012, 43).  
 
Research with users of DI have found that, by virtue of their “biological” connection 
to offspring, the donor is often perceived as a threat to the status of the non-genetic 
parent (Becker 2000; Hargreaves 2006). Becker’s (2000) North American 
heterosexual participants sometimes feared a future scenario in which a donor would 
make a parental claim on their child. The lesbian and heterosexual recipients in 
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Nordqvist and Smart’s (2014) study were generally less explicit and the authors use 
one participant’s description of “ghostly” to describe the presence the donor had in 
their lives - something which could be experienced as unsettling or odd. Nordqvist 
(2010) argues that “matching” practices, whereby a donor is selected for their 
physical resemblance to the non-genetic parent, is one way of managing this threat, 
not necessarily by attempting to “pass” as a genetic family but by making the donor 
“less visible” in everyday life. These findings are highly relevant to my own study 
since my donor participants were acutely aware of the symbolic threat they might 
present to their recipients.  
 
“Biological” connections seem to have particular cultural purchase because they are 
associated with that which is given, rather than that which is made. As Carsten 
(2004) highlights, the division between nature and culture, has heightened 
significance in the West. Here, discourses of the “biological” or the “natural” have 
particular rhetorical value. Strathern argues that “cross-referencing” is used 
habitually in Euro-America, drawing on taken for granted “facts” to justify particular 
social arrangements (1992b, 18). “Naturalising” is perhaps the most powerful means 
of cross-referencing; since nature is presumed to pre-exist society, it is 
unquestionable and unchangeable. Nature is equated with a given reality, culture 
with the uncertain and the changeable (Strathern 1992a). This cultural opposition of 
social action and permanence is perhaps most clearly evidenced in Modell’s (1994) 
analysis of adoption narratives shared with adoptees. She found that the narrative, 
commonly used at the time by social workers and adoptive parents, that the adopted 
person was special because they had been “chosen,” was problematic for adoptees. 
For adopted persons, being “chosen” implied that they could be “unchosen” and thus 
undermined the sense of permanence which they linked to “real” kinship.  
 
The association of “biological” relationships with endurance over time can also be 
seen in the narratives of adopted children who describe the need to meet or find out 
about their birth parents in order to connect themselves to the past. For example, 
many of the American adoptees interviewed by Modell (1994) reported a “gap” in 
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their life story (and therefore sense of self) because they did not know where they 
had come from. Similarly, adoptees interviewed by March (1995) in Canada talked 
about the importance of being able to place themselves in genealogical continuity. 
The importance of “knowing where [they] came from” was repeatedly emphasised in 
Carsten’s interviews with UK adopted persons who had been reunited with their birth 
parents, a phrase that was also used frequently by my own interviewees. As Carsten 
(2000b; 2004, 146–53) explains, the desire to “know” their birth parents was valued, 
even if the relationship turned out to be poor, because they provided a sense of 
continuity between past, present and future. Knowing their birth parents provided a 
means for adopted persons to anchor themselves in time, overcoming the “rupture” to 
“kinship time” represented by adoption practices. Occasions where the birth mother 
or father had already died before they were contacted caused profound trauma partly 
because they reinforced this “dislocation” (Carsten 2000b). 
 
However, whilst permanence, or “fixity”, to borrow Mason’s (2008) term, is 
perceived to be an important facet of what distinguishes kinship relationships from 
other kinds of relationships, the “biological” is not the only discursive basis on which 
it can be constructed. As Mason argues, a sense of “fixity” may be established in 
other ways. She gives the example of parents’ friends – our relationships with these 
“aunties” and “uncles” may feel fixed because they are chosen for us, by our parents. 
Building on Mason’s work, Davies (2011) has suggested that shared surnames are 
referenced by children as a means of establishing these “fixed affinities” between 
themselves and others, representing a formal, quasi-legal, link between persons. 
Davies’ work reflects a finding from research with adoptive parents and children; for 
these groups, the legal status of their relationship was crucial to establishing this 
feeling of permanence (Logan 2013; Jones and Hackett 2011; 2012). Logan (2013) 
finds that this legal status was particularly important for adopters in more open 
adoptions. Once they were legally established as the parent(s), they felt more 
confident facilitating and managing contact with the birth family because their status 




Research with gay and lesbian people also shows that a sense of fixity can be 
achieved via other “non-biological” means and challenges the discursive dichotomy 
between chosen/given and impermanence/permanence. Weston's (1991) 
ethnographic work detailing the “chosen families” of San Francisco’s gay and 
lesbian communities suggests these families, formed through friendships and mutual 
aid, were seen to be more enduring than their families of origin. Weston’s informants 
contrasted the sense of endurance felt in relation to their chosen family, with the 
fragility of their families of origin, in which many of their relationships had faltered 
or collapsed due to homophobic prejudices.  
 
Weston’s ethnography demonstrates that the association between “biological” 
kinship and permanence better reflects ideology than experience. In many cases, as 
with Weston’s participants, reality fails to live up to our expectations and it is when 
this expectation is not met that its ideological force can be seen most clearly. This 
gap between ideology and experience is evident in Carsten’s study of adult adoptees 
who had experienced reunions with their biological mothers. These relationships, 
often between two very different adults, were frequently characterised by formality 
and had a “doomed quality about them.” In part due to the “excess of demands on 
one side or both (2000b, 149). Here, genetic closeness and the expectation of kinship 
is uncomfortably at odds with emotional distance. Finkler (2000) reports a similar 
“gap” when American patients seek out genetic kin for the purposes of obtaining a 
genetic family history. She describes the experience of one participant who felt guilty 
for approaching her aunt for a blood sample as a means of obtaining a genetic family 
history since the request highlighted the fact that they had lost touch (Finkler 2000, 
69). Finkler suggests that these medical kinship links can be profoundly alienating 
since they emphasis the “gap between their experience and their genetic identity” 
(2000, 209). 
 
The examples from Carsten and Finkler’s studies suggest that our cultural conflation 
of “nature” with permanence can make genetic ties difficult to screen out. Our 
expectations that biological ties should be automatic and enduring can weigh heavily 
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when they do not reflect the way we “do”, or wish to, “do family.” This is also 
evident in previous research with gamete donors. Speirs (2008) conducted in-depth 
interviews with fourteen men who donated sperm anonymously in the 1960s, 70s and 
80s. She found that, despite being encouraged to “screen out” the procreative 
consequences of their donation, many continued to feel a connection with their 
imagined offspring. This was often experienced as a curiosity and some did have an 
interest in meeting their offspring (Speirs 2008; 2012). However, many also 
articulated fears about being contacted by their offspring, some imagining that they 
would automatically feel compelled to care for them (financially or emotionally) - 
reactions that could be problematic for themselves, their own families and the parents 
of their donor offspring. Similar fears are reported in Wheatley’s (2016) recent study 
of sperm donors in Denmark. Here, sperm donors can choose to be anonymous or 
identity-release. Those who chose to donate anonymously, and some others who did 
not, described fears of offspring “imposing” themselves, either financially or 
emotionally. Whilst such impositions were usually described as illegitimate by 
donors (they emphasised that, without a pre-existing relationship with the mother, 
they could not be the “real” father), their partners often perceived that they, as 
donors, did owe something to their offspring – that they had an “emotional debt” to 
their genetic children. 
 
It would, however, be too simplistic to say that gamete donors always perceive their 
connection to offspring as something to be feared or discouraged. Sometimes 
connections with offspring are actively constructed or celebrated. In a study of 
anonymous egg donors in Spain, Orobitg and Salazar (2005) report that, whilst 
attempting to frame their donations in a medical or scientific discourse as “just 
genes,” this process was never entirely complete. The babies that they imagined 
would result from their donated eggs were never entirely not “theirs” (2005, 47). For 
example, the authors describe one case where donating eggs was a way to (in some 
sense) have another child despite not being able to afford to raise another. In a 
similar vein, despite making clear that genetics did not constitute family, some 
Australian sperm donors interviewed by Riggs and Scholz (2011), perceived 
donation as a way of leaving a genetic legacy. Several studies have also suggested 
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that gamete donors feel, or imagine they would feel, a responsibility towards any 
child conceived. For example, many of Konrad’s (2005) egg donor participants 
imagined strikingly similar scenarios, in the donor-conceived child was orphaned and 
they then felt obliged and willing to care for that child. Studies have shown that both 
sperm and egg donors (Riggs and Scholz 2011; Kirkman 2004b; Mohr 2015; Konrad 
2005) perceive benefits for offspring in being able to find out about or contact them. 
In some cases, donors therefore suggested that “responsible” donors should be open 
to such possibilities, however, often such contact was seen as emotionally 
problematic. In other cases, donors suggested that separation was necessary in order 
to retain the belief that their donor offspring were not their children (Konrad 2005; 
Speirs 2008). These studies suggest that, even where it is encouraged (arguably 
enforced) by systems of anonymity, screening out the social significance of genetic 
substance is not always entirely possible in practice, and is not necessarily desired by 
donors.  
 
I should highlight that none of these qualitative studies were conducted with those 
donating in the context of identity-release legislation. All have been conducted in 
jurisdictions which, at the time, upheld the rights of donors to anonymity, although 
two included known donors in their samples (Riggs and Scholz 2011; Kirkman 
2004a; Kirkman 2004b; Kirkman 2003). Mohr’s (2015) and Wheatley’s (2016) 
research in Denmark are the only studies to include those donating as “identity-
release” donors. However, Danish regulations allow donors to choose whether or not 
to remain anonymous. This is a significant difference with the ethic of openness in 
the UK context. As the first half of this chapter demonstrated, legal regulations and 
clinic practices are an important factor shaping the meaning of bodily donation. We 
therefore cannot assume that the experiences of those donating in contexts which 
uphold anonymity will reflect those of men and women donating in contexts where 
the rights of donor-conceived offspring to identity their donor are enshrined in law. It 
would be expected (and my own findings confirm) that identity-release donors are 
unlikely to report significant fears about contact from offspring, because they should 




The continued ideal of the two-parent family  
So far I have demonstrated that “biology” is a flexible category, creatively used (or 
not) in Euro-American constructions of kinship. I have shown that “nature” is 
culturally associated with permanence which gives it a high discursive value in 
constructing our family but, although the ideological connection between genetics 
and kinship may be hard to entirely screen out, fixity and family can be achieved in 
other ways. At first reading, this all sounds very radical. As some have argued, the 
nature/culture dichotomy is being destabilised and the concept of the “biological” as 
a straightforward basis to kinship is being challenged (Strathern 1992b; 1992a; 
Franklin 2003). However, as Franklin (1990) has previously highlighted, despite 
their transgressive potential, reproductive technologies are most often used in ways 
which presume a biologically-related, two-parent “nuclear family” as the most 
appropriate way to raise children.  
 
Sheldon argues that the first HFE Act (1990) can be read as a “strong moral 
statement of the importance of the nuclear family and the imperative that each child 
should have one (and only one) father and mother” (2005, 527). Citing evidence in 
the law itself and the parliamentary debates which preceded the implementation of 
the act, she demonstrates how donor-assisted conception was legitimised, but only 
under conditions which maintained the appearance of a hetero-normative “nuclear” 
family. Parliamentary debates emphasised marriage as the ideal context in which to 
raise children and heterosexual, “stable” relationships as a satisfactory second-best. 
The 1990 Act was clear that a child may have only one legal mother (always the 
gestational mother) and one legal father (her husband or partner) and instructed 
medical practitioners to consider any potential child’s “need for a father.” Sheldon 
(2005) suggests this “need” be interpreted as symbolic, a means of reproducing the 
image of the heterosexual, nuclear family, rather than practical or material for a 
second provider, since a same-sex partner would be able to provide for the latter. The 
first HFE Act also provided anonymity for gamete donors which Sheldon suggests 
enabled the legal and social production of donor-conceived families who appear “as 
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if” they were achieved without the help of a donor. Haimes’ (1993) analysis of the 
Warnock report (1984), which preceded and informed the HFE Act 1990 and her 
interviews with committee members found that donor anonymity was justified as a 
means of avoiding emotional and legal complications for both donors and recipients, 
but was deemed particularly important with regard to sperm donors who were 
described as a potential “invasion of [a] third party into the family” (p.86).  
 
In 2008, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was updated. In many 
ways the 2008 changes appear progressive and seem to challenge the dominance of 
the nuclear family ideal. However, these changes are far from revolutionary (Gamble 
and Ghevaert 2009) and the legal frameworks which govern their use remain quite 
conservative in many ways.  As McCandless and Sheldon (2010) have argued, the 
model of “the sexual family” (Fineman 1995) remains relatively unquestioned as the 
ideal institution in which to raise children. These legal amendments allow, for the 
first time, the female partner of the women undertaking treatment to be named as a 
co-parent on the birth certificate. For those in civil partnerships this is automatic, as 
it is for husbands. For unmarried partners (male or female) both partners must give 
written consent in order for them to be named as the second parent. In theory, the 
mother can also name a friend or acquaintance as a parent (with their consent); they 
do not, in theory, need to be in a sexual relationship.  
 
Whilst on the face of it these changes seem to challenge the nuclear family model 
and heteronormativity, McCandless and Sheldon (2010) demonstrate that two 
important assumptions went relatively unquestioned throughout the parliamentary 
process of amendment. These assumptions reinforce the model of a sexual family 
consisting of a couple in a romantic relationship and their children. The first of these 
assumptions is that there should be a maximum of two “real” parents. Whilst the 
benefits of having two parents rather than one were debated in parliament, the 
possibility of a legal third parent was not discussed (McCandless and Sheldon 2010, 
191). McCandless and Sheldon write that, “the two parent model retains a grip on the 
law which appears to have outlived any inevitable relationship between legal 
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parenthood and either biological fact or marital convention” (2010, 191) (A similar 
argument is made by Wallbank (2002) in her analysis of UK surrogacy laws). 
McCandless and Sheldon argue that the hold of the two parent ideal is linked to the 
idea of “parental dimorphism” – the mother and father roles are seen as 
fundamentally different but complementary (2010, 193).  
 
The second assumption underlying the legal changes is that these two parents ought 
to be, at least potentially if not actually, in a sexual relationship. Married or civil 
partners of the woman undergoing treatment have “first shot” at obtaining legal 
parenthood (ibid: 197). The status provisions for men and women to become 
recognised as parents through prior consent were clearly designed to cater for 
unmarried couples (ibid: 198) but, as I have said, are not actually restricted to those 
in sexual relationship (obviously it would be quite difficult to actually enforce any 
such restriction). However, it is limited to those who might potentially be in a sexual 
relationship; those for whom such a relationship would be prohibited under incest 
legislation (i.e. siblings or a parent and child) may not be named as co-parents. Those 
involved in the law making process were unable to explain why this provision had 
been included beyond “the idea of something not quite being right about a mother 
and daughter raising a child together” (ibid: 198). In fact, as McCandless and 
Sheldon (2010) highlight, such arrangements may be common in practice – perhaps 
if a girl were to have a child at a young age, her own parents might also take on a 
parental role. The provision of this clause therefore shows the extent to which the 
sexual family model is ingrained.  
 
An emerging role for third parents 
As I demonstrate in my analysis, the entrenchment of this two-parent model shapes 
how donors negotiate their role in relation to offspring and recipients. However, 
there is some evidence that the legal and cultural purchase of the two parent model 
might be waning. Sheldon (2005) writes that judges in complex cases of family law 
have been increasingly willing to “fragment fatherhood” in the new millennium, by 
assigning parental status outside of the nuclear family in which a child is intended to 
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be raised. Sheldon argues that judges have recently conceptualised genetic fathers (or 
knowledge about them) as important identity-resources, and increasingly articulate 
the belief that a genetic father figure need not threaten the status of the social father, 
and may even “serve to cement and protect relationships within one's social family” 
(2005, 551). Although the law is clear that gamete donors have no parental rights and 
responsibilities, we might interpret the introduction of identity-release legislation in 
2005 as part of this wider trend toward seeing genetic parents as resources who 
might support both offspring and their social families.  
 
These recent judgements and legislative changes are arguably part of a wider 
idealisation of openness and a tendency towards viewing secrets, particularly “family 
secrets” as undesirable and corrosive of personal relationships. Smart (2007; 2009; 
2010) argues that there is now a legal presumption that it is best for a child to know 
his or her genetic origins. In the case of adoption and assisted reproduction, it is 
increasingly frowned upon to mislead children about their genetic origins because 
such knowledge is seen to be necessary to the child’s ontological security (Carsten 
2000b; Smart 2009; Melhuus and Howell 2009; Melhuus 2012; Klotz 2013). We 
might view recent calls for donor-assisted conceptions to be recorded on birth 
certificates (see Blyth et al. 2009) as part of this push towards genetic truth-telling. 
Smart (2009) links this moral attachment to truth-telling in personal relationships to 
an ideal of the  “pure relationship” in which intimacy is created through mutual 
revelations of ones “true” self (Giddens 1992). Whilst Smart herself is critical of the 
growing tendency for courts to impose such simplistic “genetic truths” on complex 
social relationships, I do not enter into such debates here. Instead I use her work to 
illustrate the idealisation of openness as part of the cultural context in which donors 
make sense of their role.   
 
Accounts of donor-conceived individuals on the importance of knowing their 
biological identity have both led to, and been shaped by, this ethic of openness. Since 
the new millennium, several studies with donor-conceived children and adults have 
been published (Turner and Coyle 2000; Hewitt 2002; Scheib, Riordan, and Rubin 
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2005; Jadva et al. 2010). This research shows that knowledge about, or contact with 
donor parents, is often articulated as beneficial in order to make sense of their own 
identity. However, the information deemed identity-relevant is not limited to 
knowledge about genetic inheritance, in the strictest sense, but also includes access 
to narrative information about donors’ lives and the ability to construct lateral ties 
with donor-related half siblings. It should be noted that often participants in these 
studies have been recruited via online platforms for donor-conceived individuals to 
discuss their experiences and/or find donor-related connections. It is therefore likely 
that the findings are biased towards those for whom being donor-conceived is 
significant and who are interested in meeting their donor parents. For my own 
purposes, this is not a significant limitation since I am interested in these accounts as 
part the causes and effects of the new ethics of openness and therefore part of the 
social context in which my participants donated.   
 
The first published research on the experiences of being donor-conceived used semi-
structured questionnaires to investigate the experiences of sixteen adult offspring, 
conceived via DI (Turner and Coyle 2000). The authors report frequently negative 
experiences of being donor conceived, often including feelings of betrayal by their 
parents, which were associated with late or shock disclosure of their donor-conceived 
status (see also Klotz 2016). Many respondents described a need to find out more 
about the donor in order to understand their own identity, one respondent wrote, “I 
needed to know who I was and how I came to be” (Turner and Coyle 2000, 2046). 
Some imagined that they would have much in common with their donor and might 
feel close to them if they met. The authors suggest that, in the absence of any 
information about them, donor offspring fantasise about their donor.  
 
More positive experiences and family relationships are generally reported by donor 
offspring who know about the circumstances of their conception from an earlier age 
(Hewitt 2002; Scheib, Riordan, and Rubin 2005). However, these studies continue to 
emphasise the importance of information about, and/or contact with donors, as an 
important source of identity-related information. Hewitt’s (2002) questionnaire study 
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of DI offspring, aged 11-59, found that 42, of a total of 47, respondents sought 
information about their donors (with two having already made contact). Many (33) 
reported that, without this information or contact, a piece of their identity was 
missing. They often sought information about their genetic and medical histories. 
However, Hewitt also reports an interest in their donors’ social histories. As she puts 
it, they were interested in “knowing their donor as a person” (2002, 6). Scheib et al.’s 
(2005) more recent research with the adolescent offspring of identity-release donors 
in the USA confirms Hewitt’s findings. Their analysis of 29 questionnaire responses 
found that the vast majority planned to pursue contact in the future with many 
believing that knowing more about the donor would help them to learn more about 
themselves.  
 
The survey methodology allows little opportunity to analyse why and how 
information about, or contact with, donors is seen to be identity-relevant. 
Ravelingien et al.’s (2013) addresses this knowledge gap, analysing direct quotations 
from donor offspring, published in academic studies and in literature published by 
donor conception support groups. The authors find very varied explanations about 
why information about, or contact with, donors was relevant to “who they are.” 
Whilst some of these explanations employ deterministic understandings of the 
relationship between genes and identity, others are more nuanced about the role of 
genes or may emphasise the donor’s role in providing narrative information. So for 
example, whilst some citations reported a belief that their donor’s genes constituted 
literally half of their identity, others described a milder curiosity about the donor as a 
source of genetic clues about why they were the way they were or who they might 
become in the future. Others talked about a desire to map out their ancestral history 
or complete their life history by finding out more about the donor and the 
circumstances in which they donated. Interestingly, Ravelingien et al. (2013) 
describe how this information, whether narrative or genetic in character, could be 
perceived as important, not only to the individual donor-conceived person, but also 
to their children and future generations. The authors also identify the desire to 
“‘connect’ with one’s natural roots” (2013, 260) as a motivating factor. In this sense, 
offspring saw their donor as someone who they might provide them with a sense of 
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belonging and with whom might develop a meaningful relationship, occasionally 
characterised as a father-child type relationship.  
 
Several studies, including a recent literature review (Blyth et al. 2012), have found 
that donor-conceived individuals also value information about, or contact with, their 
donors as a means of making further connections beyond this relationship, 
particularly with half siblings (Jadva et al. 2010; Kirkman 2004a; Blyth 2012). Of 
these, Kirkman’s (2004a) and Blyth’s (2012) qualitative interview studies 
demonstrate what is deemed valuable about these connections. Some sought this 
information as a means of avoiding consanguineal relationships, some imagined they 
might develop friendships with donor half siblings or that they would feel an affinity 
if they were to meet (Kirkman 2004a). As Blyth (2012) explains, these relationships 
provided a space in which to reflect on the relevance of genetic inheritance to their 
relationships, whilst also exercising agency over when and how such things mattered. 
For example, donor siblings were often interested in identifying physical and 
behavioural resemblances between one another (Kirkman 2004a). However, as 
Blyth’s participants explained, they were aware that they perhaps saw these physical 
resemblances precisely because they were looking for them. 
 
The concept of agency is also emphasised in Klotz’s (2013; 2016) study of donor 
conception in the UK, Germany and, to a lesser extent, the USA. As part of this 
study, she learned about (sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly) the experiences 
of six donor-conceived adults and young people who had been conceived with sperm 
from anonymous donors. Her participants also reported the desire to find out about or 
contact their donor relatives as a means of “completing” their sense of self. However, 
she warns against interpreting such statements as evidence of geneticisation of 
identity or kinship (see, for example, Ettorre, Katz Rothman, and Lynn Steinberg 
2006; Finkler, Skrzynia, and Evans 2003). Echoing Carsten’s (2000b) research with 
adult adoptees, she instead suggests that donor-conceived people seek such 
information as a means of exerting agency, which had been previously undermined 
by the late or shock discovery that their conception had not taken place as they had 
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previously assumed. Searching and finding, what Klotz terms, these “wayward 
relations” is means of asserting their own agency – a process which could be 
comforting and reassuring in itself, not necessarily as a means of forming new 
kinship relationships.  
 
Of course what is missing from these accounts are the voices of the donors and any 
sense of how these relationships might be negotiated between these actors, in the 
context of wider family networks. These studies tells us what donor offspring 
imagine they might gain from contact with, or information about, their donor. The 
stories about being donor-conceived therefore constitute part of the emotional 
reasoning behind moves towards openness in donor-conception (an argument that my 
own participants very much subscribed to). However, these studies don’t really give 
us a sense of how relationships or communications with donors might play out; How 
exactly do donors go about, or imagine they might go about, providing this kind of 
identity-relevant information and what kinds of challenges might it throw up? How is 
donor-parenthood negotiated? This is a question my own study seeks to address.  
 
Negotiating “donor” parenthood 
My own study contributes to a small but growing body of literature in which donor 
parenthood, though clearly distinguished from “real” parenthood, is attributed social 
significance. In the following examples, “biological” connections between donors 
and their offspring are made socially meaningful, though not in ways which map 
onto pre-existing kinship relationships. Instead, donors renegotiate the meaning of 
their connection to offspring.  
 
Though I recognise the line is blurred, I distinguish these studies from those with 
donors who have donated in contexts which uphold anonymity, including several 
studies conducted with known donors. These studies were conducted at a time when, 
legally and culturally, donors were not expected to think of their relationship to 
offspring as significant. Although I recognise that many previous anonymous donors 
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either did not want, or were not entirely able, to dismiss this connection, they were 
donating at a time when they had few prospects of meeting or contacting their 
offspring. Organisational practices and legal regulation did not then create the 
discursive and imaginative space offered up by identity-release practices, in which 
donors make sense of their relationship to offspring in new ways. Although known 
egg donation was common prior to 2005, studies with such donors suggest they often 
portrayed their role as “just as if” they had not donated, as an aunty of friend of the 
family (Kirkman 2003; Winter and Daniluk 2004). In these cases, known donors 
continue to screen out the significance of their donation for their relationship to 
offspring.  
 
However, there are some exceptions to this rule. There are more recent cases of 
known donation, for the moment limited to the literature on lesbian couples using DI, 
where donors may seek, and recipients may desire, sperm donors to play some kind 
of role in relation to offspring (Dempsey 2010; 2012; see Nordqvist and Smart 2014; 
Nordqvist 2012; 2014 for perspectives of recipients). Quantitative analysis of online 
sperm donation profiles suggests that male donors in same-sex relationships are more 
likely to seek such arrangements (Riggs and Russell 2011). Dempsey (2010; 2012) 
conducted fifteen interviews with Australian gay men acting as known sperm donors. 
She found that they described their role on a continuum from donor to father figure. 
At the one end were those who saw themselves as (only) a sperm donor and 
expressed little or no interest in their connection to offspring. At the other end, was a 
man who rejected the term “donor” and saw himself as the father (Dempsey 2012, 
164). This man had agreed with the birth mother and her partner that he would be 
known as “dad” from an early age. Although the lesbian couple are the primary 
carers, he has regular contact, including overnight and holidays, makes financial 
contributions to his son’s care and is involved in “big decisions” in the child’s life. 
These two examples are dissimilar to my own findings in the sense that they either 
activate or deactivate the significance of their genetic connection to offspring. At one 
extreme of the continuum, genetic connections are screened out. At the other, genetic 





For my own purposes, the most interesting cases are the two “in-between” examples 
on the continuum Dempsey proposes. In these two case studies, we see how the 
meaning of genetic relatedness is dynamic, negotiated and sometimes overtly 
contested. Philip initially used the term “uncle” to highlight both the permanent yet 
flexible character of his role (Dempsey 2012, 162). An uncle, he explains, is a life-
long, genetic connection but, socially, can be very close or very distant. However, 
Philip went on to explain how his relationship with the child gradually grew closer. 
When his donor-conceived son began calling him “daddy” at age five, he describes 
easily accommodating this transformation of his role and now sees the boy once a 
week and attends events at his school.  
 
Dempsey’s final case study emphasises the interactive and ongoing nature of these 
kinship negotiations because, in this example, genetic relatedness has varied 
significance to the key actors involved. Michael describes his relationship with his 
donor offspring as “more like a sperm donor than a father” but, he explains, this is in 
accordance with the wishes of the recipient couple rather than his own (2012, 166). 
He was aware of the role the couple expected of him at the time of donation but felt 
he had no other options to pursue fatherhood, or something like it. Michael has made 
his offspring a beneficiary in his will and is hopeful that, in time, he will be able to 
play a more fatherly role in his offspring’s life. This last example foregrounds the 
continual renegotiating involved in enacting donor parenthood, responding to others’ 
actions and feelings, as well as changing circumstances.  
 
This sense of “making it up as they go along” is also highlighted in Sebastian Mohr’s 
research with Danish sperm donors. At the sperm bank where Mohr carried out his 
ethnographic fieldwork, donors could opt to be identity-release or anonymous. Of his 
26 participants, 14 had agreed to be identity-release. Mohr describes these men as 
“pioneers,” walking “unexplored kinship territory, not really knowing how to ascribe 
meaning to connections that defy existing classifications of kinship” (2015, 25). Like 
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my own participants, Mohr’s non-anonymous donor interviewees struggled to find 
the vocabulary to describe their role and, although they felt sure they had obligations 
towards offspring, often found it difficult to articulate what these were. My own 
participants seem to have been more forthcoming in articulating what this 
“pioneering” role might be. This may be because my participants were donating in a 
context in which openness was encouraged and their experiences of counselling 
encouraged them to think through the kinship consequences of donation. In contrast, 
Mohr describes how his participants, despite the identity-release option, were 
encouraged to think of their donation in purely contractual terms (a financial 
exchange with the sperm bank). Whilst the vast majority of my participants had not 
met their offspring, they were a little further on than Mohr’s participants in exploring 
the new kinship territory into which they had ventured. My findings therefore extend 
Mohr’s by describing the imaginative kinship work donors engage in when they 
make sense of their role.  
 
The two studies described in this section both illustrate how donors attribute social 
significance to their connection with offspring without this necessarily being seen as 
a parent-child relationship. Instead, the meaning of the donor/offspring connection is 
continually negotiated and renegotiated. My own research contributes to this growing 
body of scholarship which demonstrates, not only the socially constructed 
categorisation of “biological” processes and their selective deployment in relation to 
kinship claims, but also the creative ways in which the meaning of the “biological” 
can be renegotiated in relationship to kinship. Or to put it another way, it is not just a 
case of managing whether, or what aspects of, “biology” matter in relation to kinship 
but also managing how “biology” is made to matter to the social relationships in 
which it is implicated. In these studies and my own, procreative ties are not ignored 






I began this chapter by arguing that bodily donations have no intrinsic meaning but 
instead the ways in which they are understood are shaped by the legal, social and 
cultural contexts in which they take place. This is a fundamental premise of my own 
study since I assume that the introduction of identity-release legislation, and the ethic 
of openness which informed this amendment, will shape how gamete donation is 
understood by those that donate in this context. 
 
With this in mind, I demonstrated how donors, recipients and staff implicated in 
bodily donation often construct these practices as gifts. My own findings continue 
this pattern. However, by analysing the research on organ and blood, as well as 
gamete, donation, I demonstrated that the social significance of giving and receiving 
such gifts is highly varied between different persons and contexts. I highlighted three 
different (though related) gift discourses which are drawn on to describe acts of 
bodily donation: an ideology of the “pure gift”, a discourse of gifts as personal, 
relational activities and a discourse of “communal gifts” – acts of good citizenship. I 
also demonstrated that each of these discourses may be more or less available to 
different actors in different contexts; the identity of donors, legal regulations, 
organisational practices and the material-symbolic properties all shape (though do 
not determine) the way in which donation is understood and portrayed. The concept 
of gift discourses and their relative availability is central to my analysis of donor 
participants’ narratives. In Chapters Five and Six, I show how these different gift 
discourses both constrained and enabled donor participants’ narratives. Gender, 
clinic practices and wider cultural discourses encouraged or discouraged donors to 
talk about their donation in particular ways, as a particular kind of gift.  
 
The second half of this chapter focussed on the material-symbolic properties of 
donated gametes as procreative substance. Situating my research within work on 
sociology of the family and the new kinship studies, I argued that the transmission of 
genetic substance does not automatically create kinship relations. Instead, in line 
with authors in these fields, I conceptualise relatedness or family as something which 
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is continually constructed (or not) through everyday practices. According to an 
English model of kinship, “genetic” or “biological” connections constitute one 
perspective from which kinship connections can be claimed (Edwards and Strathern 
2000). However, they may be deemed insignificant, screened out by social 
connections formed through caring or intention. In this project, I have sought to 
examine if, and how, identity-release donors construct their relatedness to offspring.  
 
This review has also illustrated the contradictory pressures which identity-release 
donors are subject to. On the one hand, “natural” ties are idealised as enduring and 
automatic and an important means of anchoring oneself in time. On the other, donors 
are aware that their “natural” tie to offspring can be perceived as a threat to the 
“social” parent, particularly in light of an ideal of two-parent families. As my 
findings demonstrate, the donors I interviewed were subject to these pressures to 
both disconnect and connect with offspring. In showing how they negotiate these 
dual imperatives, I contribute to a small but growing body of literature which 
evidences how “biological” connections can be made socially significant though not 
in ways which map onto any pre-existing kinship categories. The donors I 
interviewed did not dismiss, or try to dismiss, the significance of their connection to 
offspring. Instead they actively and creatively renegotiated the meaning of this 
connection, qualifying its potential kinship significance and therefore minimising the 





Designing and Doing the Research 
 
This chapter traces the process of data collection and analysis, beginning from my 
initial aims and questions through to the production of the written thesis. I describe 
both my initial research design and rationale and the way in which these changed and 
adapted as a result of experiences and circumstances in the field. In this way, I aim to 
capture some of the messiness of “real life” research, particularly how my day-to-day 
decisions in the field have impacted on the data collected and the kind of thesis I 
have produced.  
 
Aims and objectives 
I began this project with the aim of addressing two primary research questions, from 
which I identified several subsidiary questions each: 
1. How do UK identity-release gamete donors view and experience donation?  
a) How do donors describe the role of a gamete donor?  
b) Has the meaning of donation changed for donors over the life-course, if so 
how?  
c) How do donors describe their motivations?  
d) How do donors describe the donation process, in and out of clinic?  
e) How do donors describe their role in relation to (potential) donor-
conceived child(ren)?  
f) How do donors describe their role in relation to recipient(s)?  
g) How do donors feel about the possibility of contact from donor offspring?  
h) How do donors expect they should or would react if they were contacted 
by donor offspring or recipients?  
 
2. How do donors’ social contexts shape their views and experiences?  
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a) What kinds of experiences and cultural discourses do donors draw on in 
order to make sense of donation and their role?  
b) What are the similarities and differences in the views of different donors 
and how might these be explained? 
c) With whom, and how, do donors discuss their donation?  
d) How do clinic staff view the act of gamete donation and the role of 
donors?  
e) What differences (if any) exist in the way clinic staff perceive different 
donors (i.e. men/women, parent/childless, younger/older) or different types of 
donation (known, patient, volunteer)?  
f) How do clinic staff interact with donors?  
 
These are the original research questions with which I embarked on this project. As 
my research progressed, I became more or less focussed on particular questions, in 
response to the data produced. In some cases, I was limited in the extent to which I 
could address particular questions (i.e. 2(d)-(f): those relating to staff views and 
interactions with donors) because of the limitations of my methodological approach 
(see section on staff interviews). In other cases, my focus emerged later, in the course 
of my analysis; the data I produced was more sociologically interesting and original 
in relation to some questions than others. As a consequence, the findings reported in 
this thesis are centred on those questions relating to donors’ relationships with their 
offspring and recipients (1(e)-(h)). I became interested in additional, related 
questions, as my interviews progressed; a substantial section of my findings analyse 
donors’ views on their role in relation to the wider community and the issue of 
payment. This was not specifically set out in my original research questions but does 
relate to my broader research aims. 
 
Overall methodological approach 
My interest in how donors made sense of donation, and why, necessitated a 
qualitative approach to data collection. I wanted to capture the complexity of donors’ 
views and experiences and also analyse the discourses they drew on to negotiate their 
role. For this reason, I selected in-depth interviews as my primary method of data 
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collection. I did consider the possibility of embarking on a more “traditional” 
ethnography of a fertility clinic (as Konrad (2005) and Mohr (2015; 2016) have 
previously conducted). However, whilst such an approach might have elicited a 
greater understanding of the wider clinic culture, it would have been difficult to 
observe significant numbers of donors in the clinics or interactions in which donors 
were implicated; this is because a relatively small number of donors donate in any 
one Scottish clinic in any one year (in 2011, the clinic which recruited the highest 
number of donors in Scotland recruited 24 egg donors and 12 sperm donors, but in 
nearly all other clinics there were less than 5 sperm donors and less than 15 egg 
donors). As a consequence, only a small proportion of clinic consultations, 
discussions and practices within the clinics directly implicate donors. I therefore 
decided to focus on donor interviews as the best means of engaging with donors’ 
views on, and experiences of, donation. In order to contextualise donors’ narratives, I 
also interviewed staff about their interactions with donors and their views on gamete 
donation and conducted observation of clinic practices (most often by “shadowing” 
doctors during clinic consultations). My investigative focus was on the donation 
stories of donors themselves – it is these which I was primarily oriented towards 
understanding and explaining. Data generated through staff interviews and clinic 
observations were used as an analytical resource to explain and situate the views and 
experiences expressed by donors. 
 
Recruitment and sample: donors 
Given limitations on time and resources, I had intended to limit fieldwork and 
recruitment to one research site. I selected an assisted conception unit, which I refer 
to with the pseudonym “Hillbrook,” based in a large NHS hospital on the outskirts of 
a small city, where a senior staff member had already expressed support for the 
project prior to funding being secured (whilst writing the research proposal I had 
emailed all five fertility clinics in Scotland accepting gamete donors at that time). 
This clinic was selected primarily because of the support offered by this staff 
member, a key gatekeeper, and because it was within commuting distance of my 
home. I reasoned that focussing on just one site had the benefit that I could 




Donor participants were recruited via letters sent from clinic staff to men and women 
who had donated gametes since April 2005. Their names and addresses were 
available via the clinic’s pre-existing records. In my initial proposal to NHS research 
ethics, I had stated that I would not myself access these records and that clinic staff 
would send out information on my behalf. I had considered that such an approach 
avoided my having unnecessary access to information about who had donated and 
would be more likely to secure ethical approval. However, this approach created a 
burden for already busy administrative staff and caused significant delays in letters 
being sent out. The task took longer than I had anticipated since donors’ files had to 
be located (not necessarily straightforward) and consent forms checked to find out 
whether they had agreed to being contacted for future research, before letters could 
be prepared and addressed. All donors who had consented to being contacted were 
sent a letter signed by one of the clinic’s doctors, introducing the project and inviting 
them to take part (see Appendix i), an information leaflet detailing the projects aims 
and what participation would involve (Appendix ii) and also a consent form 
(Appendix iii) and pre-paid envelope to return the form should they wish to take part. 
 
My first round of recruitment elicited fewer responses than I had hoped. The first 
batch of letters were sent to, what the clinic termed “altruistic” donors (non-patient 
donors who were donating to unknown recipients). Clinic records stated that there 
had been 23 altruistic donors (14 men and 9 women) since April 2005. However, 
only six letters were sent out because the majority had not consented to being 
contacted for research purposes (though promisingly, four of these responded, agreed 
to take part in the project) Anticipating similar difficulties with known and egg-share 
donors, and in the knowledge that there were no further male donors included in 
these groups, I began the process of finding a second research site. 
 
The second site selected, termed “Greenview”, was a privately funded, specialist 
fertility clinic located in a different Scottish city. Staff at this site had also expressed 
some support at the proposal stage and so my request did not appear “out of the 
blue”. The clinic was an attractive option because I knew that they had recruited 
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relatively high numbers of donors compared with other clinics in the area and I 
considered that the inclusion of a private clinic might enable some comparison 
between donors at private and publicly funded clinics. At Greenview, I secured NHS 
ethical approval for an amended research protocol that enabled me to access donors’ 
records directly and address letters myself. This proved a much quicker method of 
recruitment though it also gave me an insight into how difficult (sometimes 
impossible) it could be to locate records and consent forms. It often took several 
attempts to find donors records, particularly those which had been archived, and then 
consent forms were sometimes missing or had not been electronically uploaded to 
the patient database. 
 
A total of 96 letters were sent out via the two clinics (30 to Hillbrook donors and 66 
to those who had donated at Greenview). Twenty completed consent forms were 
returned (a response rate of 21%) and, in all but one case, I was able to contact the 
respondent via email or telephone and arrange an interview. At this point, my sample 
included only five male donors and the same number of “altruistic” egg donors. In 
order to enable some comparison between different “types” of donors, I had 
originally set out to recruit a minimum of eight donors in each of the following 
groups: sperm donors, “altruistic” egg donors, known donors and egg-share donors. 
So, with the aim of supplementing recruitment, particularly of male donors and 
“altruistic” egg donors, I contacted the National Gamete Donation Trust (NGDT). 
This government-funded charity aims to raise awareness of gamete donation and 
increase donor numbers. They keep records of UK donors who are willing to be 
contacted by researchers or the media. Details about the project and the relevant 
documents were sent out to all donors in this group, via an email list. This elicited a 
further five responses and interviews were arranged. 
 
In total, I interviewed twenty-four donors, eight men and sixteen women; a gender 
imbalance which loosely reflects (or more accurately, understates) the imbalance in 
gamete donation nationally (HFEA 2014, see also Chapter Two). Fourteen donors 
(seven men and seven women) were volunteers or “altruistic” – meaning they were 
donating to someone they did not know and were not participating in an egg-sharing 
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scheme. Eight participants were known donors (six female and two male). In this 
sub-group, two women (Grace and Maya) had donated eggs to their sisters, two to 
their friend (Laura and Hannah) and Tom donated sperm to his wife’s best friend. 
Nina (who was also an egg-sharer) donated half of her eggs to a friend who she had 
previously worked with though, at the time of the donation, they had little contact. In 
Anna’s case, she had become friends with someone she had met on an online 
infertility forum, they had become friends, occasionally meeting up, and only later 
had she offered to donate her eggs (after the recipient’s initial egg donation plans had 
fallen through). Despite constituting the largest donor “type” at Greenview and 
making up approximately one third of the egg donor population nationally (HFEA 
2014), egg sharers are under-represented in my sample with only five being included 
in the study. This resulted from a poor response rate from this subgroup. The five 
participants interviewed were the only responses from a total of 38 letters sent to egg 
sharers (13% response rate). Table 1 shows the numbers of different donor “types” 
recruited and how. As it shows, the NGDT was a helpful method of recruiting 
predominantly “altruistic” donors whilst the small number of egg-sharers who 
participated were all recruited via Greenview. The numbers in each sub-group do not 
add up to the total of twenty-four participants I have reported. This is because three 
participants were categorised in multiple groups; Anna and Neil had donated to both 
people they knew and those they did not, whilst Nina had participated in an egg-





Table 1: Recruitment of different donor “types” 
Donor type Number recruited and how 
Volunteer (altruistic)sperm donors 2 Hillbrook 
3 Greenview 
3 NGDT 
Total = 7 
Known sperm donors 1 Greenview 
1 NGDT 
Total = 2 
Volunteer (altruistic) egg donors 3 Hillbrook 
2 Greenview 
2 NGDT 
Total = 7 
Known egg donors 4 Hillbrook 
2 Greenview 
Total = 6 
Egg share donors 5 Greenview 
Total = 5 
 
 
Table 2 provides demographic information about the donor participants and the 
circumstances of their first donation. All had donated between 2005 and 2013, with 
one sperm donor (Daniel) still in the process of donating at the time of interview. In 
Anna’s case, she had also donated twice in 2003, prior to identity-release legislation 
being introduced. Most had completed just one donation cycle, although five had 
donated more than once. As explained in Chapter Two, the levels of payment 
permitted to gametes donors has changed since 2005. The donors therefore varied in 
terms of the amount of payment offered to them, depending on when they had 
donated and also the category of donor they fell into (sperm/egg, egg 
share/volunteer). Those donating after April 2012, were usually offered a fixed sum 
of £750 for egg donors or £35 per visit for sperm donors (payable as a lump sum of 
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approximately £400 upon completion of a donation cycle). However, these fixed 
payments were not offered to any known donors in my sample. Those donating prior 
to April 2012 were usually offered the opportunity to claim expenses incurred as a 
result of donating, up to a maximum of £250. Egg-share donors were an exception. 
This group of donors are not offered either fixed sums or the chance to claim back 
expenses but do receive significantly discounted treatment in exchange for donating 
half of their eggs from one cycle of IVF  
 
The sample is relatively heterogeneous in most respects other than ethnicity, with all 
but one Black West African egg donor participant being white of Northern European 
ancestry and all but three of these were white British. The donors came from a 
variety of socio-economic backgrounds representing a wide range of occupations, 
including senior managers, students, a call centre operative and the recently 
unemployed. At the time of their first donation, participants’ ages ranged from 25 to 
42 with the ages of different sub-sets often reflecting the differing criteria for donors 
of different types. Men can usually donate sperm up to the age of 41 and, although 
male donors were represented at both extremes of the age range, sperm donors in this 
sample generally tended to be older than egg donors. Egg sharers were, on average, 
the youngest group, all in their late twenties and early thirties. Known and volunteer 
egg donors tended to be in their early to mid-thirties. Approximately two thirds (15) 
of the donors were married or living with a partner at the time of their first donation, 
three described themselves as being in a relationship and six as single. Zara, Rob and 
Daniel identified as gay and the rest as heterosexual. Half of the participants already 
had their own children at the time of their donation. Of the remaining twelve, four 
were egg-share donors who conceived as a result of their own treatment which 
coincided with their donation. Based on the available statistics about gamete donors 
nationally (HFEA 2014), in most respects this sample is broadly comparable with the 
wider population in terms of the proportion of donors of different ages and ethnic 
backgrounds. However, when compared with the national data since 2005, the 












Adam A 2008 39 Single One daughter 
Anna A x 2 






Living with partner 
One daughter  
 
Bridget S 2010 29 Married Son born following 
donation/treatment cycle 
Daniel A 2013 25 Single None 
Debbie A x 2 2006 31 Married Three children 
Eve A 2010 34 Living with partner Two children 
Faye S 2008 35 Married Twins conceived 
following 
donation/treatment cycle 
Grace K 2011 33 Married None 
Hannah K 2010 33 Married Three daughters 
Ian A unsure 42 Living with partner Ten children, including 
one who died just a few 
days old 
John A x 2 2006 33 Married Two daughters 
Karen A 2011 36 In a relationship One daughter 
Laura K 2012 31 Living with partner None 
Liam A 2009 33 Single None 
Maya K 2011 36 Married Two sons 




36 Single None 
















*A-altruistic, K-known, S-egg share 
 
Recruitment and sample: staff 
I recruited staff participants via the two clinics where donor participants were 
recruited. Because I was carrying out observations in the clinic, my communications 
with staff about my research were inevitably more informal. To begin with, I gave a 
presentation to staff about my research and the ways in which they could participate 
if they wished. I then sent internal letters (Appendix iv) and an information leaflet 
(Appendix v) to all staff via internal mail which detailed how to exclude themselves 
from all observations in the workplace if they chose to, by notifying one of their 
colleagues. None took up this option and some returned consent slips via an envelope 
in the clinic and so I began to arrange observations and interviews with those who 
had volunteered. Further interviews were arranged following informal conversations 
with staff in the clinic.   
 
In total, I (formally) interviewed 20 staff members with, slightly more (12) 
participating in Hillbrook than Greenview. I attempted to interview staff in a range of 
occupations. However, some groups were easier to recruit than others. This was 
partly the consequence of my location within the clinics. In Hillbrook, I agreed with 
staff that I would base myself at the nurses’ station and as a consequence many 
nurses agreed to take part. There was no equivalent place in Greenview and so I 
Olivia S 2009 29 Married Daughter conceived 
following 
donation/treatment cycle 
Rachel A 2013 25 In a relationship One son 
Rob A 2008 32 Single None 
Sarah A 2011 34 In a relationship None 
Tom K 2013 35 Married Two children 
Yasmin S 2011 28 Married Son conceived following 
donation/treatment cycle 
Zara A  2010 30 Single  None 
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came into contact less with nurses and only one participated in an interview. 
Similarly, embryologists are under-represented in my staff sample in large part 
because of their relative segregation in the laboratory and the difficulty of simply 
“popping in” to this sterile environment for a chat about the project. My sample of 
staff interviewees included seven nurses, six doctors, three administrative staff, two 
counsellors and two staff members who worked in the laboratory. Further informal 
conversations took place during observations but, as a general rule, staff who 
engaged in these kinds of interactions, also agreed to be interviewed. 
 
Data collection: donor interviews 
I conducted interviews with donors from May 2013 to February 2014. Most were 
conducted in Scotland but many necessitated travel across England. This was the 
case in relation to all five interviews with donors recruited via the NGDT. In 
addition, two donors recruited via the Scottish clinics lived south of the border, one 
due to relocation (Adam) and one because he had travelled to his recipient’s chosen 
clinic to make his donations (Tom).  In five cases, donor interviews took place in 
workplaces or cafes. However, I interviewed the majority in their own homes. On 
one level, this was for convenience – there would be no need for donors to travel or 
arrange childcare in order to take part. However, the domestic setting also had the 
advantage of creating a relaxed environment for the interviews. Usually the 
interviews took place around the kitchen table or on the sofa, cups of tea in hand. In 
addition, being invited into the homes of participants enriched my understanding of 
their lives and contextualised their donation narratives. Often, I met their children, 
occasionally their partners and their pets too. Without having to ask, I got a sense of 
how they lived their day-to-day lives, whether in well-to-do suburbs, rural villages or 
cramped flats on city estates. I saw children’s pictures on the wall, photographs and 
mementos of travels on display. Being at home, the donors were able to make use of 





Most donor interviews lasted approximately two hours with the shortest being just 
over an hour and the longest three hours. Before beginning each interview, I asked 
participants if they had any questions and recapped the key points on the consent 
form they had previously signed. All agreed to the interview being recorded with a 
digital recording device. Interviews followed a loosely chronological framework, 
beginning with a variation on the request, “Tell me how you became a donor.” From 
here, many donors continued unprompted to talk about their experiences in the clinic 
and their views on the role of the donor. I encouraged participants to continue their 
own narratives, focussing on the topics they considered to be relevant. However, I 
also made flexible use of a topic guide and, if participants had not themselves 
covered a particular issue, I would raise it. The topic guide can be read in its entirety 
in Appendix vi. It includes questions under the headings: “Deciding to donate,” 
“What kind of act is gamete donation?” “What was your experience of donation?” 
“What are your feelings about donation now that it is completed?” “What do you 
think your role is in relation to donor-conceived children and recipients?” and 
“Collect demographic information.” Questions were added or amended throughout 
the data collection process as a result of my reflections on ongoing interviews.  
 
I tended to use open-ended questions in order to elicit in-depth responses from 
participants, to avoid imposing my own assumptions on the conversation and enable 
participants to frame the discussion in their own terms (Legard, Keegan, and Ward 
2003). I used verbal and non-verbal probes and prompts to encourage participants to 
elaborate and explain their views and experiences. These included more specific or 
closed questions in order to probe for more information. So, for example after having 
asked, “What was your experience of being a donor in the clinic?” and, “Tell me 
about the processes and procedures involved,” I might also ask, “Did you experience 
any pain or discomfort?” if this was not an issue the donor had already raised 
themselves. Similarly, I sometimes expressed my own views or told participants 
what other donors had told me and asked how it compared with their own views and 
experiences. It could be argued that these are “leading” questions which compromise 
the validity of my findings. However, I follow Agar (1980) in suggesting that all 
questions are leading in some way and that making statements or asking closed 
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questions can be a helpful means of clarifying understanding. In addition, by 
occasionally expressing my own views, including agreement with participants, the 
interviews took on more of a conversational tone, participants were more likely to 
feel relaxed and be open about their experiences. As Stanley and Wise (1993) argue, 
a conversation in which one participant never expressed their own views would be a 
decidedly strange one and this would likely have its own impact on data collection, 
potentially stilting communication and limiting the richness of the data collected.  
 
I enjoyed interviewing donors. Communication felt relaxed and I got the impression 
that donors also enjoyed telling their stories. I found it easy to build rapport with 
most participants, not only because I was interested in their experiences as donors 
but also because I often genuinely liked them as people. Frequently, I found we had 
experiences in common and these provided opportunities for more two-way 
conversation which seemed to put participants at ease. Some participants had 
previously conducted their own research. Others, particularly egg-sharers, were of a 
similar age and the same gender to me. Although, at the time the interviews took 
place, I was not a parent, I did discuss my intention to have children in the future and 
I had some insight (as an aunt and as a primary school teacher) into caring for 
children and I used my own knowledge to engage with those participants who were 
mothers and fathers. 
 
I sometimes raised questions which participants found difficult to answer – perhaps 
they had not previously thought about them or they found it difficult to articulate 
their views. However, donors often commented that they found such questions 
thought-provoking and that it was interesting to explore them. Sensitive topics did 
arise, such as the death of family members, miscarriages and relationship 
breakdowns. However, participants were able to reflect on these events and their 
connection to their donation narratives without becoming distressed, perhaps because 
enough time had passed that they were able to talk about their grief without also 
reliving it. I concluded interviews by asking more general questions about the 
donors’ lives – their work and family lives, their plans for the rest of the day – as 
well as clarifying the circumstances of their donation, such as dates and ages. This 
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constituted a “phase of emergence” or gradual “winding down,” moving the 
conversation away from more personal and emotional topics and towards a more 
every day, two-way conversation (Corbin and Morse 2003). 
 
Before I left, I asked participants if they would be willing to comment on an 
interview summary and if they would like to be updated on the project’s findings. All 
agreed to comment on summaries and requested further information about the 
research outcomes. I produced summaries based on notes taken as soon as possible 
after the interview and emailed them to participants, encouraging them to tell me if 
there was anything they felt I had missed out or misinterpreted. Donors’ responses 
proved a further valuable source of data collection. Firstly, as a form of “member 
checking” (Lincoln and Guba 1985) they provided a means through which to validate 
my own interpretation of the interview discussion. All but one participant responded 
to my email and the vast majority approved of the summary in its entirety. On 
several occasions, participants expressed delight that I had been able to gather 
together all their thoughts and experiences into one story. As Olivia put it, I had 
created a “memoir” which “captured everything [she] thinks and feels [about 
donation]” and, with which, she could remember her experiences. Many donors also 
replied with further information about their lives since the interview and the 
donation. For example, Rachel told me that since the interview, she had donated for a 
third time and had found out that a little girl had been born to her first recipient. 
Other participants did offer some corrections – usually these related to dates and ages 
of the different persons involved and often I had already highlighted my doubts about 
their accuracy. However, on one occasion, the correction offered by a participant 
provided an interesting insight into the cultural constraints and pressures upon 
gamete donors. He suggested that my wording be slightly changed and, regardless of 
what he had originally said in the interview, it was interesting to me that he thought 





Data collection: clinic fieldwork and staff interviews 
I spent a total of twenty days in the two clinics, talking informally to staff and 
making notes of my observations and interactions there. On most of these days, I 
arranged a period of more formal observation of a particular procedure or person for 
some portion of the day. These included observation of egg retrievals on two 
occasions, tours of the clinics and visits to the laboratories but in most cases I spent 
my time sitting in on doctors’ consultations with patients. Doctors were generally 
quite willing to facilitate this kind of “shadowing,” perhaps because they had become 
accustomed throughout their careers to medical students observing their interactions 
with patients. In between consultations, I had an opportunity to ask (brief) questions 
about why particular decisions had been made (e.g. why was the use of donated eggs 
discussed in one case but not another) and to make notes. I should highlight that the 
consultations I observed were with women and couples experiencing infertility and 
not limited to those involving gamete donation, indeed this was a topic that was 
uncommonly raised. They gave me an insight into the more routine, everyday work 
of the clinic staff, rather than how gamete donation (a more unusual event) was 
discussed. 
 
If I had no particular place to be, I sometimes spent time in the reception area but 
most often “hung out” at spaces within the clinic where staff tended to congregate 
and talk informally. In Hillbrook, this was the nurses’ station, a large reception-style 
desk with two computers and a telephone. When not with patients, nursing staff 
would often use this area to look over and update notes, take phone calls and talk to 
one another. In Greenview, there was no equivalent space. Here, I usually based 
myself within one of the offices used by administrative staff which were generally 
quieter and less social spaces but still allowed some informal conversation. “Hanging 
out” enabled me to build relationships with clinic staff, share information about the 
project and ask informally about practices and procedures within the clinic. These 
informal conversations and the shadowing process also provided opportunities to 
read clinic documents related to gamete donation. In total, I collected and read 20 
documents - all informational documents and forms which were shared with, or 
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completed by, (potential) gamete donors and recipients at the two clinics. I made 
notes about the purpose and content of these documents. These brief notes as well as 
others made in the clinic were, at the end of each day, typed up and these field notes 
were later used for analysis. 
 
This ethnographic element to my project has enabled me to contextualise my 
interview data and guided my interview questions. I was able to collect data on the 
everyday goings on at the clinic, including medical practices and bureaucratic 
procedures that apply to gamete donors. I am also in no doubt that informal 
conversations with staff and simply being a familiar face in the clinic increased the 
number of staff members who agreed to take part in interviews. However, 
ethnography in this context had challenges which I suspect have impacted the 
breadth and depth of data collected. I found it personally and professionally 
challenging to continually play the role of “professional stranger” (Agar 1980), to 
repeatedly arrive at a place of work where I was neither worker not client and where 
I often had no clear task to perform or space to inhabit. As Blix and Wettergern 
(2015) highlight, the continual negotiation of access necessary in ethnographic 
fieldwork demands a high degree of emotional labour from researchers. I do not 
think my experience in this regard is unique. However, because I never fully 
overcame this sense of being “out of place” and I was, perhaps overly, sensitive to 
issues of voluntary consent and intrusion (see ethics section below), there are spaces 
(like the laboratory) and groups (senior managers and embryologists) which are not 
fully explored within this project.  
 
Staff interviews followed a similar semi-structured format to donor interviews but 
were much shorter. The shortest was just 15 minutes long and the longest an hour 
and a quarter, with most approximately 30 minutes, sometimes made up of multiple 
“slots.” These interviews were shorter primarily because they were fitted into busy 
days. Often a staff member would provisionally agree to an interview but would have 
to see whether and when a quiet period might emerge in their day. About half of 
interviews with staff took place in communal areas and the others in private rooms 
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within the clinic. In either case, they were often interrupted by colleagues seeking 
advice or support. All but one of the staff participants agreed to the interview being 
recorded. In the case where consent was not given, I made notes during the interview 
and later made a summary of our conversation. 
 
After gaining informed consent, verbal and written (see Appendix vii) and offering 
the opportunity for questions, I began interviews by asking staff to tell me about their 
role within the clinic and subsequently whether and how that might involve gamete 
donors. I asked about their interactions with, and knowledge about, donors and 
recipients in the clinic and also sought their views and experiences about donor-
assisted conception and the role of gamete donors more generally (the full topic 
guide can be read in Appendix viii). The interviews were varied in terms of the 
richness of the data produced. Often the staff I interviewed had little or no contact 
with gamete donors or they described their interactions with them as limited to the 
discussion of medical procedures (this was often the case with egg donors where the 
focus would be on explaining the effects of the drugs and risks of the minor surgical 
procedure necessary for egg retrieval). In response to questions about the role of 
donors, some participants were happy to speculate or offer their own opinions. 
However, many others felt unable to do so, directing me to the counselling staff at 
the clinic, whose role, they explained was to discuss these kinds of socio-emotional 
issues. Of course, this is, in itself, an interesting finding. However, it did mean that 
staff interviews had a very different feel to them. Staff participants generally gave 
much shorter answers and so I took a greater role in directing the conversation. In 
addition, because staff were often reluctant to speculate on how donors thought, or 
should think, about their role, there was a greater emphasis on fact-finding about the 
way procedures usually worked in the clinic. 
 
Ethical decision-making 
In advance of data collection, a thorough review was conducted to reflect on the 
ethical implications of conducting this project, aided by the University of 
Edinburgh’s School of Social and Political Science Level Two guidelines and the 
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NHS research ethics process. The research design was approved both internally, by 
the university, and externally, by an NHS Research Ethics Committee in February 
2013. All studies with human participants raise ethical issues, related to the 
avoidance of harm, gaining informed consent and ensuring confidentiality. In my 
project, these issues were largely addressed by following standard procedures. I 
informed all participants about the purpose of observation and the likely content of 
interviews, emphasised the voluntary nature of participation at all times and used 
pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality. However, there were specific aspects of the 
research design which required more detailed analysis and the adoption of project-
specific measures. These include the potentially upsetting topic of the interviews, the 
risk of coercion in recruitment via health professionals, and the limits of 
confidentiality within a small sample. 
 
The procedures designed to mediate these foreseeable risks were the subject of 
detailed external review by the NHS Research Ethics Committee. However, they can 
be briefly summarised. Firstly, the possibility that interviewees may find the topics 
discussed uncomfortably personal or upsetting was addressed by emphasising the 
voluntary nature of participation at all times, before and during the interview. In 
addition, I conducted interviews with a high degree of sensitivity to participant’s 
needs and wishes. Although the situation did not arise, I planned to adapt, postpone 
or terminate interviews, as necessary, in response to the participant’s wishes. 
Secondly, there was a small risk that egg-share donors, as both patients and potential 
participants, might feel coerced into participating given the “role of power dynamics 
in doctor-patient relationships” and the difficulty patients may have in separating 
requests for participation for their own treatment (Parry 2006, 2357). This risk was 
minimised by ensuring donors were only contacted once by letter about the project. 
Although this was sent via health professionals, it emphasised the independence of 
the project from the clinic and from any NHS institution and that there was no 
pressure to participate. Lastly, given the relatively small numbers of staff working at 
the clinic (under 50 in each clinic), and despite the use of pseudonyms and aims of 
omitting identifying information, I reasoned that staff might be identifiable to one 
another in research reports. In anticipation of this concern, I offered staff the 
105 
 
opportunity to read full anonymised transcripts of their interview which they were 
able to edit if they wished to. Although none opted to make any revisions or 
deletions, this process reassured me that staff either felt that their identity was 
satisfactorily obscured or that they were comfortable to be identifiable with their 
words. 
 
Important as these reviews were in my own research planning, not all risks can be 
mitigated or anticipated through this kind of “procedural ethics” and doing 
qualitative research involves making ethical decisions in practice (Guillemin and 
Gillam 2004). This was most evident to me when carrying out fieldwork in the two 
clinics. At first consideration, this ought to have been the area of the project least 
subject to moral dilemmas, and certainly it was not the focus of the formal review 
processes. Clinic staff were not ostensibly vulnerable people. In contrast with donors, 
they were being asked to talk about their work rather than something that might be 
viewed as highly sensitive or personal. However, in practice, being in the clinic 
involved continuous “ethics in practice” – balancing the need to ensure staff 
participation was “un-coerced” with the aim of collecting useful and valid data. 
Because I was physically present in their workplace, because I developed 
relationships with staff, it was inevitable that they might feel some social pressure to 
participate. This is a strength of ethnographic research – “hanging out” enables 
researchers to build rapport and trust with participants who may then talk more 
candidly (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). However, such relationships, come with risks 
that people feel obligated to participate. It is much harder to decline a request for 
help if it comes directly from someone you know (even only vaguely). And whilst I 
had planned only to inform staff about the project rather than ask them to participate 
directly (they were to contact me if they were happy to take part), I soon realised that 
this was a meaningless distinction. Talking to staff participants about my project, and 
why I might be interested in interviewing them, was, according to cultural norms, 
tantamount to asking them. Whilst I was in the clinic, I continuously felt 
uncomfortable with the knowledge that staff might feel under pressure to participate. 
In order to address this concern, I was very aware of, and responsive to, verbal and 
non-verbal clues that staff might be reluctant to participate and I always gave them 
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an “out” – a way of turning me down without there being any awkwardness (usually 
I prefaced and ended all discussion of the project with, “I can see you’re very busy at 
the moment. It’s really not a problem if you don’t have time”). On one occasion, this 
approach was not sufficient and it became clear that one staff member had felt under 
pressure to participate. I do not elaborate further for reasons of confidentiality but, 
since it was brought to my attention, I was able to resolve the situation, re-
emphasising the voluntary nature of participation, and the staff member was not 
interviewed. At the time, I reflected that I had ignored my own misgivings about the 
situation and resolved to follow my instincts in future. This event had a significant 
impact on me and I am aware that I perhaps became hyper-sensitive to issues of 
coercion from then on which may have impacted on the numbers and range of staff 
recruited overall. In particular, my unwillingness to intrude or ask too much of clinic 
staff may have resulted in the limited number of laboratory staff interviewed and the 
small number of nurse participants at Greenview.  
 
Analysing the data 
The use of a subheading to delineate this section from the preceding data collection 
does not reflect any such neat boundary in practice. Instead, I continually analysed 
the data as it was produced and this, in turn, informed the collection of further data. 
After the interview itself, the first act of analysis was to take notes which provided 
the basis for an interview summary. I took notes as soon as possible after interviews 
which detailed, not only the key points of the interview, but also any new or 
interesting themes which were raised. Where participants raised new themes not 
included in the topic guide, these were added. For example, I found that organ and 
blood donation were often raised spontaneously by participants, who drew 
comparisons with gamete donation. In subsequent interviews, I asked donors if they 
did, or had done, anything else which they thought was similar to gamete donation 
and also made sure to check at the end of interviews whether donors had given blood 
previously or registered as an organ donor. In my notes, I also included details about 
the interview context which would not necessarily be apparent from the audio 
recording, such as the interview surrounding, the character and mood of the 
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participant (in my opinion) and my experience of the interview. I reasoned that these 
details would be helpful when later interpreting the meaning of the toneless 
transcriptions. However, in practice, I found I rarely needed to consult my notes 
because the process of writing them (and later the summaries) cemented these kinds 
of atmospheric details in my mind. When I was later reading the transcripts, I could 
easily recall the words being spoken in their original voice and context.  My note-
taking also had a second purpose in that it enabled me to reflect on my own role in 
the data production process and improve my approach. For example, unsurprisingly, 
sperm donors were reluctant to talk in detail to me, a woman in her late twenties, 
about their experiences visiting the clinic to produce their donations. Often this 
aspect of their stories was omitted or glossed over. After a few interviews, I found 
that a helpful strategy was to tell male participants what others had said (that it was 
awkward the first time but then improved, that the room felt dishearteningly sterile, 
that they had occasionally found it difficult to produce a sample) and ask them to 
comment. I found this provoked much more detailed responses from participants 
than more direct questions. By agreeing or disagreeing with previous participants, 
they could talk about their own experiences slightly indirectly. In addition, by 
repeating what others had said, I legitimised views or emotional responses that 
donors might otherwise have thought unusual, stigmatised or inappropriate to express 
in the interview context. 
 
It was my aim to complete the process of transcription alongside interviewing. To 
some degree, this was successful, although by the time I had completed my interview 
I had a backlog of audio recordings to transcribe. All recorded interviews were 
transcribed verbatim with identifying details (places and names) either changed or 
omitted, with pseudonyms used to identify participants. Completing transcription 
myself meant that, through repeated listening, I became very familiar, not only with 
the words people had spoken, but also the way they had said them.  
 
The principles of both content analysis  (Robson 2002) and narrative theory 
(Kirkman 2002; Ezzy 2002; Riessman 1993) have informed my analysis of interview 
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transcripts, field notes and the documents I collected in the clinics. I was interested 
not only in the content of participants’ stories (the views they express and the 
experiences they describe) but also the discourses they drew on (including those in 
clinic texts) and the narrative frameworks they employed. In practice, this meant that, 
when reading donors’ words, I was continually asking myself how and why they had 
framed their accounts of donation in particular ways. Why, for example, did Daniel 
say that it was inappropriate for him to tell others about his donation, even though he 
was proud of having given this gift (see p.148)? And why did donors continually 
articulate their support for identity-release donation in relation to donor offspring’s 
“rights” to know where they came from (see p.199)?  
 
In my interviews, I asked donors to recall experiences and explain decisions which 
had often taken place years previously. Additionally, I asked them to imagine future 
scenarios and roles in relation to persons who they may never meet and, in some 
cases, might never exist. Past experiences reported by participants have been 
continuously reconstructed in their remembering, and perceptions of the future are 
only plans or imaginings rather than evidence of what will happen. However, the 
veracity of these accounts was not my central concern. As Cairns explains of her own 
research, these stories are valuable to me, predominantly because they tell us about 
the “discursive possibilities…available [and not available] to particular subjects” 
(2009, 329). Rather than suggesting their narratives constitute some kind of objective 
“truth” about the nature of gamete donation, I am interested in the ways donors make 
sense of their donation and why they make sense of it in particular ways.  
 
Once transcription had been completed, I read over all the transcripts and summaries, 
once without making any notes and then for a second time, this time, noting down 
common or interesting themes in the data. Using my notes, I created a series of 
thematic categories with which I coded the entire data set using Nvivo 10 (qualitative 
data analysis software). Borrowing Richards and Morse’s (2007) typology, these 
were predominantly descriptive or thematic codes, rather than more abstract analytic 
codes. Some examples of the total of 23 codes I used were “recipients,” “disclosure,” 
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and “donor’s family.” I therefore used Nvivo predominantly as a tool for grouping 
and easily locating data on specific themes. To move the analysis beyond description 
and think about how and why donors talked about these topics in the ways they did, I 
preferred a pen and paper method, assisted by the software. I re-read all the data 
grouped under particular codes, paying attention to the ways donors talked about 
different themes, the connections they made and the discourses they drew on. I took 
notes on these, as well as similarities and differences in the data, looking for patterns 
and contradictions, both between and within interviews. I analysed the data generated 
in the clinics (staff interviews, field notes and documents) with a view to explaining 
donors’ narratives, comparing the way in which donors and donation is framed in 
these different contexts. My previous knowledge of the literature on kinship and 
bodily donation (amongst other topics) provided “tools” with which to read and 
make sense of these patterns and discursive processes (Altheide 1987). From these 
handwritten notes I derived concepts and theories to address my original research 
question: how do donors view and experience the act of donation, and why? My 
initial theorising was refined through “continual comparison” (Strauss and Corbin 
1998) of my theories and concepts with the data in its original context (i.e. the 
interview transcript and my notes on the interview context) and analysis of “negative 
cases” (Lincoln and Guba 1985). I have attempted to modify or account for the 
negative cases and the ways in which my data was produced in the analysis I offer. 
 
Far from constituting a report on a process already completed, writing up my thesis 
was part of the analysis process. By writing, and attempting to write, these chapters, 
I refined, sometimes discarded, theories and concepts which I had developed. In 
trying to explain my findings more clearly and in prose, I found myself drawn back 
into my data and also re-discovering concepts and theories in the literature. Often I 
would find further examples and concepts which enriched my ideas and sometimes I 




Limitations and transferability 
As with any methodology, my research design and the decisions I have made in 
practice have created limitations on the data I have collected and the transferability 
of the knowledge subsequently produced. One limitation, which I have described 
earlier in this chapter, relates to my decision to focus on donor interviews over 
extended observation in the clinic. I have not directly observed donors’ interactions 
in the clinical context and instead rely on participants’ accounts (staff and donors) to 
understand how donors and staff interact in this space. As explained previously, I 
made this decision because I was aware that there would be only limited 
opportunities to observe the small numbers of donors coming through Scottish clinics 
and so it would not have been a good use of limited time and resources. However, if I 
had been able to observe donors in the clinic, this would likely have enriched the 
thesis, providing further contextual data and explanatory tools to make sense of 
donors’ narratives. 
 
Further limitations relate to my donor sample. It is not statistically representative of a 
larger donor population, it is self-selected and there is good reason to believe it may 
be biased towards those who have had positive experiences of gamete donation or 
who regard the identity-release requirements as unproblematic. In particular, the poor 
response rate of egg sharers may represent the exclusion of those who did not 
conceive as a result of their own treatment cycle since all five participants in this 
category were successful in this respect. Egg share donors who remained childless 
following their own treatment may well make sense of identity-release donation in 
different ways. It is possible that donors who remain involuntarily childless might 
think about their donor-conceived offspring differently (perhaps more likely to view 
them as their children) and the possibility of future contact with their genetic 
children may pose particular challenges. In addition, it could be expected that 
advertising my research with the NGDT, an organisation aimed at promoting gamete 
donation, would have recruited donors who have had particularly positive 
experiences of donation. For example, this decision may in part explain the high 
proportion of sperm donor participants who had engaged in some kind of 
ambassadorial work (see Chapter Eight). However, the influence of NGDT 
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recruitment was not straightforwardly apparent in practice. Sarah, the only 
participant who actively stated that she would not donate again and whose 
experience could be categorised as negative, was recruited in this way. 
 
Whilst it is clear that my sample cannot be seen as straightforwardly representative 
of a wider donor population, my findings can be theoretically transferred to other 
contexts. Because I have analysed, not only donors’ views and experiences, but also 
the cultural contexts which shape these, I am able to make “inferential 
generalisations” (Lewis and Ritchie 2003) to donors in other circumstances. Such 
generalisations rely on careful comparison of the “sending” and “receiving” contexts 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). I offer a more precise discussion of the contexts to which 
my findings can be meaningfully transferred in my concluding chapter. It is 
necessary to first analyse my findings since it is only by showing how it is that the 
social context shapes these particular donors’ experiences that I can identify 
sufficiently similar contexts where the processes and concepts I produce can also 





Giving and Getting Back: Connections 
with Recipients 
 
This chapter examines the ways in which donors talked about recipients and 
described their relationships to them. It seems fitting that I begin my analysis with 
this topic since it mirrors the starting point of many participants’ narratives. Asked, 
“Can you tell me the story of how you became a donor?” many donors began the 
interview by describing the known or imagined recipient(s) of their donation. They 
explained that helping the recipients had been their primary (and usually sole) aim in 
becoming a gamete donor. Donation was conceived as an act of giving or helping 
and the primary relationship it therefore entailed was that between giver and 
receiver(s). This chapter examines the significance of this “gift” relationship for 
donor participants.  
 
I first show how most donors, at various points in their interview, framed their 
relationship to recipients as one of social solidarity. In this way, recipients were 
depicted as a generalised “person in need”, frequently characterised as “desperate.” 
Donors saw themselves as comparatively fortunate, at least in fertility terms, and 
knowledge of their ability to help created a moral imperative to intervene. In line 
with this portrayal of recipients as a generalised other, donors demonstrated a 
commitment to equality in terms of the possible recipients of their donation. Their 
recipient was depicted as a “universal stranger” (Titmuss 1973), although sometimes 
with the caveat that they ought to be appropriately deserving of the chance to become 
parents. I argue that, when they talked about their donation in these ways, donors 
drew on a discourse of “communal giving,” which they exemplified through 
analogies with blood donation or charity. In this way, donors presented their 
relationship to recipients as indirect and impersonal; their gift was part of a 




However, I go on to show that many donors also talked about their relationship to 
recipients in more specific, personal terms – they were particularly interested in their 
recipient and the consequences of their gift. In this sense, the gift of gametes was 
framed as a “relational gift,” commensurate with Maussian theories of gift-giving – 
something which connects specific givers and receivers. This framing was 
(unsurprisingly) most dominant in the narratives of known donors, who often 
presented the donation as one act, embedded within a relationship where mutual 
giving was the norm. However, many other unknown donors, the majority egg 
donors, also constructed connections with their specific, though anonymous, 
recipient(s). For some, particularly egg share donors, these ties were linked to 
imagined similarity or shared experiences. Others constructed connections with 
recipients by imagining, and sometimes seeking information about, the impact their 
donation had had on their lives. Some donors were content to imagine this, whilst 
others (almost entirely egg donors) were interested in contacting or meeting their 
recipients.  
 
However, the social-cultural contexts in which donors donated limited their ability to 
construct these more personal connections with recipients. The maintenance of 
donor/recipient anonymity by clinic staff created practical and ideological barriers to 
such connection-making. Some donors and clinic staff resisted anonymity, 
particularly in its strongest form, or questioned its necessity. However, nearly all 
donors, including many who already knew their recipients, described a need to limit 
connections with recipients in various ways. I suggest that, to some extent, this desire 
to limit connections can be understood as a product of organisational practices and 
discourses which characterise donor-recipient connections as risky. However, I also 
argue that we need to situate these clinic practices and discourses in their wider 
cultural context, specifically a cultural ideology of the “pure gift” which emphasises 
the importance of “letting go” of gifts, as well as an ideology of a two-parent family 
(see Fineman 1995; McCandless and Sheldon 2010; Wallbank 2002 discussed in 
Chapter Three).  The desire to limit connections with recipients can therefore be 
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understood as a means of respecting both the norms of gift-giving and the boundaries 
of the recipient’s family. 
 
As becomes clear throughout the chapter, some donors (particularly known donors 
and egg sharers) had greater resources to draw on in order to construct personalised 
connections with recipients. Others (particularly sperm donors) experienced greater 
pressures to disconnect from their recipients. Whilst such pressures and opportunities 
did not entirely determine behaviour, we can see their impact in the frequency with 
which different “types” of donor talked about their donation as a personal, relational 
gift. Male donors were much less likely to frame their donation in this way when 
compared with female donors, particular egg sharers and known egg donors. This 
finding is important in relation to my subsequent analysis because how donors talked 
about their relationship to recipients also influenced how they talked about their 
relationship to offspring and the wider community.  
 
Desperate recipients and the moral imperative to donate 
All the donors I interviewed imagined the suffering of recipients and empathised 
with their situation. Donors frequently described recipients, whether unknown or 
known, as “desperate” for a child. The pain and heartache of infertility and 
involuntary childlessness was often reflected upon and it was generally assumed that 
egg or sperm donation would be a last resort, having exhausted all other available 
options to become parents, with the exception of adoption:  
Googling…I just read a lot about these kinds of things and I can understand 
how, unlike myself, people are desperate to have families and you think it’s 
one of these most natural things you can do and they just can’t, for whatever 
reason, do it. I do like to help. I’m one of these that if I can help other people 
I will. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
[Having fathered a baby who was still-born at 28 weeks] I understand for 
women who can’t have kids as well, how they must feel…Now all these 
maternity wards [are] locked up, really secure places but, as I was growing 
up, I remember women going into hospitals and stealing babies. It used to be 
on news. We’re looking for this woman, this baby has been stolen from so 
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and so. But you can understand it can get that bad for somebody to go and 
do this thing, and how desperate.  
(Neil, known and identity-release sperm donor) 
There was a gendered dimension to this desperation, with women’s desires to have a 
child most likely to be characterised in these terms. Often references to “desperate 
women” were made without explanation – the characteristic infertility sufferer 
automatically assumed to be female. At other times, the belief that infertility caused 
greater suffering for women was justified through reference to a maternal or 
biological need to be a mother. However, such statements were often qualified 
during the interview with a recognition that men might also experience this longing 
for a child: 
But I think for a female as well, maybe because…And again, I know a lot of 
men who are desperate to become Dads, desperate to become parents. But I 
think it’s very much more a female need, you know, a biological need to be 
a Mum, to be a parent.  
(Laura, known egg donor) 
           
This desperation for a child was very often contrasted with donors’ own experiences 
and comparative good fortune. Many commented on their own good luck in 
conceiving quickly and without difficulty. For some, like Hannah, whose mother had 
suffered recurrent miscarriages, their own fertility had been experienced as a 
particular blessing since they had anticipated difficulties. For Rachel, Karen and 
Adam, their children had not been planned and they reflected that they must 
therefore be particularly fertile – something they had become particularly grateful 
for, having learned of others’ difficulties conceiving:  
And I really realise that I was so lucky. I mean, I didn’t even blink and I was 
pregnant kind of thing. Which was really unexpected. I think I thought that I 
was gonna have a really hard journey myself. And didn’t. Kind of makes 
you really feel for other people. 
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
Both my ex and I, we both wanted kids but it just sort of happened. And 
initially you kind of go, oh no, and then, you know, you see all these people 
who are struggling to conceive and then you think well, you know actually 
we’re quite lucky and I wouldn’t go back for anything in my life. You know, 
she’s a great kid. 




Despite their own difficulties conceiving, egg share donors also contrasted their own 
good fortunes with those of potential recipients. Many egg sharers were donating as 
part of their first IVF treatment cycle. They had often been told by clinic staff that, 
being young (under 35) and with good ovarian reserves (indicated by their Anti-
Mullerian Hormone (AMH) levels) their chances of IVF success were relatively 
high. In three of the five cases, male factor issues had been identified as the barrier to 
conception and could be treated with ICSI. They contrasted this positive outlook with 
the situation they imagined for recipients, of repeated and expensive failures, as well 
as the long waiting times to procure donated eggs: 
The waiting list [for donated eggs] is huge. Even if you’ve got ten grand to 
blow on treatment, you can’t go and do it next month or in six months’ time. 
You know, you don’t know how long you’re gonna be waiting. So there are 
people who just wait years and years and years and it must be heart-
breaking. 
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
‘Cos like, oh my God, what that couple would have gone through, I mean I 
know what I went through and they’ll have gone through more than that.  
(Olivia, egg share donor, original emphasis) 
 
Several of the donors, mostly egg donors, presented the inability to have a child as 
the ultimate misfortune. Whist they recognised that in other ways, such as 
financially, they might be less fortunate than potential recipients, they presented 
themselves as luckier in this, for them, far more significant sense:   
Because we’d been so fortunate. I mean there’s so few women that walk into 
a clinic and get pregnant straight away. You know, I was so…Actually I feel 
quite emotional [voice breaking] about it now. You just hear so many 
people’s shit stories. You just think fucking hell, how lucky was I? So, so it 
was kind of tinged with sadness that it hadn’t worked for [recipient]. But, at 
the same time, you know, we were like fuck! We’ve gone from ten years of 
being together with having no children to having three in three years. So it 
was quite a full on. But yeah you really feel, you really do. I’ve got a real 
strong feeling that you know women just shouldn’t leave it so long. They 
shouldn’t go for all the shit trappings of a material life if what they come 
down to wanting is, you know, they just shouldn’t leave it. And I think 
there’s so many women that do just leave it. 




Not all donors had necessarily experienced strong desires to become parents 
themselves. However, this was not conceived as a barrier to understanding, and 
sympathising with, the desperation of potential recipients. Zara, for example, had 
made a firm decision not to have children of her own. However, she reflected on her 
desire not to have children in order to empathise with others’ desires to have 
children. Knowing how strongly she felt about remaining childless, she imagined that 
recipients must feel equally strongly about becoming parents. In this sense, she was 
fortunate in comparison to recipients because her body was no barrier to fulfilling her 
wishes:  
It doesn’t seem fair that some people can be perfectly fertile and have no 
desire for children and other people have often quite crippling child hunger 
and have no ability to have children of their own. Would be nice if the body 
and mind matched up.  
(Zara, egg donor) 
 
The characterisation of recipients as desperate and themselves as comparatively 
fortunate created a moral imperative for donors to donate. Mirroring Orobitg and 
Salazar’s (2005) findings on egg donation in Spain, participants, particularly egg 
donors, often explained that they had “spare” of something that other people 
desperately needed. It was therefore clear to them that they should try to help by 
sharing their surplus with those who could make use of it. Donors commonly made 
analogies with giving blood or donating unwanted items to charity:  
I just thought that you know I’ve got these things in my body that I’m not 
making any use of. I’m not even aware that they’re there and there’s surely 
people out there that could make use of them, I suppose it’s just like 
anything you’re going to throw out. You think, oh don’t throw it out. Put it 
in the charity shop or somewhere where people can make good use of it. So 
that, that was it really. That’s how it came about for me. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
Faye drew on her political beliefs and identity as a Labour voter to explain why 
donating was the right thing to do in her situation – if others were in need, whilst you 
had plenty, you had an obligation to help: 
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Well you know, I’m a socialist. I wouldn’t sit with a bowl of soup if 
somebody sitting next to me’s got nothing. I would absolutely share it. 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
 
Like Eve below, egg donors commonly drew on their decision not to have any more 
children in order to classify their eggs as spare and therefore themselves as having 
more than they needed. Once classified in this way, they did not want them to go to 
waste (to be “flushed down the toilet” every month, as some put it), if they could 
instead be put to good use: 
I’d already had my two [children] so I just kind of thought. To me it’s just 
kind of giving blood. Something I’ve got spare of so if other people can use 
them then why not. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
 
John classified his donated gametes as “spare” in a different way. He had previously 
taken part in a research trial for the male contraceptive pill which had stopped his 
sperm production for a limited period of time. He explained, by donating, he had 
been able to make use of the “extra” sperm he therefore had, having not produced 
any for that research period. I suspect that John did not necessarily know or believe 
that having stopped sperm production for a given time that he would produce more 
sperm in the following year or over his lifetime. Instead, I suggest it is an experience 
he is drawing on to construct “extra” for narrative purposes and that he enjoyed the 
symmetry of these two attempts to help others:  
I’d taken part in a trial aiming to stop sperm production. So being able to do 
something with the extra was something…You know you can give 
something usefully back in. Knowing people who had had difficulty 
conceiving and thinking in some way you could assist in that whole side of, 
that whole world that we will never be part of, we’ll never see. Because we 
were able to conceive so easily that it seems daft that there are people out 
there that can’t conceive and have real difficulty conceiving.  




In these ways, donors constructed their gametes as “surplus.” The knowledge that 
they had extra, whilst others were in need, created a moral imperative for donors to 
donate.  
 
The (almost) universal stranger: deserving and underserving recipients 
Extreme longing for a child was generally the only defining feature of recipients, in 
the eyes of donors. Other than this unifying attribute, donors generally imagined that 
recipients could (and should) be from all different walks of life. In this way, they 
depicted their donations as gifts to “universal strangers,” comparable to Titmuss’ 
(1973) vision of anonymous blood donation systems. The vast majority of donor 
participants were happy for their donation to be given to women and/or couples of 
any ethnicity or sexuality, and single women as well as those in relationships. For 
Rob, the knowledge that his recipients were from diverse backgrounds was 
something he actively celebrated: 
R: I’ve got, there’s three children at the moment. I think it’s two girls and a 
boy. And then, one’s to one lady, one’s to a heterosexual couple and one’s to 
a gay couple.  
LG: Oh right so you’ve got one lesbian couple, one…. 
R: I’ve covered all of them haven’t I? 
R: [Coming back to this topic later in the interview) But it was interesting as 
well, I realised that every sort of dimension had a family. I was like, that’s 
pretty cool. You know, ‘cos I’m quite open and you know I’m also within 
that sort of demographic [identifies as gay]. I quite like that. 
(Rob, sperm donor) 
But it would just be so nice to know that it was somebody who you know 
really, you know desperately wanted to have a child. To be honest, I 
couldn’t care less whether they were gay, straight, bisexual, whatever. 
Black, white, ginger, I don’t really. You know what I mean? 
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
 
HFEA donor consent forms provide donors with the opportunity to restrict their 
donation to particular categories of recipients or, in the case of known donors, to a 
particular person. This section of the form is blank and donors can theoretically write 
down any restrictions they wish (though clinics are not obliged to accept them if they 
consider their restrictions unethical or impractical). However, support to conceive 
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was generally seen as a universal right and the vast majority of donors rejected the 
option to restrict their donation, on moral grounds. They did not think it was right for 
them to decide who would and would not be helped:  
LG: Did you put any restrictions on it? 
I: No. How could you?! How could you? To imagine the pain of somebody 
wanting a kid and not being able to have a kid, and I would choose. How? 
It’s nothing to do with me. I’m not God. I’m not God. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
 
There were some exceptions to this belief in universal entitlement. Two donors did 
place restrictions on their potential recipients. Although their specific restrictions 
were different, they both justified their decisions by defining deserving recipients as 
those for whom infertility was less “chosen” and who they imagined would make 
good parents. Liam had decided to restrict his donations to heterosexual couples. His 
initial explanations centred on a distinction between “biological” and “social” 
infertility. He imagined heterosexual couples to be people (like his own adoptive 
parents) who had suffered a strictly “biological” misfortune which left them unable 
to conceive. Their infertility was characterised as given and unchosen. In contrast, 
the infertility experienced by same-sex couples and single women was seen to 
contain an element of choice (although he did recognise that the choices of such 
persons were limited). Although he admitted that there would be real difficulties in 
actually doing so, he felt that, in theory, lesbian women could find a man with whom 
they could conceive without donor assistance. Notably, Liam does not consider the 
possibility that women in heterosexual relationships might equally overcome male 
factor barriers to conception by selecting an alternative sexual partner for the 
purposes of reproduction. Despite his problematic logic, it is through reference to 
“choice” that he characterises heterosexual couples as being in greater need, and 
therefore more deserving, of his help: 
Okay as a donor, who do you want to help? And of course they would very 
much like you to also help homosexual couples. And that’s something I 
couldn’t bring myself to do. ‘Cos it’s a case of, hang on a minute, why are 
we helping these people again? You know, it’s a case of, is there anything 
wrong with their biology? No? So reproductively everything functions as is? 
Yep. Then why arghhh. That’s where the thought process falls down. I mean 
there’s a bit of me says, no, no no, no, don’t be xenophobic, don’t be 
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homophobic. Don’t be phobic! It conflicts with that. ‘Cos there’s a part of 
me going, how does this sit? And it does come down to trying to boil it 
down to, yes ‘cos there’s plenty of information where yeah these people 
irrespective of how they are, who they are, and what they believed and feel 
and do, yeah they make perfectly good parents. On both sides of the coin, no 
matter what orientation you want to choose. Good. Me as a person though? I 
can’t square helping because, is there anything wrong with the biology 
there? No. Then technically you don’t need my help. 
 (Liam, sperm donor) 
 
As Liam continued, he also began to explain his decision through reference to the 
needs of the potential child conceived. He accepted that there would be no difference 
between heterosexual and same-sex couples’ parenting skills but he felt that the child 
might experience stigma attached to being the child of lesbian parents. Although he 
acknowledged that attitudes might change in time, Liam felt that being donor-
conceived might already be stigmatised and so by restricting his donations to 
heterosexual couples, he hoped that the child might have at least “a chance at 
normality:” 
So in a case like that [same-sex couple with donor-conceived child], how 
can you have normality there? So here is my Mum and here is my Mum. 
Yeah they’ve got the ginger hair [from me] as well, they’re just gonna have 
the bullies lining up to make their life hell. Anyway. Or maybe not. Maybe 
this is just my fear from it. Because as I say, we want society to evolve. And 
what we batted an eyelid about in the past, now we couldn’t care less about. 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
 
The only other donor to impose restrictions was Faye. In explaining her decision, she 
expressed a desire to give to deserving recipients who would raise the child in a 
healthy environment. Specifically, she was concerned about her eggs being used by 
recipients who were smokers and women over the age of 50. The possibility of older 
or smoking parents conflicted with her hope that the children conceived from her 
donation would be raised in a healthy and active environment. Faye valued health 
highly, was very active and ate well. For her, “smoker” was an identity and she 
associated smoking with inactive and generally unhealthy lifestyles which she 
imagined would be passed on to any children conceived in that environment. She 
acknowledged that, in doing so, she was perhaps stereotyping people who smoked 
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but, in her experience, smoking was associated with negative character traits, such as 
selfishness or failing to value life and health. 
I think it’s just if people are, I value health so highly. It’s, you’re given a gift 
of life, just as when you come into the world, your gift is that you’ve got this 
life. And I feel that smokers just are squandering that gift.  
I’ve got this perception that smokers. Smokers, like I remember when the 
smoking ban came in and it was absolute outrage that they had been 
penalised in this way. What about for us, being penalised for all those other 
years? Smoking all those years, stinking of cigarettes. You had no 
consideration for us. Yeah so I think probably they’re quite selfish as well. 
Okay. And I had to write that down [laughs]! 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
 
As with Liam’s explanation, the concept of choice appears to have guided Faye’s 
decision-making as to who would be deserving. Faye spontaneously stated that she 
did not restrict her donation on the basis of the recipient’s BMI. She was aware that 
recipients who were obese might not be best placed to fulfil her hopes of an active 
and healthy childhood for any person conceived. However, having worked as a 
dietician, she was aware that being overweight might not be the result of a 
straightforward “choice” to overeat and that people’s behaviour and weight gain 
might be a result of complex reasons, which were not the “fault” of overweight 
people:  
F: I didn’t stipulate that I wanted a particular body mass index or anything 
like that. 
LG: Was that something you saw as being different to the smoking? Or the 
age thing? 
F: Erm I worked, I’m a dietician and my case load was clinical, it was 
obesity. And I met lovely people who were overweight. They’re overweight 
for different reasons. So I would never judge somebody on their weight. So I 
don’t think it ever. I think I probably would accept that you know some 
people are overweight not just purely because they’re sitting down and 
eating too much. It can often be a psychological thing. It might have been 
the fact that they’ve never been able to have children. 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
 
Although only Liam and Faye placed restrictions on their donation, they were not the 
only donors to express concerns about their donation being used by inappropriate or 
undeserving recipients. Several donors raised concerns about their donation being 
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used by people who would not care for their children properly, who might harm or 
abuse them. Often these concerns had an implicit or explicit class dimension to them 
with such behaviour being associated with those from particular areas, known for 
high levels of social deprivation: 
As long as it’s not your average mob from like [city housing estate 
associated with social deprivation], swaggering in with their Buckfast
8
, 
wanting babies or something. Kind of draw the line at that... ‘Cos everybody 
should be entitled to have children, as long as it’s not going to somebody 
who…They obviously wouldn’t allow, kind of, I would imagine junkies or 
alcoholics or unstable people or things like that to go through the procedure. 
You know, and I think that’s quite right ‘cos I don’t think they’re able to 
bring up a child properly as far as I’m concerned.  
(Rachel, egg donor) 
They’ve wanted to have a family and so. And how they bring up that family 
is to their standard. Everyone’s very different aren’t they? You go round the 
shops and you see kids sometimes drinking coke from a little teat bottle. 
And it’s like, what on earth are they doing? You know, it’s just your own 
moral standings.  
(Rob, sperm donor) 
 
Usually donors’ concerns were alleviated by their assumption that such persons 
would be unlikely to pursue parenthood via assisted reproduction (particularly given 
the often substantial expense) and that, if they did, clinic procedures would ensure 
such persons were screened out. Rob, for example, described some initial concerns 
about whether any donor-conceived children might end up in the “care system” or 
suffer abuse. However, as he put it, he “answered [his] own feelings” by reminding 
himself that this would not be an “unwanted child” conceived accidentally “one 
drunken night,” it would have taken hard work to conceive via the clinic. In the 
extract below, Daniel is similarly reassured by the stringent screening procedures 
which he was subject to as a donor, as well as the cost of treatment, that recipients 
would not be having children “for the sake of it:” 
D: I can’t remember when it came up but they did say, I think it was 
[counsellor] was saying that the clinic has a right of care to where the child 
goes. If that makes sense? Which is quite nice. Which is nice to know that 
                                                 
8
 Buckfast is a fortified wine popular in Scotand and, in public discourses and media representations, 
widely associated with anti-social behaviour. 
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it’s not gonna go into family which is having a child for the sake of it. But 
then again Greenview’s not a place where you would go just for, just for the 
sake of it. Which I think again is a nice thing. 
LG: It’s a lot of money.  
D: It’s a lot of money and the way I’ve read the price list, I would be quite, I 
don’t think I could afford to go there myself if I wanted the help. But I think 
that’s the nice thing about Greenview as well. They’re aware, there’s so 
many screening processes, even with myself, there’s so many screenings 
with my bloods etc, my background, sort of who I am. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
In the extracts I have discussed thus far, donors depicted their donations as a 
communal gift and their connection to recipients as one of shared community; they 
were all part of the same society in which some people needed (and deserved) help 
and some were able to offer it. In fertility terms, donors were the “haves” and 
recipients the “have-nots”. This framing of gamete donation is reminiscent of 
Titumss’ (1973) view of anonymous blood donation as an action which both reflects 
and maintains social solidarity, indeed many of my donor interviewees made 
analogies with blood donation. By framing their donations in this way, donors 
constructed a relationship with recipients which was indirect – they were connected 
via shared membership of the community, a generalised sense of social solidarity 
(much as Titmuss described). This is emphasised via the conception of their recipient 
as a “universal stranger,” or at least a deserving universal stranger.   
 
Personalised relational gifts 
Although adoption of a communal gift discourse was common amongst all donors, it 
was more or less dominant in different narratives. Many donors also talked about 
their relationship to recipients as something more direct, a connection between them 
and their specific (though perhaps anonymous) recipient(s). However, for reasons I 
will suggest, describing this more personal connection, and indeed talking at length 






Gifts embedded in existing relationships 
One reason for this gender pattern was the fact the vast majority of known donors 
were egg donors, including all those who had donated to family members. Although, 
this does not, in itself, explain the tendency for female donors to talk about their 
relationship to recipients in more personal terms. Known donors commonly 
expressed the idea that their donation was embedded in a relationship in which 
mutual giving was the norm. For these donors, giving was generally presented as an 
enactment of their existing relationship. This is reflected in the words of known egg 
donors when they explained that donating was such a “normal” and obvious response 
to their sister’s or friend’s suffering. As Laura said, in the context of her friendship 
with the recipient, she “couldn’t not have done it.” These sentiments mirror those 
reported by known organ donors in previous studies (Sanner 2003; Gill and Lowes 
2008).  
 
In the context of existing relationships, donation was often conceived as a joint 
project rather than a one-off gift. By this I mean that donors intended to work with 
the recipient(s) to achieve their aim of having a child rather than simply to give them 
a one-time donation. They often expressed a willingness to try again if the first 
donation was unsuccessful and, in Anna’s case, this is exactly what she did – with 
the result of a successful pregnancy on the second try:  
I said to [recipient] when it happened, we do this till it works. We’re in it for 
the long haul. I’m not just gonna walk away and let you down 
(Anna, anonymous and known egg donor) 
This sense of donation as a joint project was also reflected in the way that known 
donors and recipients tended to approach the donation process. Recipients nearly 
always offered, and generally did, accompany known egg donors to the clinic for 
each visit. For Anna, having that support and partnership throughout the process was 
an advantage of donating to someone she knew rather than to her previous 
anonymous recipients. Known recipients and donors, and usually their respective 
partners, normally attended joint counselling sessions and also talked through the 
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donation and various related issues (such as disclosure and potential risks) as a 
group, outwith the clinic: 
And then obviously we had various conversations from then on about 
actually how it works and the legalities of it, the best methods to go about 
doing it. Which was: bottle of wine, figured it out! 
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
But [recipient] came with me to all my appointments. And I liked that. 
When I did it anonymously, there was nobody there with me. And it’s quite 
a lonely process. And the nurses and that are nice but it’s not the same as 
having another woman there. Do you know? And it was nice at Hillbrook 
‘cos the other thing they did that I thought was nice, they let her go in the 
egg room, the egg collection room…So she’s seen the eggs been collected. 
She’s seen them from the start. And I thought that was nice. Do you know 
what I mean? And she looked after me. And she took me up to all my 
appointments. And we had lunch. Do you know what I meant? And it was 
nice. It really was, really nice. So that was the nice side of it, you know, we 
went together. I kept saying to her, people think we’re gay [laughing]. But it 
was nice. It was really nice, having a bit of support there, from another 
woman, is better than a man. 
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
 
Women who had donated to their sisters often emphasised the norm of mutual giving 
in families generally, and their families in particular. They explained, it was expected 
and “natural” that family members would help each other whenever possible. Maya 
used the example of her Aunt’s kidney donation to her cousin, as well as her own 
upbringing, to illustrate: 
I think maybe ‘cos we're quite a close family. It's [donating’s] just the sort of 
thing we would do. I mean, my Dad would do anything to help us out. So 
would my Mum. I think we've just grown up with that as well. It's your 
brother, your sister, you do whatever you can to help them. It's not like, we'll 
remember I did that for you, you have to do that for me. It's just the way we 
feel. It's a natural thing. So I don't know if it's just that. 
(Maya, known egg donor, original emphasis) 
Grace spoke at length about her own cultural background and upbringing in Nigeria 
in order to explain her expectation of familial giving and, again, the normality of her 
decision to donate eggs to her sister. She explains that her husband found the 
donation problematic, in part, because his own cultural background (he is Finnish) 
was so dissimilar in this respect. Interestingly, having lived in all three countries, 
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Grace believed that Scottish family norms were more akin to those she had grown up 
with in Nigeria than those she had observed and experienced in Finland:  
We were brought up in Nigeria…Well we were very very close as a family 
and we were used to giving and receiving from each other. So it’s part of the 
culture…. 
The extended family is very strong, you know, in my culture. While the 
Finish culture, it’s almost non-existent because…The Scottish culture here is 
totally different. It’s closer to my culture because you get parents looking 
after their kids, teenage girls having babies and just hand over the babies to 
their Mums. You can’t do that in Finland. You are totally on your own. If 
you like get pregnant at fifteen, that’s your problem. Most mothers would 
not do that because their culture has taught them not to look at life in a 
different way. You know, to give a certain percentage of their life to their 
child and then the rest for themselves. So the family, extended family 
system there is truncated at some point.  
    (Grace, known egg donor) 
 
Connecting through shared experience or imagined similarity 
Another likely cause of egg donors’ greater tendency to talk more about their specific 
recipient was the synchronicity of female donors’ and recipients’ treatment. Egg 
donors were aware that in order for them to begin the process of donation, they 
needed to be “matched” with (usually just one) recipient and their treatment 
schedules managed so that the recipient would be ready to have the fertilised egg 
implanted shortly after the egg retrieval process was completed. In contrast, male 
donors were aware that their donations would be frozen and stored for six months 
before they would be available for use in treatment and, legally, they might be used 
by up to ten families.
9
 For some women, knowledge of one-to-one synchronous 
procedures fuelled their imagination about the recipient’s concurrent experiences and 
perhaps heightened a sense of their own actions impacting the lives of particular 
others: 
LG: This is maybe a weird question but did you think of yourself as 
donating to the clinic or to these particular women? 
R: Erm to the women. Always. I drove my boyfriend mad with it all. Oh, 
this woman, what if she’s been told, that’s me on the injections? She’s been 
told that’s me on the injections. Do you think she knows I’m coming in 
                                                 
9
 Sperm donors have the opportunity to restrict this number further but none of my participants 
opted to do so. 
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today for the retrieval? You know, it was very much about the woman who 
was getting it. ‘Cos if it was me in that situation that couldn’t have children, 
and I knew somebody was gonna donate eggs to me, I would just be going 
mad, wondering how it was going and what she was doing and wanting to 
check in with her 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
You knew at some point later that day, the other couple would come in and 
then the husband. Maybe the other couple wouldn’t come in but the husband 
definitely had to be there to provide a fresh sperm sample. So that they could 
do their part of the fertilisation. And kind of, some of me was a little bit 
curious, but not curious enough to hang around or anything or stalk 
anybody. I just thought they’re gonna be doing that as well. And they’re 
gonna be pleased that they’re gonna have six or five opportunities. 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
 
Women who had donated via an egg sharing scheme often drew on their own 
experience of the treatment process and its outcomes to imagine how recipients 
might feel at different stages of the process, particularly finding out about the 
outcome. These women, who had had IVF themselves, knew how anxious they had 
been waiting to find out, how elated they had been when they conceived and, like 
Olivia, how disappointed they had been when their first attempt had not worked. Egg 
share donors were therefore particularly likely to draw on this presumed shared 
experience in order to empathise with recipients during and after the donation. Often 
egg share donors’ narratives contained a real sense of lives played out in parallel: 
And also we had [son]. So after having a success, you’re hoping, you’re 
really hoping that they, that it worked for them. And I did, I contacted the 
clinic after [son] was born and when we were ready to try again saying, that 
if the couple who had the success wanted a sibling, that it is something, you 
know, that we could discuss ‘cos we’re doing our second round. 
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
But when it doesn’t work you do feel a bit like a wee bit deflated for them. 
‘Cos like, oh my God, what that couple would have gone through. I mean I 
know what I went through and they’ll have gone through more than that.  
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
 
Sometimes non-patient donors drew on their own experience of pregnancy or early 
parenthood in order to imagine how their recipients might feel at a particular point in 
their journey (as opposed to drawing on this experience in order to empathise more 
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generally with the desire to become parents). For example, Rachel, who suffered 
from an autoimmune disorder and was therefore worried throughout her own 
pregnancy about the risk of still-birth and miscarriage, imagined that recipients, 
having waited so long and perhaps suffered many disappointments en route, might 
also be particularly worried about miscarrying:  
‘Cos I was very much like that, I just couldn’t breathe the whole way 
through it. I was so terrified. Especially ‘cos of the Graves disease, you’ve 
got higher risk of still birth as well. So I always thought, if I don’t miscarry, 
I’m gonna have a still birth. I just convinced myself. And I couldn’t enjoy 
my pregnancy ‘cos I was so busy worrying. So when he did finally come 
out, I felt like I could breathe again, you know [laughs]. So I can imagine it 
would be only ten times worse for them. I can totally get it.  
 (Rachel, egg donor) 
 
Donors were usually aware that the clinic would try to match them with a recipient(s) 
who resembled them physically. In fact, this process is fairly limited. Given the 
relative shortage of donors, matching is usually based on very basic characteristics, 
such as hair, eye and skin colour. However, as in the extracts below, some of the egg 
donors imagined that, should they meet, they might recognise this similarity between 
themselves and the recipient. In reality, it is unlikely that these donors could have 
picked out their recipients amongst other clinic-goers since they had no physical 
features which would have distinguished them from many of the women and couples 
in the waiting room on this basis.
10
 However, regardless of whether recognition 
would be possible or not, for some donors, knowledge of the matching process 
fuelled their imagination about who these recipients might be:   
                                                 
10
 These two donors are both white with brown-blonde hair. A donor from an ethnic minority 
background or perhaps a donor with red hair might have had a greater chance of identifying their 
recipient in this way since there would have been fewer patients in the clinic who resembled them 
on the basis of these basic categories 
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R: And it would be good to see how much we maybe resemble each other. 
‘Cos they do try and match up women that look alike. 
LG: Yeah. Not just with the child but with each other. 
R: Yeah so it would be funny to see. You know, so it’d be funny to see what 
they matched us up with. Just out of curiosity. We’d be looking at each other 
and would we totally get it? Oh yeah I totally get why they matched us, you 
know, we are very alike. Or would it be totally random. It would just be 
interesting to see 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
O: But all they said was that they’d match you to your kind of... 
LG: Kind of what you looked like? 
O: Yeah kind of what you looked like. I used to sit, if I was in the 
Greenview, sitting in the waiting room thinking, are they getting my eggs? 
Are they getting my eggs? It was curiosity. 
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
 
Constructing connections through gift-giving 
For many donors, the process of giving gametes created a symbolic link between 
their life and the recipient’s. They knew that their actions would impact on others’ 
lives and they hoped that recipients would now feel a sense of completeness, having 
achieved the family they so wanted. Many donors felt a sense of satisfaction or 
achievement in imagining the consequences of their donation for recipient(s). Donors 
drew on various experiences and knowledge in order to imagine the happiness of 
their recipients. Some, like Faye, knew others who had or were experiencing 
infertility and had seen or imagined the impact becoming parents would have for 
them. Others, like Daniel, had read magazine articles and online texts discussing 
infertility and others’ success stories:  
But you just think of what you’ve done, that you’ve given happiness to a 
family and you know that child’s wanted and loved… But you just know 
you’re gonna do somebody a world of good.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
And I know that good people like my friend, would be so grateful, so happy, 
so glad that somebody else had done that. Then that would be a great gift to 
give to somebody. ‘Cos there’s nothing better than seeing like delight on 
somebody else’s face. I would never see that delight but I would know that it 
would happen.  




For some donors, like Faye, it was enough simply to imagine the impact her donation 
would have for her recipient(s). However, many other donors sought further 
information about the consequences of their donation. Most of the donors 
interviewed had contacted the clinic to find out if any children had been born as a 
result of their donation. In almost all cases where donors offered a reason for this 
decision, they explained that they had wanted to know if their actions had been 
worthwhile, whether they had been successful in helping another as they had 
intended. In this sense, their desire to find out if a child had been born was about 
whether they had helped someone else become a parent, rather than about whether 
they themselves had become “donor parents.” This information was significant to 
them primarily as a means of finding out whether they had helped the recipient or 
not. Where the donation had been successful, donors felt a greater sense of 
satisfaction at the imagined happiness of the recipients and were often disappointed 
for the recipients if they learned that it had been unsuccessful: 
It’s like a wee sense of achievement as well that this has happened. I’m glad 
to have been a part of it to be able to help somebody. I said to the staff at the 
ACU that I would like to know all the way along, how things go with 
retrieval, if the woman gets pregnant how it goes, if she’s successful, if she 
has a successful pregnancy and delivers and…..I felt like I was pestering 
them for a while, I thought she must be due, she must be due, But then I did 
get word back finally that she’s had a boy in October so I was really pleased. 
I thought great. It’s just another thing. Oh I was able to help somebody. And 
it’s not just helping somebody by carrying their shopping. It’s giving them 
something they really want. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
          
On occasion, donors felt they had been given additional hints about the recipients 
and/or the consequences of their donation. This information was highly valued. 
These further details heightened donors’ sense of achievement or emotional reward. 
As we saw earlier in the chapter, Rob was pleased to discover that his donation had 
helped to create families for heterosexual and lesbian couples, as well as one single 
woman. Liam was also delighted to find out that his recipients were planning 




L: But in the way they speak there is an indication that some of these 
families might want there to be a little brother or sister. So of course to keep 
consistency, you come back and you use the same source, so to speak. So 
that there is genetic cohesion. So that’s kind of cool. 
LG: What made you think that? Did they actually just say, oh they probably 
want a brother or sister? 
L: Yeah. It was. It was one of those throw away phrases in the sentence and 
it just makes you go, hang on, thank you for the hint. That’s brilliant. It 
doesn’t give you any specifics. But it’s like [gasps] yes! They will have 
siblings and they can go forth and cause havoc and chaos and have fun 
which will be brilliant.  
(Liam, sperm donor) 
 
Several donors were interested in enacting this symbolic link they felt with the 
recipients of their donation, forming a more “real life” relationship. Five unknown 
egg donors and one sperm donor (Daniel) expressed an interest in meeting their 
recipients, if that was something they were also open to, and would have valued 
other forms of contact, such as a letter or a message passed through the clinic. Again, 
this more personal connection was imagined to be pleasurable because they could 
gain a real insight into how their donation had helped their specific recipient(s). In 
this sense, meeting or hearing from recipients could be seen as a form of symbolic 
reciprocation for the gift they had given. However, we might also understand donors’ 
desires as a means of narrative building or completing their own donation story. 
They were curious about the particular consequences of their actions but they were 
also interested in the recipients’ backstory – what had led them to use donated eggs? 
How long had they been trying? 
LG: Would you actually like if you knew who the recipients were? 
Y: Yeah I think that would be wonderful. Because I think mainly because 
the reason we’re doing it is from an emotional side of things, you want to 
help somebody. I think it’d be wonderful to. I think it’s exactly the same as 
when families want to meet, you know when the person who’s received an 
organ donation, wants to meet the family who lost their loved one. It’s like 
that’s the same for me. I want to know. I’d find it far more. It doesn’t 
necessarily need to be a friend or anything but to know who they are I think 
would be wonderful because you could really say, oh this is where it’s going 
to. 
(Yasmin, egg share donor, original emphasis) 
I mean, I would like the contact.  Just for, if the recipient would want to say, 
aw just fire me a wee email saying, aw I’ve had a great day. I’m feeling 
fantastic. I’m eight months, I’ve only got so long to go. I’m having a boy, 
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that kind of thing. And then if they wanted to give me a wee update every 
now and again it would be nice to know, that’s all. Not ‘cos I’ve got a huge 
desire to be part of their lives but just that I would find it interesting that it’s 
something I’ve helped with. 
Well I think, I wonder if they would want to meet. ‘Cos I’d be delighted to 
meet them. I think it would be really nice. They could get me a coffee and a 
cake and everything [laughing]. It’d be nice. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
 
For one egg donor, Sarah, the desire to contextualise and personalise her donation 
had led her to find her own recipient via an internet forum. In contrast to those 
donors I classify as “known,” she had made a decision to donate her eggs prior to 
finding a recipient. She then had only limited contact with the woman, sending 
messages online. However, it was enough to find out her reasons for seeking a donor 
and therefore offer the personal context that Sarah was looking for:  
S: I ended up – not a very orthodox sort of route really – ended up going on 
a forum and looking for women that wanted egg donors. And I came across 
one woman in the area. We’d never met but we e-mailed each other. So she 
said, if you could be a donor that would be amazing…... She was in her mid-
thirties, and her and her partner had been trying for a long time, and I think 
she had endometriosis, and it was just the only way she could have a child is 
through donated eggs.  
LG: So did you donate directly to her? 
S: Yeah. 
LG: All right. So did you contact the clinic and then find this person 
afterwards on the forums or…? 
S: I can’t remember how I did it. I think – it’s all a bit blurred now – I think 
I found her and then it kind of felt a bit more personal rather than it just 
being anyone.  
LG: And was that important to you? 
S: In a way, I suppose, yeah. I just wanted to imagine someone, and I 
wanted to know how much they wanted it. So that was helpful for me. 
(Sarah, egg donor) 
 
All of the donors discussed in this section constructed their donation as a gift which 
created an ongoing connection with recipients. Imagining the recipients not only 
motivated donors’ initial decision to donate, but the process of giving created a 
continued link with these persons. Some sought to personalise this imagined 
connection by seeking further information about recipients and the outcomes of their 
donation. Others were interested in building a more tangible relationship with 
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recipients based on their gift and their, now intertwined, life-stories. As with 
Maussian understandings of the gift exchange (Mauss 1990; Carrier 1990), these 
gifts were seen to be constructive of social ties between persons. 
 
As detailed in Chapter Three, for Mauss, one way in which gifts produce ties 
between persons is by setting in train chains of obligations to receive and reciprocate. 
In line with this theory, several donors expressed a belief that recipients might wish 
to reciprocate in some way for the gift they had given and a few had experienced a 
return gift of some kind. For most donors, the possibility or experience of 
reciprocation in some form, whether as a material gift or a message of thanks, was 
valued highly and taken as recognition and appreciation of their actions. However, 
donors were usually keen to state that they had not expected or needed any form of 
reciprocation. This qualification perhaps reflects an alternative cultural imperative 
with regard to gift-giving in Western capitalist societies; as detailed in Chapter 
Three, gifts are seen as “purer”, better gifts, when the donor does not acknowledge 
its having been given and expects no acknowledgement from the recipient (J. Parry 
1986; Laidlaw 2000): 
I just thought it might have been nice to hear something from them like a 
wee card saying…You know maybe a wee thank you card and a wee 
picture. I think that might have been just a nice wee gesture. But as I said, 
it’s not something I would expect I just think it may be nice you know. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
D: I initially got flowers the day after my donation from the clinic as a thank 
you and then yes, later on, flowers via the clinic from the recipient as well. 
LG: I see. What was that like both of those things? 
D: It’s little things. It’s just that sort of feeling appreciated. 
LG: I suppose it’s hard to know but did that in any way feed into doing it 
again? 
D: Not for me personally but it’s just a nice… it is it’s the act of being 
recognized that’s the thing. It doesn’t matter what it costs. Someone’s put 
the thought in to do that. 
       (Debbie, egg donor) 
 
These extracts are consistent with a Maussian model of reciprocation in which giving 
back creates ties and ongoing relationships, rather than breaks them. It could be 
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argued that reciprocation is a means of “paying back” donors and therefore divesting 
recipients of ongoing obligations and achieving a sense of closure. However, there is 
no evidence in my own data that donors saw reciprocation from recipients as means 
of paying them back in some way for their donation, of gaining some sense of 
conclusion, nor that they desired this. Donors did not expect or want expensive return 
gifts. These gestures were valued as acts of recognition and appreciation of their 
action and donors often emphasised the time and effort that had gone into them. For 
example, Anna appreciated that her recipient had bought her twelve sunflowers (her 
favourite flower) to thank her for the twelve eggs she had donated. Donors therefore 
valued these gifts as signs that the recipients were thinking of them just as they had 
been thinking of the recipient – that they too experienced this connection or link. In 
this way, reciprocation was a means of continuing rather than concluding the 
relationship.  
 
Several donors expressed a desire to give a further gift to recipients, other than their 
donation. Again, these gifts seem to have been proposed as a means of building or 
expressing the imagined connection they felt with their recipient(s). For Anna, it was 
perhaps an act of reciprocation for the return gift she has experienced. However, as 
Bridget and Karen described (and as I discuss further in the next section), there were 
practical and social barriers to making these gifts and reaching out to recipients in 
this way: 
I asked about leaving flowers out or leaving a note or something. And [the 
clinic were] like, sorry.  
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
I’d be happy to meet them, to write to them. I think it would be great. I 
would love to. I wanted to send a card and a wee Babygro when the baby 
was born but I, I didn’t know how to go about that. I thought it might be a 
bit awkward so I just erm… So I didn’t but… 
(Karen, egg donor) 
And the second time she bought me a like an orange bucket for plants ‘cos I 
love plants, to plant sunflowers in the garden as well. So it was nice. But I 
says to her, I want to be able to buy him something as well that he can keep. 
So I bought him a wee duck bank and stuff. 




Research on organ donation, has suggested that recipients might feel indebted to 
donors in ways that could be problematic for the relationship between donor and 
recipient (Fox and Swazey 2002; Scheper-Hughes 2007). I did not interview 
recipients and so am reliant on known donors’ perceptions of their feelings. 
However, donors’ narratives suggest that recipients did feel some sense of obligation, 
or at least a desire, to reciprocate in some way and demonstrate their appreciation. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that the majority of known donors received gifts 
from their recipients, ranging from a night in a “fancy” hotel to jewellery and 
flowers. Whether this desire to reciprocate was experienced as problematic is 
difficult to ascertain from donors’ perspectives. However, most known donors 
reported that their relationships with their recipients had now returned to their 
normal, pre-donation form:  
And then it just went back into being our friends. And I remember we had, 
we were somewhere in some God-forsaken place but we had hidden a bottle 
of bubbly somewhere. And then they phoned when she was born. And that 
was just a normal like celebration of our friend had a baby that were so 
desperate to have a baby. 
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
Obviously we, we’ve got this closeness. But it [relationship with recipient] 
is the same. It’s very much the same. Nothing’s changed at all. Absolutely 
nothing.  
(Laura, known egg donor) 
 
Grace and Anna both spoke about their recipient’s gratitude in ways that suggested it 
might be experienced as indebtedness. However, there was no suggestion that these 
feelings had caused any difficulties in their relationship. Grace and her sister 
remained close and Anna and her recipient remained friends who met up 
occasionally, just as they had been before. Both Anna and Grace expressed a desire 
to relieve their recipients of any indebtedness and this may explain the tendency for 
all donors, but particularly known donors, to play down the impact donating had had 
on their own life and health:  
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LG: Do you notice a difference in your relationship? 
G: In her I notice, her attitude. A difference in her attitude, yes. 
LG: What do you mean? 
G: She’s more closer. She’s making a lot of sacrifices for me that she would 
normally not do before. Or she would do it but grudgingly. But now it’s so 
easy for her and she just says, oh Grace, don’t worry, I’ll do it for you. 
Don’t worry, I’ll do it, you know. Like there’s not boundaries any more. She 
just does those things and I feel it’s because of the egg donation sometimes. 
I feel sometimes she’s just so happy and so grateful that she has [daughter] 
in her life….. 
LG: How do you feel when you notice that? 
G: I’m enjoying it. Seriously [laughing]. To tell you the truth, I’m enjoying 
it. I won’t complain [laughing]. But I was thinking about talking to her about 
it. She shouldn’t do things like she feels indebted to me. ‘Cos she’s not 
indebted to me. I wanted to do it. And I did it. I didn’t do it because I was 
expecting anything back.  
(Grace, known egg donor) 
And she keeps saying to me, I owe you everything. No you don’t. You so 
don’t. Do you know what I mean? No. I do. No, you don’t, you don’t.. 
(Anna, anonymous and known egg donor, original emphasis) 
 
Limiting relational gifts: organisational practices 
The extent to which donors were able to construct their donations as relational gifts, 
connecting them to specific recipients, was limited both by organisational practices 
and wider cultural beliefs about the risks of gift giving. The organisational practice 
of anonymity most obviously created practical boundaries which limited donors’ 
connection-making but I will argue that such practices also reinforced wider cultural 
norms and beliefs about the risks of relational gift-giving. The way gamete donation 
was practiced and discussed in the clinic sent the message that connections between 
donors and recipients could be problematic and were best avoided. 
 
The most obvious way in which donors were constrained in constructing 
relationships with their recipients was through the anonymity of the system. If they 
did not already know their recipient, donors were normally unable to find out any 
information about them or communicate directly with them. Maintaining anonymity 
was an active and everyday practice of clinic staff. As one nurse explained, they had 
to “box clever” to ensure that donors and recipients were not in the waiting room at 
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the same time. This, the nurses told me, was particularly challenging in cases of egg 
donation because the treatment of donors and recipients needed to be synchronised. 
For some staff, the maintenance of anonymity also foreclosed the possibility of 
indirect communication. This would seem to be the reason why Bridget, quoted in 
the preceding section, was prevented from sending a gift and message to her 
recipient.  
 
The main reason that clinic staff gave for maintaining anonymity was simply that it 
was procedure. As a senior nurse at Greenview explained:  
It’s anonymous donation so it’s anonymous as far as I’m concerned. I 
anonymise everything. From the clinic point of view, we anonymise it 
because it’s anonymous and they’ve got the chance to keep it anonymous. 
(Rebecca, nurse, Greenview) 
However, when pressed further, some explained that limiting connections with 
recipients was necessary or preferable in order to avoid emotional complications of 
more personal relationships. Although nurses, in particular, often recognised that 
donors might take pleasure in finding out more about the recipient and the 
consequences of their donation, they explained that sharing such information might 
also have a negative emotional impact if the donation was not successful; the more 
they knew about the recipients, the greater the sense of guilt or disappointment might 
be if they produced few eggs or if their donation did not result in a pregnancy: 
And I think it might be… I don’t know if it would be a good thing for them. 
I sometimes, not worry, but I sometimes think to myself when it’s known 
donation as well, kind of what impact it has on the couples. One, if the 
treatment doesn’t work. And how bad or guilty the person donating feels 
about the treatment not working. And you’re still having lots of contact with 
the person. Although, when it’s anonymised, unknown, you may feel sad. 
‘Cos you can find out if it’s been successful and you may feel sad for that 
but you don’t have to face this person though. 
(Beth, nurse, Hillbrook) 
[When egg donors ask about the recipients] I don’t say too much because if 
it doesn’t work out you don’t want them to think they’re disappointing the 
person. So keep it quite...don’t say too much really about…try and say really 
very little about that. ‘Cos obviously if they end up with no eggs or very few 
eggs then they’re not going to be giving the person any so don’t want to 
disappoint the person. 




Clinic staff, including counsellors and medical staff, commonly viewed known 
donation as particularly complicated from an emotional and relational perspective. 
They often expressed concerns that known donors, particularly family members, 
would feel pressured into donating, sometimes repeatedly, if an initial donation was 
unsuccessful. Although I do not want to diminish these concerns nor deny the 
possibility that some known donors do experience negative pressures to donate, 
Grace’s story suggests that questions about coercion do not always make sense in the 
context of known donation. As she explains, with family, and arguably also with 
close friends, it is difficult to distinguish one’s own feelings about donation from the 
potential recipient’s. This is partly about empathy but it is also about the difficulty of 
distinguishing coercion from obligation. It seems that in the context of the clinic, 
pressure to donate is viewed negatively, as coercive and compromising the autonomy 
of persons. Whereas, in the context of families and personal relationships, pressure 
may be viewed more positively, as obligation or duty. The tension between these two 
understandings is evident in Grace’s story:  
G: It was difficult. You know, especially the part about seeing the 
psychologist. Because the psychologist wanted to know if I felt like I was 
under any kind of pressure to donate those eggs. And how does my husband 
feel about this and things like that? And those were three key questions 
because….Because the person I’m donating my eggs for is my sister, of 
course, you cannot say exactly what’s motivating you to do this. There’s 
love. There’s commitment. There’s family values as well. There’s so many 
things that influence that decision. So it’s kind of tricky to answer.  
LG: How to say if you feel an obligation? 
G: Exactly. Exactly. If it was doing it out of obligation, out of pressure, out 
of love. I didn’t know [laughing]. 
LG: Was it a difficult decision? 
G: No. Not exactly no. 
(Grace, known egg donor, original emphasis) 
Grace’s experience suggests that there may be some tension between the medical-
ethical expectation of informed consent and the familial context of donation. Donors 
are expected to give their informed, voluntary consent to donate. However, the 
concept of entirely “voluntary” consent relies upon the same model of personhood as 
the ideology of the “pure gift” (J. Parry 1986): one in which people are 
fundamentally independent and their desires and needs can be easily distinguished 
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from those of others. I would argue that such an asocial model of personhood is 
never achievable but nowhere is this clearer than in the context of personal and, 
particularly family, relationships. This is because relations perceived as kin are seen 
to be intrinsic to the self – personhood is constituted through these relationships 
(Carsten 2004, 107). In this context, it is impossible for Grace to separate her own 
desires from her sister’s needs since the two are fundamentally intertwined. 
 
Negotiating organisational practices: questioning and resisting 
anonymity 
Anonymity in itself does not prevent donors from constructing connections with 
recipients. As Konrad (2005) argues, anonymity affords an imaginative space within 
which donors can narrate relationships with their nameless recipients. And, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, lack of contact did not necessarily prevent donors 
articulating these connections in quite personal terms. In addition, sometimes donors 
and staff questioned or resisted anonymity, particularly in its strongest form. 
 
In various subtle ways, some donors contested the limitations of anonymity. For 
example, Sarah circumvented the normal practice of anonymity by seeking a 
recipient online in order to personalise the donation. Similarly Bridget’s request 
(refused by clinic staff) to send a gift to her recipient can be read as a challenge to 
absolute anonymity. Bridget lamented the apparently nonsensical ban on 
communicating information to recipients. Having previously experienced a degree of 
lactose intolerance, she stated that it was a shame she couldn’t simply tell the 
recipients to just “watch this kid around dairy.” Like Bridget, Karen questioned the 
degree of anonymity enforced by the clinic. To her, it felt “clinical” and she would 
have liked the opportunity to build and personalise her connection with her recipient, 
if that was something they were also interested in:  
LG: Is there any way that you think the experience of being a donor could be 
improved? 
K: Erm well for me it was all because it was anonymous, I felt it was really 
quite clinical, the whole thing. You know it was very, I’ll not say 
regimented but I knew what I had to do and I knew what the whole process 
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and when it was done and dusted well that could have been it. But it was out 
of my interest that I wanted to find out that it was successful. That I wasn’t 
just doing it for nothing. 
K: [A little later in the conversation] And I’m a curious person and I’m an 
impatient person as well so I was just like ah what’s happening?! I don’t 
know like I said, it would have been nice to know if the recipient would 
have liked to meet me, or would have liked to get in touch with me. That’s 
one thing I’ve always wondered about. If they perhaps wanted to keep in 
touch with me. I’d like to know that side of it. Either way it wouldn’t upset 
me but its’ one thing that I would’ve liked to tick a box. Yes they can 
contact me. They can get in contact with me by phone, email… 
(Karen, egg donor) 
Staff interviews also suggest that some donors pushed the limits of anonymous clinic 
practices by seeking the maximum amount of information permitted to them about 
their recipients. Terry, a nurse, explains that donors often asked questions about their 
recipient which staff were not permitted to answer: 
T: [Donors] ask a lot. They do ask about the procedure quite a lot. All IVF 
patients do but they are interested in the recipients so you sort of see. 
Sometimes they want to get a wee hint about the recipients but you can’t 
really give any hint. But I don’t, they know they can’t know but I just 
think… 
LG: What kind of things do you mean? 
T: Well they just say when’s the recipient coming in? Is she excited about 
her treatment? Some of them don’t but some of them do 
LG: And do you normally say anything? 
T: I don’t say….you’ve got to be pretty vague.     
  
(Terry, nurse, Hillbrook) 
 
However, it was not only donors that resisted complete anonymity. Some clinic staff 
celebrated and encouraged a level of connection-making between specific donors. 
For example, whilst in some cases (like Bridget’s) staff refused requests to send gifts, 
there were many more cases I was told about where such requests had been viewed 
as kind and entirely appropriate gestures. Rebecca at Greenview told me that 
recipients sent gifts to egg donors in approximately five to ten percent of cases. Like 
many of the nurses I interviewed, she spoke about these gifts and thank you cards in 
positive terms as something greatly appreciated by donors. Terry expressed this view 
in the strongest term, suggesting that such thank you gifts should really be expected 
and she couldn’t understand why they were so rare: 
Do you know what I think is odd? I must admit. A few people that have 
been donated to, egg sharers, or full altruistic donor, have given eggs to 
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people…and if it was me receiving eggs from somebody else and I know 
they’ve gone through that, I would leave flowers or a letter to say thank you 
or thanks. And there’s only one person since the whole time I’ve been here 
who’s done that. 
(Terry, nurse, Hillbrook) 
 
Later in our conversation, Terry also suggested that the matching process might also 
facilitate connections between recipients and egg donors. Along with her colleague, 
she explained that the nurses at Hillbrook had previously requested a greater role in 
the matching process because, unlike the clinic manager (who currently organised 
matching), they got to know the recipients and the donor. They both discussed an 
occasion where they had had a recipient and donor “coming through” at the same 
time who they thought would be a really good match. When I asked why they 
thought this, they explained that they were really gentle, really similar people and 
their families were also quite similar: 
They were just, similar kind of families, similar kind of background, similar 
kind of people. Just gentle and sort of quite timid people. Just seemed like a 
nice match. Just thought they’d be good. 
 (Terry, nurse, Hillbrook) 
I tried to probe as to why Terry might have thought it would be good to match people 
who were similar in terms of their personality. Was it because these traits might be 
inherited and therefore the donor would be a better “stand in,” genetically, for the 
recipient? Was it because, with identity-release legislation, there was a chance these 
two families would meet in the future and she thought they might get along? It was 
difficult to get Terry to elaborate much on the reasons for her comments. However, 
she did repeat that it “just seemed like a nice match.” My interpretation would be 
that, through donation, staff felt they were symbolically linking these women and 
their families would therefore be connected. They took pleasure from the idea that 
that the women involved might approve of one another or recognise something of 
themselves in the other. However, this was something that was felt at an emotional 
level rather than something which had been thought of for a practical reason. 
 
It is notable that the staff who were most likely to celebrate connection-making 
between donors and recipients were nurses. This group spent the most time with egg 
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donors, particularly in situations where there was opportunity for informal two-way 
conversation. They got to know egg donors best. We might therefore infer that their 
views had been influenced through dialogue with donors (and perhaps also 
recipients) and the ways in which some framed their donations as a relational gift. 
This seems likely. However, I would also add that they were able to take on this 
perspective and celebrate connections between donors and recipients because this 
view of gifts as personal, relational activities has cultural saliency – it is a 
meaningful and legitimate way to talk about gifts (see Chapter Three). 
 
Negotiating organisational practices: embracing separation 
Although both staff and donors did sometimes question or resist absolute anonymity, 
the vast majority stated that some degree of separation between donors and recipients 
was best. Whether known or unknown, it was common for donors to talk about the 
need to keep some distance from recipients and they placed limits and boundaries on 
their relationship. For example, donors commonly described avoiding relationships 
with recipients that were “too close.” For some unknown donors, this was often 
given as a reason why they would not donate to someone they already knew. Or in 
some cases, they stated they would potentially donate to an acquaintance but not to a 
close friend or family member. Making things “too close” or “too personal” were 
also reasons given by some donors as to why they would prefer not to meet or 
receive any contact from recipients or, occasionally, even to find out if the donation 
had resulted in a birth or not.  
 
This desire to limit closeness was not only expressed by unknown donors. All four 
known donors who had donated to friends rather than family, explained that retaining 
or creating some distance between themselves and the recipient might be necessary 
for the donation to succeed in the long-term. Nina, for example, explained that her 
and her recipient had largely been friends within the workplace and that this kept a 
“nice distance” between them and they planned to “return to their own lives” once 
the transfer had taken place. In a similar vein, Hannah had thought that her friend and 
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her husband might find it necessary to curtail their relationship, post-donation. From 
her own perspective, this was unnecessary but she was prepared to sever that 
connection if that was what her friend preferred:  
For me, absolutely this was their thing. So if they felt it was too awkward to 
ever see us again when the child was born, I was saying, that’s, that’ll be 
really sad but it’s fine.  
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
In the event, all involved did not find this to be necessary and Hannah described her 
relationship with her friend as unchanged. 
 
In line with the views of clinic staff, donors sometimes expressed concerns that 
knowing too much about the consequences of the donation could lead to emotional 
complications. For example, connections with, or information about, recipients were 
associated with the risk of guilt if the treatment failed. Nina expressed strong feelings 
of guilt that she had conceived twins via the egg-sharing process, whilst her recipient 
had not conceived at all. Breaking the news to her had been a difficult experience: 
That two week period afterwards was awful. For me. I really did feel awful. 
‘Cos I knew, having had the experiences, that I thought Tina, Tina’s body 
would be telling her if she’d had a successful implant…..And then when it 
was confirmed and she was crushed. And then I had to say, I’m pregnant 
and it’s twins. 
(Nina, known egg share donor) 
Several other unknown donors commented that they might, or did, feel guilty if they 
discovered that the donation had not resulted in a pregnancy. Some, like Rachel, 
imagined that recipients might wish they had been matched to a different donor. 
However, these statements were usually followed by a comment that they knew such 
feelings were irrational. They knew they could not have done any more to help and 
they had at least given the recipients an opportunity to try.  For a couple of donors, 
potential exposure to feelings of guilt or disappointment was given as a reason not to 
find out if the donation had resulted in any births or raised as a concern regarding 




The risk of being judged or being judgemental were also given as reasons why 
donors would not wish to meet their recipients. Two donors explained that if the 
recipient were to meet, or find about more about, them, prior to the donation, they 
might make unfair or prejudiced assumptions about them and their potential genetic 
contribution to offspring. For example, Rob had thought carefully about whether or 
not to describe his sexual orientation, as a gay man, in his donor profile (the part 
which could be read by prospective recipients). On the one hand, it was a significant 
part of his identity which he did not feel he ought to hide. On the other hand, he 
thought, as did the doctor advising him, that such information should not be relevant 
to recipients and to include it would enable recipients to discriminate on this basis. 
He therefore felt conflicted about whether to enable recipients to discriminate against 
him, or the idea of homosexual offspring (he reasoned that recipients might assume 
homosexuality could be genetically inherited), or risk that his offspring could be 
raised by homophobic parents. Karen similarly raised concerns about being judged 
by recipients, this time in the event that they were able to meet pre-donation. 
Although elsewhere in the interview she said she was keen to meet recipients, she 
considered that doing so at this time might allow them to judge her, based on 
superficial characteristics, which might dissuade them from using her donation. For 
this reason, she advocated the anonymous system of matching as she felt, to do 
otherwise, would make the process “too personal:” 
[On meeting the recipients prior to donating] Well I don’t know because, 
well I, we’ve been anonymously matched. I would, I think that maybe 
meeting each other, as I’ve said they might see me and think, coloured hair, 
tattoos, she’s maybe got a really wild streak in her. She’s maybe a bit off the 
rails. And think well I’m not sure I want her. Her genes might make my 
child wild as well. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
Eve also spoke about the risk of herself becoming “judgemental” if she were to know 
“too much” about her recipient: 
E: [Explaining why she wouldn’t be a known donor] I think it’s probably 
because I would know them. And I would maybe see them. And I would 
maybe see the child. Like if it was somebody who lived around here or 
somebody from my work, I would constantly hear stories about the child, if 
it was successful. I think at that point my curiosity would just come out and 
I would probably want to know more than is healthy. I think, as bad as it 
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sounds on me, I would become a bit judgemental. That’s not how you do it! 
That’s not how I did it with my two. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
Here, being “judgemental” is presented as, self-evidently, a bad thing. It would not 
be “healthy” for her and therefore ought to be avoided.  
 
Donors’ statements, that connections with recipients brought emotional risks, would 
seem to mirror the concerns of clinic staff, previously described. For both donors and 
staff, relational gifts are emotionally messy – they may bring positive emotions 
(pride or satisfaction) but such personal connections also risk negative experiences 
(being judged or becoming judgemental, feeling guilty). It is not possible to know if 
clinic interactions directly shaped donors’ views. I found only one example in my 
data where a donor described an interaction with a staff member where this message 
(that “too personal” connections are emotionally risky) was directly conveyed. 
However, it seems likely that donors were influenced by the wider context of 
anonymity and the implications of such a system. Keeping donors and recipients 
separate would seem to imply that connections between the two are risky or 
inappropriate, that gamete donation is safer, less problematic if some distance is 
retained.  However, we can also understand the anonymous system itself as a product 
of two wider cultural ideologies. Firstly, it is a product of an ideology of the “pure 
gift” – the belief that gifts, properly given, ought to be entirely “given up” and givers 
should receive nothing in return. Secondly, it is a product of an ideology which says 
that a “proper” family constitutes two people in a sexual relationship and their 
offspring. Under such a model, donors, as potential third parents, represent a threat to 
the status of the recipient parents. When they embrace the system of anonymity or 
talk about the need for distance from recipients, donors are both mobilising, and 
influenced by, these cultural beliefs. 
 
Good gifts are “pure gifts” 
Social rules about how gifts should be given were rarely made explicit by my 
interviewees. As this section demonstrates, it is necessary to look quite carefully at 
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donors’ narratives to see how they are influenced by such norms. My attempts to 
encourage participants to articulate these norms usually fell flat. However, Faye was 
an exception. She used her sister as a poor example of a gift-giver – someone who 
had difficulty truly “letting go” of their gift, expecting continued reference to the fact 
of her having given it: 
F: And I’m quite, I like to give gifts. I’m a much better giver of gifts than I 
am a receiver of gifts. Just generally as a person. And I think about my 
younger sister. If she gives you something, if she has something, she gives it 
to you, she’ll make reference to it every time she sees you. Oh you’ve still 
got that, I’m pleased you’ve got it. So she’s, it’s almost like you’ve got to 
thank her every time you see her. [Sister’s] a bit like that….  
LG: But that’s kind of important to you about giving a gift that you don’t 
mention it? 
F: You kind of don’t mention it you know. It’s like you’ve given the gift, let 
it go. 
 (Faye, egg share donor) 
Faye, along with Daniel, was also explicit that seeking, even imagining, connections 
with recipients constituted a form of reciprocation and thus undermined the purity of 
their gifts. Daniel and Faye suggested that the right and appropriate way to give a gift 
was to give it up completely. They implied there was something not quite right about 
seeking or enjoying, even symbolic, reward for your actions (such as feeling pleased 
at being able to help others). It was not seen as appropriate to want praise or 
expressions of gratitude for giving a gift: 
D: I know I shouldn’t say I know I shouldn’t say I should be proud of it. It’s 
not something you should shout on the rooftops. 
LG: Why not? Why do you say that? 
D: I’ve love to shout from the rooftops and say, I’m doing this to help 
people. But it’s something. It’s who I am. I’m not gonna hide it. 
LG: But why do you say you shouldn’t be proud of it? 
D: Because you’re doing it to help people, you’re not doing it for a self-
reward.  
LG: Yeah but I don’t know if those things are incompatible. 
D: It gives you this warm feeling that you’ve actually done something to 
help somebody else. So to me that kind of takes like the selfless act away 
from it, so to speak. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
Then that would be a great gift to give to somebody. ‘Cos there’s nothing 
better than seeing like delight on somebody else’s face. I would never see 
that delight but I would know that it would happen. So I think that it was 
you know completely selfish. It was about the joy of giving. 




Daniel and Faye’s words mobilise an ideology of the “pure gift” – the idea that the 
most altruistic act is one which is given without any expectation of return, of any 
kind, and that gifts, once given, ought to be entirely alienated from the donor (Parry 
1986; Laidlaw 2000; Derrida 1992 see Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion 
of this theory). Whilst Daniel and Faye were the only participants who were quite so 
explicit about this being the “right way” to give gifts, we can see the influence of this 
ideology more indirectly in many other donors’ narratives. When they stated that 
they had not expected any gratitude or reward, when they play down the pain and 
discomfort to themselves, when they tried not to judge recipients and talked about 
the emotional messiness of making gifts too personal; in all these ways donors 
mobilise (and were subject to) cultural discourses that gifts should be entirely given 
up and that (in order to really be altruistic) the giver should not expect or receive 
anything in return, nor retain any attachment to that which has been given. 
 
Respecting the boundaries of the recipient’s family 
However, we cannot fully understand why donors felt compelled to limit their 
connections with recipients if we restrict our analysis to beliefs about gift giving. 
Much more explicit in my interviews was the belief that such limiting was necessary 
in order to shore up the boundaries of the recipient’s family, and particularly to 
protect the recipients’ position as the “real parents.” Donors wanted to give recipients 
a “normal” and full experience of parenthood and so it was important to them that 
they were not seen to intrude. As Bridget explained, if she were to meet her 
recipient(s), she would have to be really careful not to “tread on her toes” by taking 
on, or being perceived to take on, any kind of maternal role. 
 
In relationships described as “too close,” donors felt that it would be difficult to 
maintain these boundaries, either because, under such circumstances, they would feel 
compelled to interfere with the parenting of their offspring or because their presence 
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alone would be perceived as an intrusion. In these extracts, Eve expresses the first 
view and Rob the second: 
But I think if I knew them then the whole genetic part of it would come in a 
bit more. I would be thinking right but that’s part of…. part of me… that 
you’re raising. And you’re not raising them the way that I would want to. 
But I think if they were closer and I seen them and I seen the child there’s 
more of an emotional link. ‘Cos I can kind of see them as they’re growing 
up. So I don’t think I would cope with doing the known donation. I think 
that would be a bad idea for me. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
My role was to help another couple make a family and then my hope is that 
they’ve created a happy family so that child would be happy…that’s their 
life really. I wouldn’t want to, well I don’t think it would happen, but [I 
wouldn’t want to] be introduced into that family in whatever way ‘cos then 
that would interfere with their family really. For me, you would need to step 
back to let that person have that life that they want to with that child. 
(Rob, sperm donor) 
 
Rob’s perception, that distance was necessary primarily for the recipients was 
reiterated in many interviews. Donors felt that they needed to respect the boundaries 
of their recipient’s family. It was crucial that they were not seen to intrude on this 
space and particularly not to threaten the recipients’ status as the “real parents.” 
Olivia was quite explicit that distance was necessary for the recipients more than for 
her: 
O: [On not donating to a known recipient] It’s not so much, ‘cos I think my 
preference actually would be to see [child] all the time growing up, but it’s 
more so for them as another family. I don’t feel that would be right for me to 
be involved. ‘Cos then, you know, say with my friend, say she gives them a 
packet of crisps and I’m like, he’s only one! And that then becomes that 
whole, you’re not the parent! It’s me! You know what, it’s far too 
complicated, I think, if you’re close.  
LG: It’s harder to know what your role is? 
O: It’s the boundaries, It’s more where the boundaries are. What you can say 
and what you can’t say, I think, for a close person.  
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
Several other donors described similar situations in which they imagined donating to 
someone they knew but subsequently then feeling an inappropriate urge to interfere 
if they perceived that the recipient was parenting poorly. In such cases, it was often 
unclear why they imagined they would feel particularly compelled to intervene. 
151 
 
Although, in the extract above, Eve attributed these feelings of responsibility to her 
genetic relatedness, donors were rarely so explicit. Donors might also feel a 
particular responsibility because their actions and their decision to donate had made 
the child’s life possible.  
 
Donors presented it as self-evidently problematic if they were to act or feel in any 
way motherly or fatherly towards their offspring. It was taken as given that such a 
situation would be challenging for the recipients. I would argue that their 
assumptions stem from a wider cultural ideology of the “sexual family” (Fineman 
1995) (see Chapter Three) and an idealisation of the parent-child relationship as an 
exclusive one (Melhuus 2012). Donors were aware of wider cultural beliefs, that 
“proper” families constitute two people, in a sexual/romantic relationship, and their 
offspring and the importance of having one’s “own child” (and the exclusivity that 
implies) in order to truly be a parent (Melhuus 2012, 43). If it is assumed that a child 
should have only two “real” parents, then the donor, if perceived to be behaving in a 
parental manner, represents a threat to the status to one or other of the recipient 
parents, particularly the non-genetic parent. 
 
Sperm donors as a particular threat 
The sperm donors I interviewed seemed particularly concerned that recipients might 
perceive them as a threat. Adam, for example, explained that it might well be 
challenging for a male recipient to make contact with, or thank, their donor:  
A: Because, because for a man to be infertile that is a blow to the ego. And 
sending a letter to some other guy. It would feel weird to me if I was on that 
end. And so I’m not expecting [them to get in contact]. I probably would not 
have written anyway, if I had been in that situation. 
LG: Because it rubs that in, in some way? 
A: It may require them to face up to facts that they’re not ready to 
completely digest. 
(Adam, sperm donor, original emphasis) 
Similarly Neil explained why male recipients would not normally be interested in 
staying in contact with their sperm donor: 
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You can understand men being embarrassed feeling they’re not a man 
because they can’t have kids themselves. 
(Neil, known and identity-release sperm donor) 
Here, Adam and Neil refer to the particular stigma attached to male infertility, 
associated with impotence and seen as a threat to masculinity (Wischmann and 
Thorn 2013; Snowden, Mitchell, and Snowden 1983; Gannon, Glover, and Abel 
2004; Thompson 2005), to explain why their recipients might perceive them as 
“some other guy” – a potential threat to their identity, as a man or as a father.  
 
We might also interpret Adam’s words as a suggestion that the male recipient might 
see the donor as threat to his relationship with his partner. The relationship between 
sperm donors and recipients has historically been sexualised. When donor 
insemination was first reported in medical journals, the practice was condemned by 
church leaders for its association with adultery (see Frith 2001; Haimes 1993). 
Although we would expect such extreme views to have waned over the years, recent 
research in Belgium (Burr 2009) shows heterosexual recipient couples continue to 
view sperm donors as “the other man” in their relationship. In informal discussions, 
clinic staff suggested that this was probably the reason why so few [heterosexual] 
couples used known sperm donors, particularly brothers. In such cases, they said it 
would be perceived as though the female recipient was having the baby of her 
partner’s friend or her partner’s brother and this had sexual implications. Terry 
recounted one such example at Hillbrook of a man donating sperm to his brother and 
his wife. She describes this scenario as a “bit creepy” and reports that staff attempted 
to persuade the couple to use an unknown donor instead: 
But I just think, well were all just talked about it. And I think, well you 
know, how would the fact that it’s my brother-in-law’s baby…? And you 
know, they had a lot of counselling about it. And we tried to persuade them 
maybe to put the sperm into the bank and we would give them an 
anonymous donor. 
(Terry, nurse, Hillbrook, original emphasis) 
  
The belief that they posed a particular threat to recipients would seem to (partly) 
explain sperm donors’ relative lack of interest in their recipients, compared with egg 
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donors. The former were much less likely to describe an interest in contacting, 
meeting or finding out more about their specific recipients. This pattern is partly 
explained by the greater numbers of known egg donors and the synchronicity of 
female donor and recipient treatment. However, in addition, I suggest that, because 
they were especially aware that they could be perceived as a threat to recipients 
(particularly male partners), sperm donors kept their distance, not just physically but 
also discursively. They were therefore less likely to talk about their donation as a 
personal, relational gift to specific recipients. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that donors often framed their donation as a 
“communal gift” – a civic act of sharing surplus or extra with those in need. In this 
way, they constructed a connection with recipients that was indirect; these were gifts 
to a generalised group of people in need or, to borrow Titmuss’ (1973) term, a 
“universal stranger.” However, many donors also framed their donation as a 
Maussian gift, a personal, relational act which created a social tie with their specific 
recipient. Known donors drew on their pre-existing relationship with the recipient 
and portrayed their donation as embedded within a wider norm of gift-giving in their 
friendships and family relationships. Egg donors, in particular, often drew on 
(presumed) shared experiences or similarity with the recipient, as well as celebrating 
the impact their donation would have on their lives. Some donors (again the vast 
majority female) sought to personalise or extend this connection by seeking further 
information about, or desiring to meet, their recipient. 
 
However, all the donors I interviewed were limited in their ability to construct these 
kinds of personal connections with recipients. Clinic practices and anonymity, as 
well as a wider cultural ideology of the “pure gift” discouraged such connection 
making. In addition, the desire to give recipient’s a “normal” experience of 
parenthood meant many donors felt some distance was best in to avoid “treading on 




All donors therefore spoke about the need for limits or boundaries to their 
relationship with recipients. However, I suggest that male donors were particularly 
discouraged from constructing personal connections with recipients because they 
were aware that, due to the stigma attached to donor insemination and male 
infertility, they might be perceived as a particular threat to the male recipient. In 
contrast, the synchronicity of treatment for egg donors and recipients provided egg 
donors with a basis on which they could more readily construct these kinds of 
personalised connections.  
 
That is not to say that every egg donor framed their relationship to recipients as a 
personal one and every sperm donor portrayed themselves at a distance. The ways in 
which participants used these discourses was much more fluid than that. However, 
these gendered cultural pressures did result in general gendered tendencies in my 
findings. This is important because the way in which participants constructed 
donation as a particular kind of gift, with particular relationships to recipients, 
influenced how they constructed their role in relation to the wider community and in 
relation to offspring. As I will show in the remaining chapters, personalised 
connections with recipients provided a narrative resource which donors could 
reference in order to manage the meaning of monetary payments offered to them and 





Money, Markets and Good 
Citizenship: Donors in Relation to the 
Healthcare System and Wider 
Community 
 
In this chapter I examine donors’ views on their position within the wider community 
and, particularly, the health care system. Whereas Chapter Five focused on donors’ 
connections with the ultimate intended recipients of their donated gametes – the 
person(s) seeking fertility treatment, this chapter looks at connections with 
alternative or additional conceptions of recipients – clinics, the healthcare system or 
“community” in a more general sense. I analyse how donors position themselves in 
relation to these groups and institutions.  
 
I first show that donors often presented themselves as active community members or 
good citizens. Donors often described the act of donating gametes as one of several 
ways in which they tried to “give back” or “do their bit” for the wider community 
and was generally presented as a moral duty. Although donation was often depicted 
as one act in this repertoire of giving behaviours, I go on to demonstrate how some 
donors developed a particular interest in donor-assisted conception and the needs of 
those seeking fertility treatment. Having become aware of the shortage of donors in 
relation to potential recipients, several took on an ambassadorial role, aiming to raise 
awareness of the need for gamete donors. In some cases, they saw themselves as 
active agents in an on-going process of social change in which donor-assisted 




It was important to donor participants that their donation be viewed as other-oriented, 
an act intended to help others in their community. One of the ways in which they 
presented their donation as a gift, and their intentions as altruistic, was by 
distinguishing it from economic exchange and presumed self-interest. Donors 
frequently emphasised a distinction between what they were doing, donating to help 
others, and what others might (but should not) be doing, donating for the money. For 
them, donation was not, and should not be, a job and they did not see themselves as 
providing a service or product in exchange for money. This opposition to financially-
motivated donation was seen to be of particular importance in the context of identity-
release legislation and the possibility of contact between donors and donor offspring. 
In contrast with several previous studies of anonymous gamete donors (Speirs 2008; 
Jadva et al. 2011; Lui and Weaver 1996; Kalfoglou and Gittelsohn 2000; Purewal 
and van den Akker 2009), all, with the exception of three egg sharers, completely 
rejected the idea that they had been, even partially, motivated by financial gain. 
Several donors, in fact, declined payments offered to them.  
 
However, this did not necessarily mean that no payment could be, or was, accepted 
by donors. Although, for some, accepting any payment would have undermined their 
conception of donation as a gift, for others, some form of payment could co-exist 
with an understanding of gamete donation as an altruistic act. Drawing on the work 
of Zelizer (1994), I show how some donors, enabled by clinic discourses and 
practices around payment, were able to accommodate payment within a presentation 
of the donation as a gift. However, for others, interactions within and outside the 
clinic limited their ability to frame payments in this way. I suggest that male donors, 
in particular, were challenged by a continued stereotype of sperm donors as 
financially motivated men, donating for “beer money.” I also suggest that male 
donors were particularly reliant on a “pure gift” (J. Parry 1986) discourse, and 
therefore absolute opposition to the world of money and markets, in order to present 
their donation as a gift. Following from my discussion in the previous chapter, I 
argue that this is because sperm donors faced barriers to constructing their donations 
as personal, relational gifts – an alternative gift discourse, which was, as a rule, more 




In the final sections of this chapter, I examine the ways in which donors positioned 
themselves in relation to the fertility clinic at which they donated and the wider 
health system. As I will show, this was presumed to be a partnership. Donors 
assumed that clinic staff, the institution itself and the “system,” like themselves, were 
acting and organised in pursuit of a shared aim: alleviating the suffering of those 
experiencing infertility. For most, this sense of team work was maintained 
throughout and beyond the donation process. However, in a few cases, a perceived 
lack of recognition, knowledge of restricted access to fertility treatment and/or the 
realisation that their “donation” was made to a profit-making business could be 
jarring to donors’ understanding of their role and, for one man, quite upsetting. I 
suggest that, although the topic of payment for treatment rarely arose, when it did, it 
often seemed to undermine the spirit of communal giving in which their donation had 
been made.  
 
As this chapter demonstrates, the concept of money was frequently referenced by 
donors in order to articulate their position within the community and health care 
system. Whatever payment was offered, whether it was accepted or not, money was 
always discursively present. By distinguishing their donation from financially 
motivated exchange, donors positioned themselves as good citizens, donating in 
order to help others. Some, particularly sperm donors, narrated their role in absolute 
opposition to the world of money and markets. At other times, donors related to the 
concept of money in quite creative ways, actively shaping the meaning of payments 
made to donors, the cost of fertility treatment and profit-making of private clinics, in 
ways which distanced these practices from market exchange. However, maintaining 
this narrative was not always straightforward. Clinic discourses and interactions with 
staff generally enhanced donors’ perception of donation as an other-oriented act and 
as a gift to the universal other. However, on occasion this understanding could be 
disrupted by alternative discourses and practices surrounding money. For example, 
their gift-giving narrative needed to be defended when others perceived gamete 
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donation to be a financially-motivated act. It could also be disruptive, even upsetting, 
when donors perceived that their donation was being sold for profit. 
 
Contributing to the community: donors as good citizens 
In line with their presentation of gamete donation as a “communal gift” (see previous 
chapter), many donors presented their donation as just one way in which they aimed 
to “give back” to society at large. For them, seeking to help others was part of what it 
meant to be a good citizen, to give as well as take from those around them: 
I’ve always viewed taking part in medical things as one way to kind of 
contribute to society, if you like. To assist other people, to assist research, to 
assist medicine. So, in the past I’ve taken part in a trial for the male pill. And 
that was a very successful trial. 
(John, sperm donor) 
My whole life is helping other people. I foster dogs and stuff like that as 
well. Yeah. But I always think, if you do a good thing, you get it back.  
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
Like Anna and John, many donors described other ways in which they contributed to 
the local and wider community. These included formalised arrangements, such as 
volunteering at local schools and residential homes, carrying out work in public 
parks and sponsored runs for charity, as well as informal one-off acts such as 
stopping to give someone a lift and undercharging an elderly person for repair work. 
Often these activities were described when I asked donors if they could think of any 
reason why they had become a gamete donor, when so few others did so.  
 
The majority of donors also described their wish to be an organ donor in the event of 
their death, with many having registered themselves with the organ donor register 
and informed their families. None of the donors interviewed stated a preference 
against being an organ donor. Daniel had also decided to donate his body to medical 
science after his death. Like gamete donation, organ donation was presented as a way 
in which they could help others and many implied that it was a civic responsibility 
for people to contribute in this way to the health system, which they and their 
families also benefit from: 
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And again, when it comes to organ donation, I’m on the organ donor list 
‘cos I kind of think, well then, what does it matter to me? You know, a lot of 
people are like I wouldn’t donate my eyes because blah blah blah. And I’m 
just like, who cares? Don’t worry about it. It needs to be done. 
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
I would always give organs, aye. Aye they can have mine, no bother. I 
mean, you’re only ever an organ donor on a motorbike. Especially the way I 
drive it too. You’re only ever an organ donor. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
Yeah. I actually think it should be the other way round, that you have to opt 
out of [organ donation]. Especially when you become a driver. You know, 
you have to opt out to not be a donor.  
(Rob, sperm donor) 
 
Interestingly, far fewer donor participants were also blood donors. In a significant 
number of cases, this was because they were excluded from doing so or limited in 
their ability to donate. Both Rob and Daniel spoke of their disappointment that 
current UK regulation disqualified them from contributing in this way because of 
their sexuality. Rachel could not give blood because of a health condition. Others 
reported repeated temporary restrictions relating to pregnancy or having had tattoos. 
Two other donors, Ian and Liam, felt unable to give blood because of a fear of 
needles. They both explained that, although they had been able to overcome this fear 
in order to give blood samples for gamete donation purposes, they were mindful of 
the bigger needles and greater quantity of blood needed in blood donation. This 
finding is intriguing in light of Valentine’s (2005) interviews with Australians who, 
for various reasons, were excluded from blood donation. She argues that, since blood 
donation is constructed as a civic practice or responsibility, those who were unable to 
donate felt excluded from the category of “good citizen.” Both Rob and Daniel 
expressed disappointment that they were not able to contribute in this way: 
They’re not going to put it [my blood] through any more screening. It’s one 
screening. One pint of blood gets tested for the exact same things as my 
blood would get tested. But they just don’t accept it.  




In various ways, donors presented generosity and altruism as fundamental to their 
own identity. They saw themselves as the kind of people who liked to help others. 
Sometimes, like Hannah, they associated this mentality with the way they had been 
brought up. Several donors also talked about their desire to pass this attitude on to 
their own children: 
I grew up with parents who did a hell of a lot in their local community and I 
do now as well. Something about helping others. I’ve just grown up. That’s 
definitely kind of a value within how I’ve been raised. That’s great that you 
do this. But you should give back a bit. It was never verbalised. But it’s just 
what happened. And so I naturally do, I don’t know, get involved in stuff. 
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
So [daughter and I] volunteer up [at the park]. We give up a couple of days a 
week. So we do that. So I think I’ve taught her how to give of herself, you 
know. And I say, when you give something, you get something back in 
return. You’ll give up your time to volunteer but you’re getting the job 
experience back.  
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
 
Whilst donors talked about helping others as a moral duty, they often also recognised 
(directly or indirectly) that others did not necessarily behave in the same way. Ian 
implies this when he describes how, for other people, “money is their God.” On a 
similar note, Daniel laments what he presents as a general unwillingness to help 
others in our society: 
With my Mum [after she died] it was kind of like, well life is too short. Why 
don’t we help others? And there’s other decisions I’ve made, like I’m going 
to donate my body to science. ‘Cos I got the attitude of, how did my Mum’s 
surgeons learn? How did they learn about cardiovascular disease, how did 
they? Do you know what I mean?  Again, who does it? And then I realised 
it’s the general public who decide what to do and donate organs, bodies etc. 
So I kind of grasped that decision of what needs help. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
Whilst the decision to donate was often framed within a wider conception of 
themselves as good citizens, who generally sought to help others, several donors 
developed a specific interest in gamete donation and issues surrounding donor 
conception. In the process of becoming a donor, via their engagement with texts on 
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the topic and interaction with clinic staff, donors became aware of the shortfall of 
donors in relation to potential recipients. Subsequently, several participants had 
attempted to publicise gamete donation and encourage others to come forward. 
Karen, for example, had set up a blog to share her experiences, Eve had contacted a 
local newspaper who wrote about her donation and Rob had taken leaflets into work 
and talked to his teammates on a local football team. Through their engagement with 
the National Gamete Donation Trust, two donors, Debbie and Neil, had been quite 
extensively involved in publicity and recruitment surrounding gamete donation, 
including multiple interviews with various media outlets and campaigns to increase 
awareness. This ambassadorial work was generally framed as an extension of their 
original donation – a means by which they could help greater numbers of people 
suffering from infertility: 
Yeah. I asked them. I got [leaflets] from the clinic. I asked the doctor there. I 
said, look you know, I work in a male prison. I could hand them out there [to 
staff]. It’s just planting that little thought really that someone may have their 
own family and be happy to donate to others etc. And I suppose really it’s 
just a next step on. I’ve helped a family. With knowing [clinic staff] and 
seeing the working, you then come to understand the business side of things 
as well. You know, they’ve got targets to meet, they’ve got high demand, 
they’ve got a low supply. Well you just sort of think, I could help out there. I 
know people in football. I’ll ask at football. So I think the awareness of the 
whole, it’s that lack of understanding. And it’s just trying to, at a low level 
really, just trying to get people more aware 
(Rob, sperm donor) 
I just wrote in to the local evening paper just to say I’m doing this. Just to 
kind of highlight it really. That was after I’d been to the meeting and, at that 
point, realised how low they were on donors. How much of a shortage there 
was of the... So I just kind of thought, this would be a good way to put a face 
to the whole process, make it a bit more friendly. A lot of people might think 
it’s very sterile, it’s very clinical, but it’s not really. You’re kind of given the 
stuff you need. You go away. You do it in your own time.  
(Eve, egg donor) 
 
Caution should be taken when interpreting this evidence in terms of how common 
these ambassadorial practices are amongst gamete donors. My sample is likely to be 
skewed in favour of those who would be more likely to share their experiences and 
actively publicise donation. This is partly because such people might be more willing 
to also take part in social research. However, it is also because a sub-section of my 
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sample, including all of the men listed above, were recruited via the National Gamete 
Donation Trust’s mailing list – an organisation with the specific aim of raising 
awareness of gamete donation and increasing donor recruitment. However, for those 
donors who do engage in these practices, the above interview extracts give an insight 
into the meaning such ambassadorial practices have for them. 
 
For several donors there was a sense that, by talking with others and the media as 
well as by taking part in donation themselves, they were part of an on-going 
movement for social change – a progressive process whereby assisted reproduction 
generally, and donor-assisted reproduction more specifically, were becoming 
increasingly acceptable to a wider public. For Nina and John, their role was in 
advancing scientific and/or medical progress for the good of society: 
And I just think that in the past people just haven’t had the opportunity to be 
able to do kind things. And because of the advances in science, you can. So 
why not? Do you know what I mean? It’s just very much a, probably just 
about who I am as a person more than anything, you know. I just think 
there’s progress. There’s progress for reasons. So long as it’s not detrimental 
to your own health or your own mental health. You know, it’s why not? I’m 
very much of that opinion.  
(Nina, egg share donor) 
I mean, my background, I’m an engineer. So I’m an engineer. I’m a 
scientist. I am… I view myself as part of that wider community of open 
minded, you know, science and reasoning and that kind of defines what I 
think makes us. Oh God it all sounds very Star Trek doesn’t it. It’s what 
kind of defines us as humanity, is our ability to do things to help other 
people for no reason other than it’s something I can do that can help other 
people. 
(John, sperm donor) 
For Liam, the progress that he saw himself to be part of was the on-going 
liberalisation of society and, in particular, increasing openness and decreasing stigma 
associated with reproduction and sex: 
The thing they we’re trying to get across [through recruitment campaigns] 
is, it’s everything from how to get the numbers up through to how to raise 
public awareness of it. And yes when it was all secret, when you could keep 
it quiet and no one had to know, fine, people were comfortable with that. 
The moment you extrapolate that out, people get hung up. Weirdly. I’m not 
sure why.  But I think it is literally, I think there are some old throw backs. I 
think we are brought up in a way we’re meant to be very proper and moral 
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and that conflicts and goes wrong somewhere along the way. And hopefully 
it will fade with time. And society will become more robust from it. With a 
bit of luck. We can but hope. Tolerance is a good thing. Change is a good 
thing. To evolve as a society has got to be a good thing. Hopefully it will 
work out eventually. We can hope.  
(Liam, sperm donor) 
 
As with Liam’s comment, donors often expressed the view that, although IVF was 
now widely acceptable, gamete donation and donor conception, particularly under a 
more open system, remained controversial. For this reason, social change was 
presented as very much an on-going process, though one which, as donors, they were 
at the forefront of. Explicit references to stigma or public disapproval were much 
more common in relation to sperm donation. Sometimes this stigma was connected 
with the sexual connotations of masturbation. Although Daniel thought that the 
stigma attached to sperm donation had probably diminished in the last five to ten 
years and found many people responded positively to his actions, others still 
considered sperm donation controversial and, at other points in the interview, he used 
the word “seedy” to describe others’ perceptions: 
LG: You were saying there is still a bit of a stigma? 
D: Yeah. And there is a lot of people that go, well done, you’re doing good. 
And then there’s other people out there that go, really? You’re doing that? 
And it’s like. I do think there is a stigma out there where, I don’t think in 
this country there’s a big advertising campaign on it. I’ve never seen 
leaflets. I’ve never seen campaigns about it.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
The continued stigma attached to sperm donation can perhaps explain a slightly 
decreased tendency for men in my sample to have spoken about their donation with a 
wide range of others. Nearly all the women I interviewed had been very open about 
having been an egg donor and had shared their experiences widely, with colleagues, 
family and friends.
11
 In contrast, male donors, particularly those not recruited via the 
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 The only exception to this rule was Laura who had only told her parents and partner because her 
friend, the recipient, had decided not to tell their daughter that she was donor-conceived. For her, 




NGDT, tended to be more private about their donation. Adam, for example, had only 
told a couple of friends (one who was adopted and the other who had previously 
donated anonymously) and no family members. He explained that he had not 
deliberately kept the donation a “secret,” as such, and had plans to tell his daughter in 
the future. However, as he explained, sperm donation was not an everyday topic of 
conversation and he was aware that, whilst he might not receive negative responses, 
others might not entirely understand his reasons for donating:   
LG: And you’ve said you spoke to a couple of friends about it. Have you 
spoken to many friends about it? 
A: No I’m reasonably private about it. I think that’s fair to say. 
LG: Is there a reason? Just hasn’t come up or… 
A: I don’t know. 
LG: ‘Cos it must have been a reasonable time part of your life, if you see 
what I mean? 
A: I don’t know. It’s still not something you sort of slip into everyday 
conversation. There’s still, I don’t know if there is a social stigma or not. I 
think most people would be totally cool with it but you know others ask 
why. You’d get a lot of questions which take a lot of time to answer. Again, 
not really had any compelling reason, except for the one friend who had 
been a donor himself. 
(Adam, sperm donor) 
In contrast to egg donors, who nearly always reported very positive responses to 
sharing their donation, affirming their status as altruistic givers, sperm donors more 
often reported negative responses from others:  
Yeah I’ve spoken to a couple of people about it. But either everybody else is 
really closed minded or I’m just really stupid and have it wrong somewhere. 
The whole joke could be on me at some point! 
(John, sperm donor) 
 
Donation is not a job: “I didn’t do it for the money” 
The financial context to donation varied amongst the men and women I interviewed. 
Depending on whether they were sharers, “altruistic” or known donors, male or 
female, and the time of their donation, donors were variously offered no payment, 
payment for specified expenses up to £250 per donation programme/cycle, fixed 
sums of £750, £35 per clinic visit or reduced cost IVF treatment (for further 
information see Chapter Two on regulation). However, whatever payment they had 
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been offered, all donors actively rejected the idea that they had been primarily 
motivated to donate for financial reasons. Of all the donors interviewed, only three 
egg share donors expressed the view that the financial benefits of donating had been 
even a partial factor in their decision making process and this was commonly framed 
as a “bonus” once a decision had been made, rather than a significant incentive: 
 ‘Cos although, like I said before, there was a financial part of it, that wasn’t 
the driving factor behind it. It was just, I really see that as like a bonus. As 
in, oh by the way, not only can you help either the researchers or women 
who want to have children, you’re getting a discount. And you didn’t feel 
like you were getting paid for it either. It was like a discount.  
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
 
Of course, we could question to what extent these statements reflect donors’ actual 
perceptions of their motivations at the time of their donation. Perhaps donors were 
simply telling me what they assumed I wanted to hear. It could be argued that such 
statements that they “didn’t do it for the money” reflect cultural expectations that 
gamete donors ought not to be motivated by money, that gamete donation should an 
other-orientated act of giving and that admitting to any financial incentive would 
undermine this. Such an interpretation would be supported by Almeling’s (2007; 
2006) ethnographic research in a US egg bank, as well as Ragoné’s (1994) study of 
surrogacy, also in the United States. Both anthropologists found that staff in 
organisations which facilitated these practices, encouraged potential egg donors and 
surrogates to articulate their motivations in terms of helping and giving, sometimes 
excluding from participation those who expressed financial motivations. Such 
expectations were maintained despite the significant sums paid to women in these 
contexts. Whilst my own observations and interviews with clinic staff did not reveal 
such strong expectations or policing of donors’ motivations, staff often expressed the 
hope that donors were motivated, at least in part, by a desire to help others. Such 
expectations were also conveyed through donor information literature which 
described donors as “volunteers” or incited the reader to help others by donating the 
“gift” of gametes. Indeed, the very use of the word “donation” to describe the 
process, with its semantic connection to charity and other kinds of bodily giving 
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(such as blood or organ donation), conveys the expectation that this should be an 
other-oriented act: 
Your donation of eggs or sperm to help a couple have a child is one of the 
most generous gifts anyone can give.  
(Becoming a Donor, NGDT website, 2014) 
Healthy female volunteers aged 35 years or less may donate following 
careful counselling. Some of these volunteers approach the Unit directly 
wishing to donate eggs, while others after further discussion agree to egg 
donation at the time of their sterilisation. 
(Hillbrook information leaflet) 
We might argue that the passing of time and the subsequent temporal distance from 
initial discussions, or acceptance, of money would allow donors increased space to 
reconstruct their motivations in line with these expectations. Whilst I certainly agree 
that the gift discourses surrounding gamete donation will have shaped the way in 
which donors view the topic of payment, as I will now demonstrate, there are good 
reasons to believe that donors’ statements that they “didn’t do it for the money” are 
genuinely held perceptions of their own motivations.  
 
A key reason for my contention is that the vast majority of donors went further than 
simply saying they didn’t do it for the money and expressed the view that no one 
should do it for the money:  
If it’s a gesture payment of a fiver then that’s fine. It’s not something. 
Again, I’m not doing it for financial gain. If you’re doing this for financial 
gain then you shouldn’t be allowed to do it in my opinion. I know that’s a 
really, I know that’s a really strong thing. But if you are doing this for a 
financial gain then you’re doing it for the wrong reasons. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
I would hope you’d be motivated for the act itself. I would hope that the 
money isn’t a motivating factor. ‘Cos I think it’s quite a selfish reason to do 
it. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
Like many donors, Daniel and Eve expressed in quite strong terms, the view that 
donating for financial gain was morally wrong and were frequently able to articulate 
reasons for taking this ethical position. This would seem to suggest that, to the extent 
that donors were influenced by the gift rhetoric surrounding gamete donation, these 
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norms had become internalised, deeply-held principles rather than more superficial 
adoptions of convention.  
 
For some donors, the problem with donors who were financially motivated was that 
it inevitably led to questions about the “price” of what was being donated. For Daniel 
and Anna, what was being given was closely associated with human life, or at least 
the potential for a life. If people therefore understood themselves as “selling” their 
gametes then, to these donors, that was uncomfortably similar to selling a child, their 
body or the rights to parenthood. These were things which were held to be sacred and 
beyond the valuation system of the market: 
If I was doing this and saying I want more money. It’s like no. To me, it’s 
like selling a child. It’s preposterous. It’s like selling an organ. It’s not… 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
How can you put a price on a human life? How much is it worth? How 
much, how much, if you couldn’t have kids, how much is that worth to you? 
How much is it worth to the next person? How can you put a price on that? 
So I think that’s why I have a hang up with the money thing.  
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
 
However, the primary reason that financial motivations were seen as problematic 
was the prospect of contact from donor offspring. The idea that offspring might one 
day learn that their conception had resulted from a financial exchange was seen as 
emotionally problematic. Several donors described a future scenario in which a 
donor-conceived teenager plucked up the courage to contact their donor, only to find 
out that the person had only donated because they needed the money. Participants 
considered that such a discovery would be quite distressing to the donor-conceived 
person. As I explain in Chapter Six, many donors positioned themselves as a 
narrative support to offspring – someone who could help them to extend the story 
they had of their life. If financial motivation becomes part of this backstory, these 
donors seem to suggest that the narrative is tainted in some way and that the 
potentially positive benefits of knowing more about what made one’s life possible 
are undermined:  
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The worry is, if you are encouraging people to do this purely for cash, the 
implications are there are gonna be people. These are going to be thinking, 
breathing, living people. They’re gonna grow up. Don’t tell them their life 
was just there for cash. That’s wrong. 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
If the child came to me at the door and I said, well actually I did it all for 
money. Well that would be horrendous to say that to a person. So if I was a 
person of that moral standing then it would just be awful, I think, to be 
telling someone that. 
(Rob, sperm donor) 
LG: Does it matter if people do it for the money? 
R: Yeah. I suppose not. Not for them it’s not. It’s them who are going 
through it. But I think for the child involved, it’s not very fair. ‘Cos what if 
they do want to get to know them and then the donor had no intention of 
ever wanting to meet them. And, you know, this child, whatever, could get 
their hopes up that they’re gonna, you know, have this big, emotional 
reunion. You know, just be part of someone else’s life. And just to be shot 
down in flames. Imagine being told, no, I only done it ‘cos I was skint. You 
know, imagine that. It would be heart-breaking to be told that. If you’d spent 
ages working up the courage and reading over this letter again and again and 
again and wondering what they’re like and then you’d worked up the 
courage to finally do it. And get told that. It would be just crushing. So I 
just, you know. Fair enough if they’re skint and need quick cash. You know, 
fine. But I just don’t think it’s fair on the child. 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
As Rachel suggests here, donors’ concerns about others donating in order to make 
money were related to a belief that such persons would, on the whole, be less 
empathic and more self-centred than those who donated with the primary intention of 
helping others. Such persons, they suggested, might not take sufficient account of 
their potential offspring’s feelings and therefore might reject attempts to contact or 
meet them in the future. 
 
Daniel and Adam raised similar concerns but also considered the potentially 
damaging consequences for the donor themselves. They thought that people who 
were influenced by financial gain might make their decision without properly 
thinking through the long-term consequences which could mean they were unable to 
cope with a future situation in which they were contacted: 
Yeah I think if somebody did it for financial reasons, you could easily get 
into a situation where a child makes contact and then that person says no I’m 
not interested and I think psychologically that would be a very tough blow 
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for a, you know, somebody who was conceived in vitro, to take. Yeah just 
did it for the money. It just sends a difficult message I think. Yeah and you 
know this way everybody who does it this way [without financial incentive] 
does it because they are trying to help and because they’ve thought through 
the consequences and are sort of happy with that. 
(Adam, sperm donor) 
I think if you want to do this to have your own personal gain, I think you’re 
doing it for the wrong reasons. I don’t think, It’s not a decision that should 
be taken lightly. Oh I can go and get six, seven hundred quid for this. Let’s 
go and do it, it’ll take twelve weeks of my life. And that’s it. I think you’ve 
got to have the mind-set to do it where it’s not just a one-off thing. You have 
got the chance of somebody coming and chapping on your door in 18, 20, 
30, 40 years’ time. You’ve got to be, I think to be a sperm donor at least, 
you’ve got to be ready to accept if they chap that door or not. I think you’ve 
got to have that prepared now. There’s no point in donating now and then 
you panic when the door does rattle.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
Ultimately, it was because they felt a responsibility towards offspring and a concern 
for their wellbeing that donor participants considered financially-motivated donation 
to be morally wrong. 
 
Are paid gifts possible?  
Although nearly all
12
 were disapproving of people who donated for money, 
interviewees were split over the issue of whether or not payments should be 
permitted to, or accepted by, donors. For some, any kind of monetary exchange was 
perceived as inappropriate, tainting the spirit of giving in which the donation had 
been made. Others took a more nuanced, pragmatic view of payment and considered 
that a gift-based model could be retained whilst allowing payment for expenses in 
some form.  
 
It was often men who most strongly advocated for complete non-payment and 
several sperm donors rejected or re-donated money offered or paid by clinics. Ian, for 
example, donated his payment to a local children’s hospital. Daniel was also 
                                                 
12
 The exceptions were all known donors who were more open to the possibility of paying donors as 




considering this possibility himself (he had not yet been paid since he was mid-way 
through the donation process). Liam also turned down the offer of reimbursement for 
travel expenses: 
See I never ever done it for the money, money didn’t interest me at all. I 
done it to help people…any penny I’ve ever had I’ve given to [children’s 
hospital]. Why would you want paid for helping somebody? What can I say? 
It’s hardly like you’re asked to run a marathon or anything. It’s hardly hard 
work. It’s hardly hard work what you’re doing so. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
To put this into context, these were not men for whom the money would have been 
insignificant. At the time of donating, Daniel was unemployed and Ian worked long 
hours in a skilled, manual job to support a large family. Although Daniel and Liam 
downplayed the time and money they spent travelling to and from the clinic, both 
were making regular return trips of around 30 miles each way. Liam was travelling to 
the clinic on his day off, whilst Ian was fitting in his visits whilst his family ate their 
dinner. Therefore, although Ian stated that donating was not “hard work,” it did take 
up a considerable portion of their free time. 
 
For these men, the introduction of even small amounts of money into the donation 
process tainted their intention to help others; it seemed to undermine the spirit with 
which they had entered into the process. As Liam explained, giving and accepting 
money are not compatible and for this reason he rejected the offer to have his travel 
expenses reimbursed: 
The aspect for me as well, if you’re paying then that doesn’t feel like 
helping. You offer help. You don’t offer help and say, here’s the bill.  
And also there’s that whole element of paying, it just didn’t sit right. Like I 
said, it’s the whole, how do you set it up in your head, how do you square it 
with yourself? For me, it’s are you helping? Yes. This is a good thing. Right. 
Fine. And then that’s the way you’re doing this. If it’s, I’m only doing this 
and I’m being paid. Well….doesn’t feel right. 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
 
Whilst John had accepted a small amount of money to cover travel expenses, he 
raised similar concerns about fixed payments to donors. He argued that fixed 
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payments, at the level now available to sperm donors, transformed donated sperm 
into a commodity. Though he did not fully articulate why he was uncomfortable with 
commodification in this particular context, he alluded critically to societal processes 
in which more and more objects and actions are becoming commodified as products 
and services which can be exchanged for money. Paying sperm donors was 
envisaged as part of this process in which the market comes to dominate more and 
more aspects of our lives. Similarly, marketisation was seen as a self-perpetuating 
process; Fixed payments to donors, however small, were presented as the first step 
on a “slippery slope” in which increasing elements of market processes are 
introduced into the donation system, increasing payment through competition for 
scarce donors:  
If you start to pay people money for it then do you start going down the road 
where it just becomes another commodity. And I’m not sure that I’m 
particularly comfortable with things being bought and sold in a market like 
that. And I think that the easiest way to prevent that from ever happening is 
you just don’t pay donors. You don’t turn it in to a commodity.  
(John, sperm donor) 
 
The men quoted here all mobilise a particularly Western ideological opposition 
between gifts and market exchange (Parry and Bloch 1989; Parry 1986 discussed in 
Chapter Three), in which the former are perceived as entirely (purely) altruistic acts 
and the latter entirely selfish. Parry and Bloch argue that we tend to fetishise money, 
seeing it as a condensed symbol of economic exchange. As such, the presence of 
money itself (rather than the capitalist relations of production and exchange with 
which we associate it), is often attributed the power to corrode social ties. In stating 
that payment would taint their altruism, the men cited here both mobilise and, are 
subject to, cultural discourses which state that money inevitably corrodes personal or 
community relationships and has no place in the realm of gifts. 
 
Many other donors expressed more nuanced views on payment to gamete donors and 
suggested that a spirit of giving could co-exist with some kind of payment to donors. 
Such expressions were most often voiced by egg donors who felt that donors should 
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not be left out-of-pocket as a result of their donation. They described the necessity of 
taking time off work for appointments and for recovery from the egg retrieval 
process, as well as paying for travel costs. Bridget also highlighted the risk that 
further time off work might be necessary if any medical complications were 
experienced, including common side-effects such as mild ovarian hyper-stimulation. 
When they reflected on these direct and indirect costs, they often concluded that the 
£750 standardised payments now available to egg donors were approximately correct 
in order to ensure that egg donors were not effectively paying to donate: 
You know, people always ask, you know, how much money did you get for 
it? But you know, see in the grand scheme of things, I don’t think it’s that 
much money for what you go through. You know, really it’s not. 
Considering, especially the amount of money I spent in transport, up and 
down. You know, if you’re taking days off work. ‘Cos if you’re taking days 
off work as well, you’ve got that to think about. And then you’ve got, you’re 
injecting yourself with drugs and swallowing all these tablets. And then 
you’re getting the actual procedure done. You know, if you think about it, 
it’s not really enough to cover what you go through. But you know, again, 
it’s not the point. I’m really not fussed about the money and I would do it for 
nothing.  
(Rachel, egg donor, original emphasis) 
But yeah just in terms of a professional woman taking all of that time off 
work and risking having to take even more time off work. It’s a huge thing 
that’s not adequately compensated for. And I don’t think women should 
expect to be paid for it so they can do it for a job. But I just think, it’s taking 
a day off work, you should be compensated for that day….And I’m not 
saying there should be any extra payment to acknowledge the pain or the 
hormones or the slightly increased risk of cancer. All of that is just a given. 
It’s just to make sure that you’re no worse off financially on top of all the 
physical symptoms. 
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
 
The perception that payment can co-exist with altruistic motivations is perhaps made 
viable because of the language commonly used in donor recruitment literature. 
Information leaflets and websites for potential donors commonly refer to 
“compensation” or “expenses” rather than payment, although not exclusively so. 
Clinic staff and donor information texts regularly refer to “altruistic” donors to mean 
unknown, non-patient donors. As seen below, such donors are termed “altruistic” in 
the same sentence in which compensation amounts are described, suggesting to the 
reader that no contradiction exists between payment and other-oriented motives:  
173 
 
Sperm donor payment - Payment of donors is prohibited. As a sperm donors 
you can receive compensation of up to £35 per clinic visit, to reasonably 
cover any financial losses incurred in connection with the donation, with the 
provision to claim an excess to cover higher expenses (such as for travel, 
accommodation or childcare).  
 (HFEA website, 2013) 
Egg Donors can be compensated £750 (includes expenses) for each altruistic 
egg donation cycle.  
(Egg donor information leaflet, Greenview) 
 
It was also common for clinic staff to suggest that payment, and some level of 
financial motivation, could co-exist with a desire to help others. Whilst some 
concerns were raised about the possibility of people donating only for monetary gain, 
financial incentive and altruistic motivation were not generally presented as mutually 
exclusive. One doctor made an analogy with medical professionals, and others 
working in caring professions; people may seek such work because they want to help 
others. However, they still expect to be paid fairly for the work they do. Like donors, 
staff cited the costs incurred as a result of donation and the need for payment in order 
to ensure donors were not effectively paying to donate:  
And even if they were doing it for money, I’d like to think that they’re still 
doing good to the society. So if, like anything in the world, we are working 
for money. We do our jobs for money. Then someone could get back and 
say, you’re not a good doctor because you’re taking a salary.  
       (Mark, Hillbrook) 
And I think [fixed payments are] more of an incentive as well for people to 
come forward as donors. But then one of the donors that’s come through, 
she is, she’s very altruistic and she’s got her family. She’s a wonderful girl 
and has donated to us twice. And I’m sure for her, the money is a help 
because she’s got young children. So she’s doing it with that in mind as 
well. But she is doing it altruistically in the sense that she knows how much 
she enjoys her family and just wants somebody else to have that.  
(Rebecca, Greenview) 
 
It is not possible to ascertain to what extent the views of staff on this topic directly 
impacted on the perceptions of donors. It may be that the influence of their beliefs 
was limited since, as staff participants explained, they rarely discussed payment with 
donors and they were only speculating about the motivations of donors they had met. 
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Similarly, it was rare for donors to report discussing payment with staff, beyond the 
briefest of conversations. However, looking at staff statements alongside those in 
recruitment literature, it would seem that medical discourses surrounding gamete 
donation at least allow space for financial and altruistic motivations to co-exist, for 
“paid gifts” not to be paradoxical.  
 
However, as both donors and staff discussed, retaining the spirit of giving under 
conditions of payment required balance and limitations. Whilst acknowledging the 
need for some payment, many donors and staff were wary of a US-style donation 
system which was commonly used to exemplify an unregulated market system. Both 
staff and donors described the American system as one where gametes were bought 
and sold at market prices, resulting in large sums paid to donors (particularly egg 
donors), differentiated  according to the desirability of the donors’ genetic material. 
Interviewees strongly disapproved of this approach to donation, often in a seemingly 
instinctual way – a gut reaction that this was not the right way to do things. Where 
more specific reasons were given, donors and staff talked about the possibility for 
exploitation of donors, particularly college students seeking a means of paying their 
fees, and the inappropriateness of recipients having such a level of choice over their 
donor’s characteristics. Interviewees particularly disliked the idea that recipients 
might be selecting characteristics from a catalogue of donors. Such an image seemed 
to have eugenic associations – raising the spectre of “designer babies:”  
[On the US system] I think that’s a bit sort of, you know….designer baby 
almost, isn’t it? 
 (Laura, known egg donor) 
I’ve been at the BFS [British Fertility Society] in [city] and my colleague 
and I were looking at this stand. And it was… honestly… I don’t know how 
realistic it was. It was sperm that you could buy from America, right. So it 
was like flicking through a catalogue of Brad Pitts, with their academic… 
and you know…And their likes and their dislikes. And you think, oh my 
goodness. How real is that? I mean, you have no way of knowing surely. In 
this country, I would probably have more faith in this country ‘cos we are 
very heavily regulated as opposed to other countries. And with the sperm 
donors you wouldn’t be choosing them for their look….That’s more your 




In contrast to their self-portrayal under the UK system, donor participants portrayed 
US donors as vulnerable workers at risk of exploitation: 
LG: How do you feel about the new payment system, do you know about it? 
S: I don’t really know what to think about it, because I know it’s rather 
exploited in America. I know they’ve got a lot more money doing it in 
America. And I think because of that, the clinicians don’t give the full facts 
of… This is just from what I’ve read on the internet and stuff, some really 
scary stories. And people do it countless times to get themselves through 
college and stuff. It just doesn’t… It’s such a big thing to do. But I think it’s 
a very small amount for you’re doing it. In this country it’s a small amount 
that you get paid. So suppose it’s a decent compensation, and I think it’s that 
small an amount that it’s not something that people will want to do again 
and again. £700, isn’t it? Or is it less than that? 
(Sarah, egg donor) 
The US system was often compared with the UK system – to demonstrate how the 
level and character of payment here was distinctive, but also as a warning of how 
things could go “too far.” Staff and donors did not want an American-style system 
but many acknowledged the difficulty of setting payment at a level where such a 
market did not develop. After some consideration, many donors concluded that the 
current levels of standardised payments permitted to UK donors did not create such a 
system but were wary of increasing the levels further.  
 
Donors’ ability to frame their donation as a gift, whilst accepting or acknowledging 
the necessity of payment, was not only influenced by the amount of money which 
was paid. The way in which payments were made and discussed (or not) was a key 
factor enabling donors to tell their stories in this way. I suggest that it is the very 
absence of discussion of payment in the clinic which makes it possible for some 
donors to claim expenses or accept payments without undermining their own sense 
of acting altruistically. All medical staff told me that they did not personally discuss 
payment with donors. Often information about payment was conveyed primarily via 
information leaflets or, at Greenview, was included briefly in the initial telephone 
screening process for new donors. Several donors told me that when they first 
decided to donate, and even during the process, they did not know if, or how much, 
they might be paid and that it was not important to them. I suggest that not having 
this specific information enabled them to distance themselves from the position of 
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“worker” and the notion of monetary exchange. In addition, donors described 
acquiring knowledge of payment via passive means - others had told them about it. 
They were not active agents in pursuit of this information. Payment was something 
which happened to them, not something which they had sought out:   
LG: Did the clinic offer you any payment for donating? 
D: I believe there’s something but I’m not 100% sure what. I’m not, I wasn’t 
in it for the financial gain. [Counsellor] mentioned there’s some sort of 
gesture payment at the end. But I’m not in it for that so whatever that is, it’s 
gratefully accepted but again it’s not expected, so to speak….I’ve never had, 
I don’t want to say this quite rudely, I’ve never had the audacity to turn 
around and say how much is it gonna be? Whatever’s given at the end will 
just be given. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
Yeah I knew you could get paid for it. I didn’t know what the amount was or 
anything. I had no idea. 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
I did get my expenses paid. So that was really handy, actually. And I didn’t 
expect that but [recipient] said to me, they will pay your expenses so 
mention it to them. Because obviously it was a drive to and from [clinic 
location] so, I don’t know, 60, 70 mile round trip. Which I wouldn’t have 
minded but they said, we’ll pay your expenses. 
(Laura, known egg donor) 
 
Barriers to constructing payment as “compensation” 
Talking (or not talking) about money in particular ways impacted donors’ 
perceptions of their actions and their place in the health care system. This can be 
seen most clearly when clinic discourses disrupted donors’ established ideas about 
their role and their donation narrative. Anna’s story is a good example. During her 
interview, Anna described at some length the impact of a comment from a staff 
member at the time when her expenses were paid to her. The staff member’s 
suggestion that she was being given “a lot of money” was offensive to her since it 
implied her own motivations had been financial and undervalued her desire to help 
others. This experience, she explained, had discouraged her from donating again (at 
this point she had already donated twice anonymously) until she came into contact 
with her known recipient via an online forum, several years later: 
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And I just felt like a slab of meat to be honest. It was so petty. It was just 
something that [staff member] did. She gave me my travelling expenses. 
Now, I’d been up and down, up and down, up and down a lot of times. And 
she gave me it. It was the way she said it, “that’s a lot of money,” you know. 
And I thought, have you any idea what I’ve just been through? You can’t put 
a price on that. My travelling cost is absolutely nothing to the gift I’ve just 
given. That’s an insult. In fact, I wouldn’t even need your travelling costs if 
your parking wasn’t so horrific. Do you know what I mean? I was like, I’m 
up and down here like six times and…Do you know, it really annoyed me, it 
really annoyed me.  
And it’s not pleasant. Nobody does it for the travelling expenses. Oh, I 
mean, what a weird thing to say. So that annoyed me and that’s why I 
stopped donating. It was nothing to do with the law. 
(Anna, anonymous and known egg donor) 
We can think of Anna’s experience as a kind of “breaching experiment” (though not, 
in this case, a deliberate one), as advocated by Harold Garfinkel (1967), in the sense 
that it reveals social norms by violating them. Minimising discussion of precise 
payments, and certainly avoiding discussion of financial motivation, with donors 
seems to have become an established practice in the clinics. This norm enabled 
donors to accept some payment, whilst maintaining their position as altruistic 
volunteer, a role that they both perceived themselves to inhabit and was expected of 
them by others. 
 
Interactions outside of the clinic could also challenge donors’ conception of their 
own role. As Rachel explained, other people did not always believe that she had been 
motivated by a desire to help rather than for financial gain:  
But people think I’m lying when I say even if I wasn’t gonna get paid for it, 
I would have done it. And I would still do it as many times as I could, as my 
body would let me, even if I wasn’t getting paid for it. You know, ‘cos it just 
was not the point. I wasn’t doing it for me. No one believes me when I say 
that 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
These experiences, or at least the reporting of them during the interview, were more 
common for “altruistic” donors donating post-2012 and the introduction of 
standardised payments. This would seem to suggest that, for the wider public beyond 
the clinic, such payments could less easily be understood as compatible with 
altruistic motivations. It is also possible that donors in receipt of standardised 
payments felt less secure in their own narrative that they were acting altruistically 
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and so these challenges are attributed greater significance, more often remembered 
and reported. Several donors reported that when they discussed donation with others, 
people’s first comment or question was on the topic of payment.  
 
One of these donors was Rachel but, in general, such responses were more 
commonly reported by men. These men explained that the public, in general, tended 
to perceive sperm donation as something men did to earn money and often they 
stated that others might see it as “easy money.” Ian described hearing and 
challenging these views from friends who assumed that he had been paid and that he 
had been financially motivated: 
See I never ever done it for the money, money didn’t interest me at all. I 
done it to help people. But I dare say, a lot of people that I spoke to about it 
were, oh you get paid for it. Wait a minute! I mean, I said, any penny I’ve 
ever had I’ve given to [children’s hospital]. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
I think there is something that’s seen as a bit kind of… well, you’re getting 
paid to have a wank aren’t you? 
(John, sperm donor) 
‘Cos if you watch, this is what I said to [counsellor], you watch Friends, you 
watch other American sitcoms, where sperm donation is, you walk in off the 
street, you get money. That’s how it’s portrayed in the media.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
I suggest that male participants more often reported these kinds of assumptions 
because of a continued stereotype of sperm donors as financially motivated (see also 
Wheatley 2016; Almeling 2011). This view was evident amongst female 
interviewees who, despite having emphasised their own altruistic motivations, failed 
to see that their male counterparts might be similarly motivated: 
I mean a lot of guys. I think they would tend to do it for financial gain more 
than anything. I don’t think they’re interested to find out what would 
become of it. I don’t know. That’s just maybe an erm uneducated statement 
to make. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
But what motivates a, or is there a factor which motivates a male altruistic 
donor? ‘Cos I can’t… Is it money? I can’t… ‘Cos I go, why would a bloke 
walk in and do that? Unless a family member or a… 




The way in which these partcipants gendered financially motivated donation is 
interesting in the context of previous work on gamete donation and gender and the 
findings of my own interviews with sperm donors. Almeling’s (2006; 2011) research 
compares cultures within US egg and sperm banks. She found that, in stark contrast 
to egg bank staff’s expectations of female donors, staff in the sperm bank expected 
male donors to be motivated by money and “too much” interest in the recipients of 
their donation was deemed inappropriate. Such gendered expectations about the 
appropriate motivations of male and female donors would help to explain Hannah, 
Karen and the wider public’s, assumptions that sperm donors would be donating for 
money. However, as I have already demonstrated, in contrast with Almeling’s 
findings and the wider sperm donor stereotype, the male donors in my sample were 
amongst the most critical of donors who acted in exchange for money. Similarly, 
despite the availability of £35 per visit payments to sperm donors, those clinic staff I 
interviewed did not suggest that current male donors were financially motivated nor 
was there any evidence that they expected them to be.  
 
Explaining men’s reluctance to accept payment 
Why did male participants so forcefully oppose their altruistic intentions to the world 
of money, meaning that they often opposed payment to donors? As I have explained, 
given the prospect of contact with offspring, it was important to all donors that their 
donation be perceived as a gift, an act undertaken with the intention of helping 
others. However, why were sperm donors less likely or able to accommodate 
payment within this framing of donation as an altruistic act? I offer two key reasons. 
 
For the first, I borrow Zelizer’s (1994) insight that the social practices, including 
earmarking and discourses around money, transform its social meaning in different 
contexts. Applying Zelizer’s insights to my own findings, I suggest that, in our 
cultural imagination and discourses about sperm donation, their payments are already 
earmarked as “beer money.” Sperm donation is stereotyped as a job, often 
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undertaken by students seeking a little extra cash - a stereotype which is connected to 
the way in which sperm donors have historically been recruited. From the 1970s-
1990s, financial incentives were advertised to potential sperm donors and students 
were often targeted, particularly medical students (Speirs 2008). In addition, a 
perception of sperm donation as a job is reinforced in the clinics’ information 
literature which expresses sperm donor payments as “per visit” rather than as a lump 
sum. Paying per visit encourages a view of such payments as earnings because the 
amount paid directly reflects the time spent in the clinic. The number of times egg 
donors come to the clinic may vary but they are always paid the same amount. In 
addition, because £35 is a relatively small amount it reinforces the idea that this is a 
little extra cash, not something which will be spent on something significant (note 
the contrast with Rebecca’s earlier assumption that the egg donor she describes 
would spend the money on her young children (p.173)). I suggest these assumptions 
about sperm donors, and payments made to them, were effectively barriers to sperm 
donors talking about their payments as bonuses, in the way some egg donors did, 
because socially their payments had already been categorised as “beer money” 
earned through a side-line job – albeit an unusual one. 
 
The second reason that sperm donors were less likely or able to talk about their 
payments as “compensation” was because, in order to present their donation as a gift, 
men tended to be much more reliant on a discourse of pure gifts or altruism, as 
absolutely opposed to self-interest and market exchange (Parry and Bloch 1989; J. 
Parry 1986). For them, their donations were gifts precisely because there was nothing 
at all in it for them and certainly not money. Whilst egg donors did also draw on this 
discourse, they often also drew on the concept of the personal or relational gift. For 
them, their donation was a gift because it was personal and intimate. As Chapter Five 
demonstrated, they often spoke about feelings of connection with or interest in the 
recipients – sometimes they wanted to meet them or find out more about them, they 
imagined the impact their donation would have on their lives and they often 
imagined shared experiences like pregnancy, motherhood or the experiences in the 
clinic. As I described in the previous chapter, stigmatisation of donor insemination 
and male infertility meant that male donors faced particular social barriers to talking 
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about personal connections with recipients. As a result they were less able to draw on 
a discourse of personal, relational gifts to construct their donation as an altruistic act, 
instead they relied more heavily on an ideology of the pure gift and therefore an 
absolute rejection of financial motivation. 
 
Donors and clinics in partnership? 
Donors generally assumed that the aims of clinics, and the wider healthcare system, 
were in line with their own – that they were all aiming to alleviate the suffering of 
infertility and that all people have an equal right to such treatment. Donors trusted 
that the system was organised towards this shared goal and often believed that the 
clinic, rather than themselves, was best placed to ensure this.  
 
This view of clinics was evident in donors’ discussions of the matching process. 
Donors saw the matching practices of clinic staff as consistent with the idea of a 
universal right to healthcare, and (at least the chance at) parenthood. Since unknown 
donors did not know their recipients and the vast majority chose not to place any 
restrictions on who they might be (see previous chapter), it was possible for them to 
conceive of recipients as universal, non-specific others, with all possible women and 
couples being seen as equal. In the absence of such restrictions, donors assumed that 
gametes would be distributed fairly. Although it was rarely made clear what 
constituted fairness in this context, donors like Eve implied that medical need played 
a part in allocating gametes: 
I don’t really see [who the recipient is] as being my choice to be honest. I 
think they way that I perceived it was just, here you go hospital. There’s 
something that can help other people. You can decide the best way to do it. 
You’re the guys that have got access to the waiting list. You know the 
treatment and where’s the demand needed most. I’m essentially just giving 
you what you need and you can go and distribute it wherever you want. I 
think I would rather it was just the hospital that just used them where they’re 
needed most. 




A sense of shared purpose and partnership with the clinics, was augmented by 
conversations with welcoming staff who appeared to appreciate their contribution, 
particularly when donors felt they had become a personally known and valued 
contributor: 
LG: So did it feel like they were quite grateful then for your donation?  
Z: I think so. They were certainly incredibly nice, very professional, very 
willing to take the time to go over things if I was curious about things. ‘Cos 
I tend to be very nosy about what’s going on and what’s happening? So any 
opportunity I got I was like, what happens at this bit? And they’d produce 
the next set of sheets and we’d go through what was actually happening, 
what my body was doing. 
(Zara, egg donor) 
For Daniel, this welcoming, personal atmosphere was something he associated with 
having donated at a small, private clinic rather than a large, NHS institution: 
D: I think that the staff treat you as you. Like every time I walk in, God 
knows how many people go through the door, but they always know who I 
am. 
LG: Really. Like the receptionist? 
D: Yeah I walk in and it’s like, hi Daniel. How are you? Just confirm your 
date of birth for me, Daniel. I don’t need to say my name. It’s very, very 
personal. The doctors, they’re all very grateful. They’re all very thankful. 
Even the nursing team upstairs is very thankful. The embryologists 
downstairs, they stop and have a chat with you when you go in.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
  
Many donors commented on the friendliness of staff in clinics and the relationships 
they had developed in their time as donors. In particular, Rob had developed a 
friendship with one doctor which had continued beyond his time as a donor. These 
more relaxed, friendly relationships most often developed for sperm donors, who 
would usually be visiting the clinic regularly over an extended period of time. In 
contrast, egg donors would visit the clinic more intensively over a shorter period of 
time and, in their time there, would undergo almost identical procedures to women in 
the early stages of IVF. Male donors, once screened and beginning to produce 
samples for the clinic, underwent no medical processes, there were no further 
medical risks to be explained and so their role was more distinct from a patient’s. It 
is perhaps for this reason that more informal relationships seemed to develop 




Interactions with clinic staff could also extend donors’ knowledge of the donor 
conception process and fertility treatment system. For example, many donors came to 
know about the shortage of donors via discussions with clinic staff, prompting for 
some the ambassadorial work previously described. Rob also enjoyed the opportunity 
to visit the laboratory and witness how his donated sperm was then treated and 
frozen. These experiences and conversations perhaps also developed in donors a 
sense of working in partnership with the clinic.  
 
This sense of joint enterprise with the clinic and an investment in the aims of the 
wider (public) health system are also evident in the reasons given by two donors for 
not accepting payment from the clinic. Liam and Maya felt that to do so would be 
directly taking money away from the work of the clinic and therefore from potential 
patients. In both cases, the donors had donated via NHS clinics and felt that the 
money offered to them could be better spent on funding treatment: 
God no. I rejected it [the offer of travel expenses]. I thanked them very 
much for the offer. That was very nice of them but would they like to put the 
money into something a little bit more practical? 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
Well, I kind of felt like we're doing this ‘cos we want to. The hospital are 
going out of their way to help us. I'm not going to take money from the 
Assisted Conception Unit when they're going out of their way to do this for 
us. 
(Maya, known egg donor) 
For Maya, her decision not to claim expenses was connected to her view of the clinic 
as an institution that was helping her sister. For her, to have taken money would not 
have made sense because she perceived both herself and the clinic to be acting with 
the shared aim of helping her sister. Grace was not offered payment by the clinic but, 
whilst joking that she could have used the money, explained that she did not mind 
that her expenses were not reimbursed because she recognised that the clinic had 
been acting to help her sister. She situated her specific gratitude to the clinic in the 
context of an appreciation for the wider, publicly funded healthcare system, which 
she had recently directly benefited from herself: 
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[Explaining why she did not mind that she had not been offered payment for 
expenses] You know, we are just so grateful to the hospital for doing what 
they did. And that the health system here is free and things like that. 
(Grace, known egg donor) 
 
However, this sense of partnership was sometimes undermined if donors did not feel 
that their contribution to the work of the clinic was valued. This was most strongly 
evident in Anna’s description of her experience at Hillbrook (p.177), when she felt 
she had been treated as a “slab of meat” and that a particular staff member had not 
appreciated the effort that had gone into her donation. However, some other donors 
also described ways in which they had felt undervalued at times. These were often 
related to a lack of, or delayed, communication from the clinic, either during the 
donation process or afterwards. Sarah had a particularly negative experience. She 
described how the doctors at the clinic had made no acknowledgement that she was 
donating to help others, rather than undergoing the procedure as an IVF patient. In 
addition, she was upset to find that there was no follow-up from clinic staff after she 
had come home from her egg retrieval. During this time, she had been in significant 
pain and had difficulty walking. The abrupt loss of contact post-donation left her 
feeling used and unappreciated: 
Yes, the injection and the procedure was explained really, really well, but 
what happens afterwards wasn’t. You weren’t told, “we’ll get what we want 
from you and then we’ll forget about you.” No one phoned to tell me what 
the outcome was. There weren’t any follow-up appointments to see how I 
was feeling physically, mentally. I did actually a few weeks later ring the 
hospital up and said it’s disgusting that the people that do this are not 
followed up. 
(Sarah, egg donor) 
 
A few other donors recounted experiences which might have temporarily 
undermined this sense of partnership. However, these were generally presented as 
minor incidents and often excused as simple mistakes or a by-product of a busy 
working environment. For example, Ian had been mistakenly asked for payment by 
the receptionist who had assumed he was freezing sperm samples for his own future 
use rather than for donation. Liam and Laura also found themselves chasing up clinic 
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staff at times, in order to progress the donation process, putting them in the slightly 
strange position of needing to hassle the clinic in order to donate. However, these 
events were portrayed as very temporary and minor challenges to donors’ position at 
the clinic. In fact, by giving the opportunity for donors to show their understanding 
of the time pressures staff were under, it might even have heightened donors’ sense 
of partnership with the clinic: 
If I was ever going to criticise it’s, they are very bad at keeping in touch. 
They really are. But then they’ve got a lot on their minds and got a lot to 
organise. But there was just a couple of incidents where you think, I’ve not 
heard anything in a month now, I’m fairly certain I should have gone back. 
Do you still want me as a donor? Oh you forgot to call me. Hi, when do you 
want me in? It’s just things like that. 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
And I think the communication could definitely be improved. Obviously 
everybody’s busy. There’s a lot of demand. But it was very much you had to 
contact them to get any sort of answers, any sort of results. So that’s, I’d 
been warned. And I think that was less of a problem for me than it was for 
[recipient]. Obviously, she was the one who was desperate to find out, you 
know, what was gonna happen 
(Laura, known egg donor) 
 
Another, less common but perhaps more significant, way in which the partnership 
model of clinic-donor relations was occasionally undermined was through reference 
to the continued journey of donated gametes into a market system of exchange. 
Donors rarely talked about how exactly recipients procured gametes. Implicit in their 
references to principles of universal rights and equality, they seemed to suggest that 
they would be distributed on the basis of need. Their frequent comparisons between 
blood, organ and gamete donation perhaps also implied an assumption that processes 
of allocation are similar in each of these systems, with medical criteria being the key 
deciding factor. However, in practice, and as I suspect many donors were well aware, 
the ability to pay is a significant consideration governing who will be able to access 
donor-assisted treatment. Clearly this was the case for those donors who had donated 
at Greenview, a private clinic at which all patients are self-funding. However, even 
for those who have donated via NHS clinics, their donations will not be available to 
all since access to publicly funded treatment in Scotland is limited by criteria which 
exclude certain persons, specifically single women, smokers and those outwith given 
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age and BMI restrictions (Infertility Network 2016). In addition, the NHS will fund a 
maximum of two cycles of IVF per person. In practice, this means that many women 
seeking egg donation may be ineligible for publicly funded treatment since it is 
common to first attempt IVF with the patient’s own eggs. From my own observations 
within the clinic, it appeared to be standard practice to use a patient’s own eggs in, at 
least, the first IVF cycle unless there was clear medical evidence that the woman 
would be unable to produce her own eggs. 
 
What is perhaps surprising, given donors’ apparent commitment to universal access 
and principles of equality, is how infrequently donors considered the status of the 
clinic at which they donated, whether it was accessible only to self-funders or also to 
NHS patients. During interviews, I asked whether donors had considered this as a 
factor in deciding where to donate. On two occasions, donors were not entirely sure 
as to the status of their clinic and the patients they treated. However, whilst most 
could state whether they had donated at an NHS or private institution, none stated 
that this had been a factor in deciding where to donate. This was despite the fact that, 
for donors at Greenview (a private clinic), an NHS clinic also recruited donors in the 
same city. In general, donors did not seem to have given their choice of clinic a great 
deal of thought. However, when reasons were given, “altruistic” donors generally 
opted to donate at their nearest clinic or the one via which they had learned of the 
possibility of donating. Egg-share donors made their decision as patients rather than 
donors – choosing on the basis of reputation, costs and/or convenience. Known 
donors followed the decisions of their intended recipients – usually their recipients 
had already instigated treatment at a particular clinic.  
 
Donors’ lack of distinction between NHS and private clinics is perhaps explicable 
through the particularly blurred boundaries between public and private in the funding 
and provision of UK fertility treatment. In this medical field, due to the restrictions 
on NHS funded treatment, it is common for patients in publicly funded institutions to 
be paying for their own treatment. In addition, patients themselves are not easily 
separable into self-funders and those funded through the NHS.  Many patients will 
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transition from one group to the other. Some will begin in the NHS before moving on 
to private treatment once they have exhausted the number of cycles they can access 
freely. Others, like Bridget, may pay for one or more cycles of IVF whilst also 
having placed themselves on the NHS waiting list, accessing this treatment if their 
privately funded cycles are unsuccessful. With the exception of egg share donors, 
many donors may not have been aware of the intricacies of NHS criteria and funding 
arrangements. However, it was clear from my interviews that donors widely 
understood fertility treatment to be expensive and were aware that NHS funded 
treatment was certainly limited:  
L: And these people are going to have paid, I dread to think how much 
money. Because I doubt that this is covered by the NHS.  
LG: It can be. Did you donate at an NHS hospital? 
L: I think it was, yes. I hope it was. Yeah it was. Yes it was. Sorry I had to 
think then. No it definitely was. I remember the blue and white logo. It’s that 
element thing, I know in most cases people are going to pay for that service. 
That’s the way it goes. 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
Given the general impression that fertility treatment is something which is paid for 
by patients, donors may not have made the distinction between privately and publicly 
funded institutions, as perhaps they might have done if a dual system operated in 
relation to blood donation and transfusion. 
 
However, where the topic of high treatment costs and profit-making did arise, these 
could be jarring to donors’ understanding of the process in which they were engaged. 
The idea that recipients could be paying for treatment (at significant cost) seemed 
incongruent with the spirit in which it had been donated – as a gift intended to 
alleviate the suffering of potential recipients and/or as a way of contributing to the 
community.  In the main, donors considered the topic only briefly, sometimes with 
an element of disappointment or surprise, before moving on. For example, reflecting 
on his reasons for donating, Daniel imagined that, as a gay man, he might one day 
require the services of a fertility clinic in order to have a family. However, as the 
interview continued, he realised with an element of surprise that he would not be able 
to afford to pay for treatment at Greenview, if he required it in the future, leaving 
him in the slightly odd position of not being able to afford his own sperm. However, 
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he moved on quickly from this discovery and, as I will go on to demonstrate, in other 
ways presented the high cost of treatment as a positive:  
It’s a lot of money and the way I’ve read the price list, I would be quite, I 
don’t think I could afford to go there myself if I wanted the help. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
A similar sense of disappointment is present in Tom’s words when he considered that 
the clinic might be selling on his freely given donation to his intended recipient. He 
did not explain exactly why but he viewed such a process as wrong. I suggest it is 
because to sell on his donation would be out of step with the spirit in which it was 
given and would undermine his understanding of the clinic as a facilitator of the gift, 
a partner with shared aims. However, as this brief extract shows, Tom quickly moved 
on from this topic and began to justify any charges to the recipients on the basis of 
storage and treatment costs. Here, as is the case in Liam’s extract above and during 
interviews with many other donors, there is a sense that donors do not want to think 
about the costs of treatment for recipients: 
Because it’s my donation to them. So it would be a bit of a miff if 
Greenview kind of charged them for it right? But they might charge for 
storage, for freezing and things like that. Which they probably do…. 
And it’s probably expensive. I guess it’s expensive actually. I didn’t really 
discuss costs with them [the recipients] too much about these things. I 
figured I don’t want to know. Almost I don’t want to know how much they 
have to pay to do this.  
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
 
However, for one man, the incongruence between his own act of giving and the 
subsequent cost to the recipients was much more emotive. During the interview, Ian 
reflected on the costs of fertility treatment to potential recipients. His original 
decision to donate had been prompted by the knowledge of a colleague’s difficulties 
conceiving and he remembered this man telling him about the thousands of pounds 
he had spent on treatment, without success. It seemed to be only during the interview 
that he came to consider the clinic’s status as a profit-making business. To Ian, it was 
“disgusting” to imagine that others, as he put it, could be profiting from his friend’s 
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distress. It is worth noting here that Ian is the same donor who had donated his 
payment (which might have covered his travel costs) to a local children’s hospital: 
I: I mean, I would quite imagine that it’s probably quite dear to have a baby 
on, well [friend] said to me they’d spent twelve and a half grand trying to 
have kids. So they must be charging people an absolute fortune to. Which I 
find quite disgusting. I’m sorry. I find that sad, very, very sad. I find that 
very, very sad.  
LG: The private clinics? 
I: So they’re not just getting hurt twice. They’re getting hurt twice. They’re 
getting hurt because they can’t have kids and stung for it, paying an absolute 
fortune for it… 
I: And I suppose Greenview, I would have to imagine that they’d be much 
the same. Well it’s a business isn’t it? 
LG: Aye. But did that matter to you? Did you think about donating to the 
NHS or private? 
I: I never thought about that. Well I would donate to NHS no bother if they 
asked me. No problem. I would donate to anybody. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
 
I have shown that donors could experience a sense of incongruence when they 
reflected on the altruistic spirit in which they made their donation alongside its 
transition into a market system in which high prices were charged and profits made. 
However, at times, some donors actually recognised benefits to the private system. 
Donors commented on the additional time and attention they received in a private 
clinic and the superior facilities – particularly the more homely (less institutional) 
environment at Greenview: 
And you know, a clinic’s a clinic but they were really interested in you and 
your story. Even though they see hundreds of people a day, you know, you 
really felt at home. Which I think obviously let’s face it at the end of the day 
the NHS don’t have enough staff to do these kinds of things. So it does 
make a difference but just because you pay for something doesn’t always 
mean you get a better service. And I have to say with them, you know 
everything from the reception staff, the magazines, the TV, I know it sounds 
really daft but you really felt in a comfortable environment to go through it 
all. 
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
And Greenview was a bit fancier than the [NHS hospital]. You know, 
you’ve got a nice flat screen telly in your room. That sort of thing.  




In addition, whilst maintaining a belief in a universal right to access fertility 
treatment, some donors explained that the high costs of treatment (as well as the 
significant effort required), would mean that candidates unsuitable for parenthood 
would be screened out. Since the costs were high, some donors reasoned that only 
those who were “desperate” to become parents would seek treatment (see Chapter 
Five): 
 
Daniel also celebrated the fully developed market system in which his donation took 
place. For him, formalised bureaucracy, including financial contracts, brought with it 
a sense of legitimacy to counter perceptions that sperm donation was “seedy” or part 
of a “black market:” 
I think that’s the thing that people are most shocked about is how 
professional it is. I think that’s the most shocking aspect of it. That people 
don’t’ realise that it is a market. I know I probably shouldn’t say market but 
it is in the private sector. There’s a big market out there. And it’s there. It’s 
not seedy. It’s a natural thing.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
Although Ian, the most outspoken critic of privatised fertility treatment, did not find 
any comparable benefits in a self-funded system, he appeared resigned to the fact 
that profits would be made in this way. He did not seem to regret having donated at a 
private clinic nor did he specifically criticise any individuals working within the 
private system. In the end, he expressed sadness rather than anger at the way the 
healthcare system is organised: 
I think it’s sad they took that amount of money off of people to give them a 
chance of creating a life. I think that’s quite sad. But I suppose business is 
business. But I’m just soft that way. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how the donors presented their donation as a communal 
gift, an act of good citizenship or “doing their bit” for the wider community. They 
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often made comparisons with blood or organ donation, giving to charity or voluntary 
work. In order to maintain this presentation of donation as a community-minded, 
other-oriented act, they made a distinction between donation as a way of helping and 
donation as a financially-motivated act or job. This distinction was of particular 
importance to donors in light of the knowledge that they may one day meet their 
donor offspring who might ask them about their motivations for donating. The 
possibility of offspring learning that their birth had resulted from a financially-
motivated decision was seen to be emotionally damaging.  
 
However, the contention that they didn’t donate “for the money” did not mean that 
all participants opposed any payments being offered, or accepted by, gamete donors. 
Some (including the majority of sperm donors) did make an absolute opposition to 
the world of money in order to construct donation as a gift. In this sense, they drew 
on a discourse of “pure altruism” as absolutely opposed to the world of money and 
market exchange (J. Parry 1986; Parry and Bloch 1989; Laidlaw 2000), in order to 
construct their donation as a gift. However, as Zelizer (1994) argues, such a view of 
money is not inevitable and many of the egg donors I interviewed constructed 
payments to donors as appropriate “compensation,” compatible with a spirit of 
altruism. I suggest that part of the reason egg donors more often took this nuanced 
view of payment was because female donors faced fewer constraints to constructing 
their donation as a personal, relational gift (see previous chapter). They were 
therefore more able to draw on this alternative or concurrent gift discourse in order to 
construct their donation as a gift. In comparison, sperm donors faced barriers to 
presenting donation as a personal gift to a specific recipient and so were more reliant 
on an ideology of the pure gift, and therefore this absolute opposition to financial 
exchange, in order to present their donation as other-oriented. 
 
I argue that, as a rule, donors’ interactions with clinic staff and texts, facilitated their 
perceptions of donation as a communal gift which enabled medical staff to carry out 
their work of helping those experiencing infertility. This was achieved largely 
through the absence of money in donor/staff interactions as well as the gratitude and 
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friendliness of clinic staff which encouraged donors to think of themselves in 
partnership with clinics. However, interactions and practices both within and without 
the clinic posed barriers to this view of gamete donation. Firstly, a few donors 
reported experiences where clinic staff offered no acknowledgement of their 
altruistic motivations, either implying they were financially motivated or (more 
commonly) treating them as any other patient. Outside the clinic, male donors faced 
particular challenges to their portrayal of donation as an other-oriented act due to the 
continued stereotype of sperm donors as financially motivated young men. Finally, I 
argued that donors could experience a sense of incongruence when they reflected on 
the transition of their donation (seen as voluntarily given, even if some payment was 
accepted) into a system where the actions of staff and the organisation of institutions 
are motivated, not only by an intention to help others, but also by an imperative to 
make profits. Such reflections could undermine donors’ sense of working in 
partnership with clinics, with the shared aims of helping those in need. However, 
these feelings of incongruence were generally managed either by simply choosing 
not to think about the costs of treatment or by reflecting on the benefits of a market 
system in fertility treatment. 
 
To conclude this chapter, I wish to highlight the connections between how donors 
viewed themselves in relation to the community and how they viewed themselves in 
relation to recipients and offspring. The ways they constructed their roles in these 
regards were mutually constraining and enabling; a sense of responsibility towards 
offspring meant it was particularly important that they presented their donation as an 
other-oriented act and distanced themselves from financial motivations. However, 
barriers to male donors constructing personalised connections with recipients limited 
their ability to accommodate payment with this narrative of donation as a gift. 
Furthermore, as I will show in Chapter Eight, the way in which they framed their 
donation as a civic-minded act provided a discursive resource via which they 





Substance and Stories: Connections 
with Donor Offspring 
 
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which donors described their role in relation to 
their donor-conceived offspring. I analyse how donors spoke about connections with 
potential, or actual, offspring and the meanings these connections had for them. The 
donors I interviewed were unanimous in their rejection of a parental role in relation 
to any actual or potential donor offspring. However, given the existence of identity-
release legislation and the potential (at least at the time of their donation) for future 
contact from offspring, this raises more questions than it answers. As might have 
been expected or encouraged of anonymous donors (Speirs 2008; see also Graham, 
Mohr, and Bourne 2016), it was not the case that donors simply screened out or 
rejected the social significance of their role in conception. All donors were open to 
the possibility of contact from offspring in the future and all but two supported the 
donor offspring’s “right to know” the identity of their donor parent(s). So if they did 
not see themselves as parents, what role did donors see for themselves in relation to 
these potential persons?  
 
Although their words were regularly premised on uncertainty and many commented 
on the futility of attempts to anticipate the future, it is possible to identify five key 
ways in which donors depicted their role. The most frequent way in which donors 
positioned themselves was as a bio-information resource for their donor-conceived 
offspring. In this sense, they were a source of genetic information which could be 
useful (sometimes essential) for offspring to make sense of their identity. Secondly, 
donors often presented themselves as a narrative support for donor offspring – 
someone who could help offspring to situate and extend the story they had of their 
life. Thirdly, donors sometimes described their relationship with offspring as a link 
to a wider network of relations and particularly as a means of creating connections 
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between half-siblings. Least commonly, donors talked about a latent “instant 
connection” which might be activated should they meet with their donor offspring in 
the future. Finally, some known donors spoke about their relationship to offspring as 
“just as if” the recipient had conceived without their help, as an aunt or a family 
friend.  
 
The final sections of this chapter reflect back on the data presented and consider why 
donors articulated their role in these ways. What kinds of wider discourses are they 
drawing on? I argue that, in order to make sense of their connection to offspring, 
donors drew on ideas and practices associated with “doing family.” As will become 
clear throughout this chapter, they often made comparisons with their own family 
relationships in order to explain why they might be able to offer offspring some 
support with such things as identity, belonging and narrative building. Donors 
deconstructed their own kinship practices and discourses, selecting and borrowing 
particular aspects which they deemed appropriate to enacting “donor parenthood”. 
However, as I explain in the following chapter, these references were always 
qualified to make clear that, although these kinds of comparisons were helpful, they 
did not see themselves as really family, and certainly not parents to donor offspring.  
 
“I’m not their parent but they have a right to know where they came 
from” 
Donors were unanimous in their rejection of a parental role in relation to donor-
conceived offspring. Instead, all attributed this role to the recipients and intended 
parents. In doing so, they often compared the relative insignificance of their 
contribution to conception with the love, care and sheer amount of work that went 
into raising children and defining somebody as a parent. Donors were keen to state 
that they did not see their role as in any sense comparable to that of the parents:  
I just don’t think of them as mine. But I think it’s because there’s no 
emotional connection there. There’s no mother-child bond there. When I 
donated, at that point it’s just tissue. It’s just body tissue. As far as I can tell, 
it gets fertilised, and it’s successful and it becomes something else. At that 
point it stops being mine and starts being the person’s, who it’s been 
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implanted in. And it’s them that makes the bond with it. It’s their child as far 
as I’m concerned. I think it’s just like, say anybody can be a father but it 
takes something special to be a dad. That’s what it plays on to me. I’m their 
mother in terms of biologically but I’m no way at all their mum. They’re no 
way at all my child. I haven’t raised them, I haven’t given them values. I 
haven’t taught them I haven’t nurtured them in any way. So for me they’re 
not my child.  
(Eve, egg donor) 
They’re your parents. OK these are the guys who’ve changed your nappy 
and fed you and dressed you for the last eighteen years. They’re your 
parents. I just happened to help get you here. I’m not going to tread on your 
Dad’s toes. I’m not going to become a father figure. I’m not going to be this 
magical person that’s going to solve anything that’s wrong in your life in the 
world. ‘Cos that’s your parents that do that. 
  (John, sperm donor) 
 
These findings chime with the work of Edwards (2000) and Thompson (2001; 2005), 
amongst others (see also Chapter Three), who have demonstrated the flexible and 
contingent significance of biogenetic substance and processes in constructing kinship 
relations. Biogenetic substance or processes may be activated in order to construct 
kinship connections between persons. However, as here, they may be deemed 
insignificant in comparison to the strength of social ties formed through everyday 
care and interaction.  
 
The anthropological literature also demonstrates that the particular processes and 
substances which people count as “biological” or “natural,” and which are 
subsequently referenced in order to construct kinship connections, are themselves 
contingent and flexible, sometimes remarkably so (Thompson 2005; Bestard 2009). 
Again, there are parallels with my own findings. In attributing the role of parent to 
the recipient, donors (primarily egg donors) often emphasised the importance of 
pregnancy, birth and breastfeeding in defining a mother, whilst genetic connections, 
though not generally insignificant (as I will go on to show), were not deemed 
relevant to defining parenthood:   
And as far as I’m concerned as soon as they take these eggs out of me, 
they’re implanted into somebody else and this baby is going to start to grow. 
As far as I’m concerned, that is that woman’s. That is that Mum-to-be’s 
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baby inside her, growing and growing. And then she’ll give birth to it. I 
don’t see myself being any part of that whatsoever. 
(Karen, egg donor) 
You come back to the sort of nature and nurture debates and discussions I’ve 
had with the children is yes, genetically, she is half my DNA but she’s been 
carried through a pregnancy by somebody else who’s given birth to her, who 
is her legal mother, who is her, you know, her Mum in every way. I'm just 
the bundle of cells that got in there somewhere. 
(Debbie, egg donor) 
 
In these extracts, participants imply that if they were to present themselves as parents 
to offspring then this would undermine the status of the recipients as the true parents. 
They find it necessary to strongly reject the role of parent in order to reinforce the 
recipients’ position, to avoid “treading on [their] toes.” In such statements, donors 
presume a model of families in which there can be a maximum of two “real” parents 
(McCandless and Sheldon 2010) and that being a parent involves having one’s “own 
child” – not something that can be shared beyond the intended couple (Melhuus 
2012). Parental positions, donors imply, are both exclusive and gendered such that 
John (although he has agreed for his donation to be used by same-sex couples or 
single women) explains that he might be perceived to specifically tread on the 
“Dad’s toes.” Donors narratives suggested that if they were to present their 
relationship to offspring as, in any sense, parental then that would diminish the 
recipient’s status and therefore undermine the intended gift of parenthood which the 
donor had set out to give. 
 
Although donors clearly and explicitly rejected a parental role, they were aware that, 
by virtue of their genetic contribution to reproduction, they could be seen as parents 
to donor offspring and they constructed their position in opposition to this idea. I did 
not ask donors if they felt like a parent to donor offspring. Instead they rejected this 
possibility without it being raised. Donors’ unsolicited and forceful negation of a 
parental role makes sense in the context of research which demonstrates the 
perceived fragility of social parenthood (for example Speirs 2008; Modell 1994) and 
an ideology of “biological” ties as enduring (see discussion in Chapter Three, 
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particularly Schneider 1968; Finkler 2000). Donors so forcefully and explicitly 
rejected the view that they were the “real” parent, precisely because they were aware 
of a cultural narrative which assumed that “natural” or “biological” connections are 
automatic and undeniable in comparison to their impermanent social counterparts. As 
Becker (2000) found in interviews with US couples undergoing fertility treatment, 
users of DI often reported fears that their children would reject them in favour of 
their genetic parent. Donors were aware that in the eyes of others, including 
recipients, they might be seen as an alternative parent and they sought to make clear 
that they had no intention of making such a claim. 
 
As the reader will likely notice throughout the course of this chapter, despite these 
explicit refutations of such a role, it was not uncommon for donors to refer in passing 
to themselves as a parent to donor-conceived offspring. This was often a term which 
was qualified, as in “genetic parent” or “biological parent,” or corrected immediately 
after. It could be argued that these instances represent slippages or reveals of donors’ 
true feelings. I would argue against such a simplistic interpretation and instead 
suggest that such references reflect the lack of an alternative vocabulary with which 
donors could speak of the role they occupied in relation to offspring. Donors have 
little choice but to adopt (to some extent) the narrative that they are a parent to donor 
offspring because it is difficult to talk about their role without reference to the terms 
“parent”, “father” or “mother”. This is a problem I am sympathetic to given that I 
have faced similar difficulties in writing on this topic: How to discuss what it means 
to be a “donor parent” without assumptions embedded in the available language that 
such a role is in some way comparable to parenthood? Mirroring findings from 
interviews with Danish sperm donors (Wheatley 2016; Mohr 2015), several donors 
commented explicitly on this linguistic absence and others complained about the 
semantic mismatch of existing terminology with their own perceptions. Several 
donors sought to overcome this lack of vocabulary by distinguishing between the 
terms “mother” and “father” (to refer to biological or genetic parenthood) and 
“Mum” and “Dad” (who they presented as the true parents) or, in one case, between 
“children” and “offspring” (a convention which I have adopted in my own writing): 
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T: Yeah well it all comes down to if the child wants to know their, what’s 
the phrase? 
LG: I don’t know. 
T: The, the donor, donor father, the genetic father, I suppose. 
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
Mum and Dad are job titles, to an extent. So Mum and Dad did the whole 
growing up type thing. The people that are my mother and father. That’s a 
genetic side of arghhhh. Language just fails me at that particular point. 
You are fathering offspring. You are not a Dad. Big, big, big distinction.  
 (Liam, sperm donor) 
And then once [the knowledge of donor conception]’s sunk down they may 
well [think], who is my real father? I don’t really like that term ‘cos I’m not 
their real father in that way. I’m not the one who’s done the work.  
(Rob, sperm donor) 
 
Donors did not present themselves as parents in relation to donor offspring. 
However, this did not mean that they perceived their role in relation to donor 
offspring as insignificant. All but two of the donors I interviewed (the two exceptions 
were both known donors) supported the introduction of identity-release legislation.
13
 
All were open, to varying extents, to being contacted by donor offspring in the 
future. Echoing Mohr’s (2015) findings, many participants commented that 
responsible donors should be willing to make their identity available and be prepared 
to meet, and potentially develop relationships with, their offspring in the future:  
If you’re a responsible donor you have to be prepared to, you know, at least 
have a meeting with a child that may be yours, eighteen years later  
 (Adam, sperm donor) 
[Referring to an online conversation in which an acquaintance had 
considered donating eggs but had been annoyed that she could not be 
anonymous]. I just thought, you know, that was really horrible. If this poor 
kid wants to know where it’s come from because it’s not come from its 
parents really. You know, why not? Why shouldn’t they? If you want to 
donate your eggs then you should be more than willing to deal with it, the 
aftermath of it. Not just wash your hands of it, walk away from the clinic 
                                                 
13
 The two exceptions were Laura and Maya, both known donors. Laura was considering the law 
from the perspective of potential recipients and worried that identity-release legislation might 
discourage would-be donors and so reduce the supply of gametes for those awaiting treatment. 
Maya explained that identity-release legislation would put her off donating to someone she didn’t 
know for fear that future contact would disrupt her own family. She felt that the legal change had 
maybe been a step too far in the sense that contact could cause more problems than it was worth. 
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with your money in your back pocket kind of thing and that’s you. I think 
I’d be more than willing to see them if they ever wanted to. 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
 
The “right to know” discourse was a common theme amongst donors and several 
donors, like Anna, spoke emphatically about the ethical importance of donor 
offspring being able to know the identity of their donor: 
I think they should have the right to know where they came from 
biologically. I am, I’m not their parent but genetically we are linked. And 
they have a right to know that. And I think that’s important.  
  (Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
And that conversation [about tracing her birth mother] with [adopted friend] 
made me realise that children have a right to know where they come from.  
(Adam, sperm donor) 
But I don’t think anyone should ever be denied the right to where they come 
from. If that makes sense? I am in favour of the anonymity being lifted, so to 
speak.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
In talking about the “rights” of donor offspring, participants seem to have adopted 
the dominant rhetoric used to advocate for identity-release legislation (Frith 2001; 
Melhuus and Howell 2009; Melhuus 2012), language that is often also used in 
information literature for gamete donors in the clinic. When first discussed, the “right 
to know” or the “right to know where they came from” was often given as an 
apparently self-explanatory reason why the law had needed to change. Further 
questioning and probing was usually needed in order for donors to elaborate on what 
they meant by these statements or why it might be important to donor offspring to 
have this information.  
 
Whilst donors did emphasise uncertainty about what the future would bring, it is 
possible to identify five key ways in which donors articulated their role in relation to 
(potential) donor-conceived offspring: 
1. An embodied source of bio-information for offspring. 
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2. A support for offspring in situating and extending the narrative they could 
construct of their lives. 
3. A link to wider networks of potential connections to people and places. 
4. A latent emotional connection between donor and offspring which would be 
activated were they to meet.  
5. A relationship with offspring which is the same as it would have been, had 
the recipient had children without their help. 
These five articulations did not map in any straightforward sense onto five different 
kinds of donors. Most donors articulated their role in multiple ways and, as is so 
often the case, given the messiness and complexity of social worlds, people’s 
perceptions sometimes appeared contradictory or changed over time, occasionally 
even within the course of an interview. 
 
The donors as a bio-information resource.  
Donors often presented themselves as sources of bio-information, information that 
was likely to be of value to any donor-conceived offspring. This was the most 
commonly cited, and frequently the first, response to the question, “Why do you 
think donor-conceived offspring might contact you?” Often comments were made 
about the practical utility of offspring being able to access this information, for 
example, to find out about possible future medical issues or to explain existing ones. 
However, donors tended to emphasise a non-medical use for this information. Many 
described a scenario in which, as a donor-conceived child grew up, particularly as 
they reached their teenage years, they might start to have questions about their 
identity. Specifically, they might wonder, “Why am I the way I am?” In this 
situation, donors explained that they might be able to help offspring to understand 
why they looked or behaved a certain way or had particular talents, mannerisms or 
personality traits. They imagined that donor offspring might like to meet or find out 
more about their donor in order to figure out if they had perhaps inherited particular 
traits from them, particularly if these were not traits they shared with the parents who 
had raised them: 
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I’ve had friends that’s been adopted that can’t find their parents but want 
questions answered. So I kind of I agree with, I know it’s not the same thing 
but if they do have any questions like, why do I do this? Why do I do feel 
this? Why do I get a sore head? Why do I get, I don’t know, growing pains 
at a certain age? Why this? Something that doesn’t have, something that’s 
biological from me, from my donation, do you know what I mean? It’s just 
stupid little things. 
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
But you had to fill in, I remember filling in a big almost like a message to 
the baby, if it was conceived. And I remember, I just remember writing 
everything like if I was that child, what I would want to know. So I am a 
total perfectionist. So I was just kind of writing all the things that kind of 
stuck out in me that maybe they have that they were thinking, where did that 
come from? ‘Cos my Mum and Dad aren’t like that. 
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
 
Donors often invested considerable time and effort in trying to anticipate the kinds of 
information that donor offspring might want to know about them in the future. This 
was evidenced in the amount of thought they gave to their goodwill message and 
personal information section in the donor registration forms (the text that can be 
given to donor offspring if they requested it after the age of eighteen or sixteen for 
non-identifying content). All donors considered this message important, although for 
some it was difficult to write, or at least to begin writing. Two sperm donors had 
electronic copies of their messages which they kindly shared with me for the 
purposes of this project. Both men had written a message which ran to three pages of 
word-processed text. However, Liam’s document was thirteen pages in total as he 
had scanned and inserted more than 25 photographs with captions of himself and his 
family from infancy to the time of his donation. Several donors explained that they 
had tried to anticipate what kinds of information the person might want or need in the 
future so that, if they decided not to get in contact, or, as two sperm donors 
explained, if they died before any contact was made, they might still be able to 
answer some of their offspring’s questions: 
And I wanted to put something and also to put enough information that if 
they decided not to get in contact that there’s still some useful stuff there. 
Things they might like to know about…..Just like about hobbies and 
interests, things I was good at, at school. Or health, you know, ‘cos I have 
problems with dairy. And it took a long time to work that out.  
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
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And so I just thought that that was really quite important really. The future. 
That’s actually, the letter that you could potentially write, you want to 
answer as many questions as possible. And so I struggled a long time with 
what to put on that. I hadn’t told anyone at work what I was doing. So I just 
really had to sit down and give myself, how am I gonna structure this? You 
know and it’s just my own moral standing really. Someone’s gonna read this 
letter. You don’t know when. What do they want to know? What are their 
issues?  
(Rob, sperm donor) 
Hello there. This is the bit of the form where I try and tell you, as best I can, 
all about me. Then with a bit of luck, this will go quite some way in helping 
you know yourself a little bit better perhaps. 
(Liam, sperm donor, opening to goodwill message) 
 
However, in writing these letters, many of the donors came to realise how difficult it 
was to, firstly, anticipate the kinds of questions donor offspring might have and, 
secondly, to articulate the kinds of information they might seek. Many of the things 
that donors thought they might pass on to offspring or that offspring might be 
interested in understanding about themselves were intangible or difficult to articulate. 
For example, they tended to talk about personality traits, mannerisms, a particular 
sense of humour or “ways of thinking” potentially being inherited by offspring. In 
contrast to information about appearance, it was this information that donors thought 
might be most relevant to offspring but was simultaneously the most difficult to 
articulate.  For some donors it therefore followed that it would be necessary to meet 
their offspring in order for them to find out this kind of information about the donor 
and therefore to understand themselves better. This information was embodied. It 
existed in facial expressions, in the way they moved, spoke and interacted. It could 
be described but always imperfectly and could rarely be summed up in a sentence or 
two. It was only in meeting the donor and getting to know them that offspring might 
be able to understand why they thought or behaved in particular ways and whether 
these had been inherited genetically: 
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A: And I think they have the right to come and say, look I just want to know 
why I’m this, why I’m that. And answer questions. I think they have the 
right to know that. I mean, when you fill out the form for egg donation, you 
can write a bit about yourself so…Before they changed the law, so they 
could find out about you. But that says like, I’m five foot three, I’ve got 
brown hair, I’ve got green eyes. That doesn’t tell you anything does it, 
really? It doesn’t tell you about the person.  
LG: What do you think they will want to know? Like you say, that is a bit 
superficial saying, five foot three, brown hair, but what do you think they 
would want to know, do you imagine? 
A: I dunno. Well, my Dad died when I was three right. So although people 
can tell me about him, it’s not the same as actually knowing him, is it? 
LG: No. 
A: And a lot of the time, I think to myself, I’ve got quite a quirky sense of 
humour, where do I get that from? Is that from my Dad or is that mine? Do 
you know what I mean? 
(Anna, anonymous and known egg donor) 
 
As a sociologist, it is tempting to categorise some of these explanations as genetic 
determinism, prioritising genetic factors over environmental ones in the construction 
of persons, or failing to recognise the interaction between the two. Certainly, there 
were several conversations with donors in which I questioned, sometimes aloud, the 
evidence that some of the traits they described could be inherited genetically, as in 
the extract from my interview with Adam below. However, it is not my intention to 
make distinctions here between “correct” and “incorrect” assumptions about 
genetically inheritable traits. If such distinctions are possible, I am not qualified to 
make them.  
 
Instead, what is interesting here is the way in which donors’ own experiences of 
family shape their understanding of the interaction between genetics and behaviour. 
For Liam, who had been adopted at a very young age, meeting his birth parents and 
extended genetic family had led to feelings of amazement that here were people who 
he had never met before but who thought, spoke, wrote and behaved in remarkably 
similar ways to him. Noticing these similarities provided him with a sense of 
groundedness: 
When these people who are born through in vitro or however the process is 
done, they grow up and they’re gonna want to know a little bit more about 
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themselves. Yeah and that’s something that can resonate with me as 
someone whose been adopted. ‘Cos Mum and Dad bless ‘em, they were 
brilliant at what they did. But I don’t look like them. I don’t think like them. 
And it’s like, good God. It’s quite nice that when you do find the people that 
make up your mother and your father that you grow up precisely like you’re 
supposed to. Which is incredibly grounding and reassuring. So for all intents 
and purposes, I think like my Mother but I look like my father. Much to the 
surprise of everyone that knows them…And then of course down the road, 
for the mother’s side of the genetic coin, so to speak, yeah talking to me is 
very much like talking to Gayle. It’s nicely reassuring. 
(Liam, sperm donor, my emphases) 
 
Several donors commented that prior to having their own children, they had believed 
that “nurture” was more important than “nature” in explaining behaviour and 
personality. However, their opinions had been reversed when they had children and, 
at a young age, felt they could see traits in them which could not have been learned 
and therefore must have been innate and genetic:  
A: But you know, and this is me the biologist talking, but personality is a 
product of genes and environment and the two interact in very funny ways. 
And I realised that when my daughter was born. That there were things that 
she picked up from me that she couldn’t have possibly learned. 
LG:  Like what? 
A: Well you know mannerisms that I try and hide from her….a tendency to 
pick her nose. And I was a notorious nose-picker as a little boy. 
LG: I think all kids might do that. 
A: Yeah but you know just certain things that I knew I never showed her but 
it was very clear where they’re coming from. And so you know I think that 
is very important for understanding yourself, that interaction between genes 
and environment. 
(Adam, sperm donor) 
And I also should say also, I very much believed, before having my children 
that I said well how much of it’s nature and how much of it’s nurture? And I 
believed a lot of it was nurture. So I felt that you were just giving somebody 
a blank canvas when you gave them an egg or whatever and they would be 
then what their environment would make them. Having had children, I now 
feel slightly differently about that. It’s nature is probably a bigger 
percentage but it’s the nurture part which will make the best of what’s in the 
nature. That’s just ‘cos my children, they are who they’re going to be. 
They’ve got very definite personalities. And they’re very definitely, they’ve 
definite opinions and they’ve got opinions that I’m sure we’ve never, we’ve 
never expressed anything about that or interests. Everybody’s individuals.  
(Faye, egg share donor) 
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However, when donors explained that it would be important for offspring to access 
this embodied bio-information in order to better understand themselves, they were 
not necessarily assuming that genetics is of primary or fundamental importance to 
explaining who we are. Looking again at the extract from Faye’s interview above, I 
want to highlight her creativity and ambivalence in the way she talks about identity 
and genetic inheritance. She draws on the dissimilarity between her and her husband 
and their genetically related children in order to emphasise the relevance of genetic 
make-up or “nature” in shaping personality and therefore why her offspring might 
want to meet her. Her explanation, as well as Adam’s contention that, genes and 
environment “interact in funny ways,” are reminiscent of Edward’s (2005) 
ethnographic work on personhood with residents of a Northern English town. Her 
informants celebrated the idiosyncratic nature of individuals’ characters. They 
emphasised that people’s characters, the ways they “turn out,” emerge from an 
unpredictable mixing of genes and experience – both are important but we cannot 
know in advance how the two will interact in the making of persons. Faye seems to 
have been expressing a similar idea. For her, the uniqueness of her children was 
evidence that genes must be important in explaining how character is formed but also 
proves that the ways in which those genes manifest themselves, in the context of 
lived experiences, is highly individual and unpredictable. Similarly, several donors 
emphasised that genes were only one piece of the puzzle but one that it was 
important to know about it in order to make sense of the bigger picture (my analogy). 
As Anna explained: 
It’s nurture over nature isn’t it? And I think you need to know what you’ve 
come from in order to understand that.  
    (Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
 
Donors varied in terms of the importance they attributed to donor offspring being 
able to access the bio-information which they embodied. For some, it was seen as 
deep-seated need, something universal or fundamental for understanding their 
identity, or even to develop a sense of self. Donors who talked in these terms 
sometimes drew on knowledge of adopted persons’ searches for their birth parents. 
Liam, in particular, the only donor to have been raised by adopted parents, talked 
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about how “grounding” and “reassuring” it had been to recognise resemblances 
between himself and his birth family. He imagined that he might be able to offer 
donor offspring a similar experience – the knowledge that, “it’s okay, you are 
growing up precisely like you’re supposed to.” For my other participants, such 
knowledge was acquired through internet research, personal or anecdotal experiences 
and media stories: 
And certainly the long discussions I’d had with my friend that was adopted 
and how important it became to her and how it changed her life. You know 
initially she couldn’t care less and then all of a sudden it kind of got to her 
and then the fact that she did meet her birth mother really changed her view 
of herself and made her understand a lot of things about herself that she 
wouldn’t have realised otherwise. 
(Adam, sperm donor) 
Yeah. Because they’ll want to know. Everybody goes through a phase of 
wanting to know why they are a bit like who they are. And some of that’s 
genetic isn’t it?  
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
 
For others, it was assumed that, unless medical needs arose, the desire to meet or find 
out about their donor parent would be a gentler sense of curiosity. “Curiosity” was a 
word that was frequently cited in interviews, although it was not necessarily 
portrayed as a minor need. However, those who talked of “just curiosity” often 
questioned the likelihood that donor offspring would contact them in the future, even 
if they had been told of the circumstances of their conception: 
I think maybe one of the things would be if it was health-related. That they 
maybe wanted to find out something about their biological past as such. I 
could imagine that scenario happening. I don’t know. You know, some 
people are maybe curious, where they’ve come from, to find out their 
background, from a biological sense.  
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
 
Many donors recognised that offspring might vary in terms of the level of need they 
developed to access the donors as a bio-information resource. Writing a detailed 
goodwill message was one of the ways in which they tried to accommodate these 
varied needs. It was common for donors to imagine how they might feel in their 
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offspring’s position and then transpose their own imagined wants or needs onto their 
offspring’s. However, such imaginings were frequently followed by a recognition 
that their offspring might not think in the same way as they did or an 
acknowledgement of the difficulty of really knowing what it would be like to be 
donor-conceived. Donors regularly commented that a donor-conceived person’s 
desire to know might change over the life-course or depend on their circumstances. 
For example, drawing on her own experience of motherhood, Rachel thought that 
having their own children might prompt an interest in their own origins. Liam 
remembered how noticing resemblances between his friends and their parents had 
prompted his own interest in his birth parent:  
And I don’t know if it’s more when they grow up and have kids themselves. 
Maybe that makes them wonder a bit more where they came from ‘cos 
they’re having kids themselves. 
 (Rachel, egg donor) 
But if you went and saw friends, you can see them in their parents. I can’t. 
‘Cos it’s not there. I don’t look like my Dad. I don’t look like my Mum. And 
particularly, oh god puberty, what an evil period of time. Yeah if you ever 
needed an example of when thought processes and psychologies were 
complete polar opposites, that was the time. Jeez! I think about four years of 
consistent flipping arguments.  
(Liam, sperm donor) 
 
Neil also explained that the previous system of anonymity might in fact have 
accentuated donor-conceived peoples’ desires to know about or meet their donors. 
By making something forbidden, it only made it more desirable. He speculated that 
now that the information was freely available, offspring might be more likely to 
postpone making contact, perhaps indefinitely. 
 
When asked, several donors described feeling curious themselves to find out if there 
was any resemblance between themselves and their offspring. However, this 
curiosity had quite a different tone to it than that which they imagined for offspring. 
Many of these donors depicted their interest as an intellectual or scientific curiosity. 
As Zara describes, meeting her donor offspring might develop her own knowledge 
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with regard to the influence of genes and environment on various behavioural and 
physical traits: 
That [choosing her own recipient] just seems a trifle too baby farming I’d 
say. And besides it would ruin the entertaining academic side. Which is if I 
do have a….sixteen year old turning up on my doorstep, there will be a bit 
of me that will be sort of going, now, nature versus nurture? Do you like 
history? 
(Zara, egg donor) 
For me, it would be just really interesting. It would purely be sort of fact 
finding. Who does she look like, what’s her life been like? That kind of 
thing. [Speaking to her teenage daughter] You’re curious too aren’t you? 
(Debbie, egg donor, original emphasis) 
 
In contrast to the situation they imagined for offspring, donors did not usually 
consider that bio-information embodied in their offspring would be important in 
understanding their own identity. Adam was the only exception to this rule. He drew 
on his own experience as a parent to his daughter, to describe how seeing traits he 
had passed on to another person might enable him to understand himself better: 
A: I’d find it interesting you know. It’s neutral. I’m…I have as many 
negative traits as I have positive traits. So it depends a little bit on which 
ones would show up. But it’s just a fascinating thing. Just understanding 
yourself a little bit and how humans function as a species I think. That’s 
certainly it. 
LG: It’s interesting you say you’d sort of understand yourself better as well. 
A: Yeah yeah. I think that’s one of the things of kids that they teach you a 
lot about yourself and certainly having my daughter makes me understand 
myself a lot better. It is almost a miniature, slightly altered version of 
yourself. 
(Adam, sperm donor) 
However, Adam was the exception to the norm. Most donors thought that bio-
information would have much greater significance to offspring than to themselves 
and, as John explains, that much of this transfer of information would be one-way: 
LG: You’re not particularly interested in who you’ve passed traits on to or 
anything like that?  
J: Erm. Probably less so. I can imagine an awful lot of that information 
going quite one way. Of course you’d be curious about them ‘cos they’ve 
presented themselves to you and said, you’re my biological parent. And so 
you’d want to find out about who are they and what they do. 




However, although in this role as bio-information resource, the relationship with 
offspring was conceived as primarily unidirectional, this was not the case when 
donors spoke about their role in different ways. As John hints at, and as I go on to 
demonstrate, donors were often interested in meeting offspring but the value in this 
contact, for them, did not generally reside with the information offspring embodied. 
 
Donors as a narrative support 
Bio-information was most commonly given as the first reason why offspring might 
contact their donor. However, this was not the case for all donors. In several cases, 
donors first considered that offspring might wish to ask, “Why did you do it? What 
made you become a donor?” For many others, initial explanations which centred on 
the relevance of bio-information to offspring led them to consider that they might 
also wish to know information about their motivations for donating. Most donors 
explained that they had included this kind of information in their goodwill message 
to offspring:  
But well, if it was me, I would [contact the donor]. I would want to know 
why. I would want to know what drove somebody to do that… 
To know that I’m here because somebody went through all that for nothing. 
Why would you do that? I would want to know that. 
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
So like I don’t know whether they would have any interest. I think, you 
know It’s not like we’ve actually given birth to them or done anything other 
than just donate a cell. But then I guess if you think of like people who’ve 
donated other bits of their anatomy. Some people want to come and find out 
about that person and see what their reasoning behind things was. 
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
 
I suggest that in enabling offspring to find out about the kinds of people and 
circumstances which enabled their creation, donors positioned themselves as a 
narrative support. They imagined themselves helping offspring to situate their 
biographies in time and extend the narrative they had of their lives. As Smart 
explains, the telling and re-telling of stories is one way in which people make links 
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across the generations and through which people can gain a sense of being rooted in 
time (2007, 82–86). She gives the example of children using their parents’ past 
biographies as a starting point for developing and presenting their own identities in 
the present. In this sense, donors imagined that sharing their motivations and the 
context in which they donated will provide offspring with the prologue to their lives 
– a resource which they might then choose to draw on, in order to develop their own 
self-narrative. 
 
Donors generally felt that, for offspring, extending and embedding the story they had 
of their lives would be a positive experience because their backstory, the prologue to 
their birth, was one of giving and caring. As explained, in the previous chapter, being 
able to provide this positive narrative was a key reason why it was so important their 
donation be viewed as, at heart, an altruistic act and not as a financial exchange. 
They often contrasted these circumstances with those of adopted children finding out 
about the circumstances which had led up to the adoption. Aside from the lack of 
pregnancy and birth in the former case, many donors commented on the more 
negative connotations associated with “giving up” an adopted child (compared with 
giving a gift of egg or sperm to recipients) and the potential challenges this might 
create in the relationship between birth parent and adopted child were they to meet in 
the future: 
I hope that the child will have been sort of brought up knowing about the 
efforts that their parents have gone to, to make them come to be. Yeah I 
think, I don’t know maybe it’s different for kids who are the result of an IVF 
donation versus adoption because with adoption there’s some giving away 
whereas I hope that the child wouldn’t feel that they were given away. It was 
more the parents wanted to have him so much, that they tried so hard. 
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
LG: And it sounds like you’d briefly thought about a scenario where 
someone would knock on your door. And you said you’d be happy to speak 
to them. Why, do you think, do you think it’s likely that would happen? 
Y: Do you know, I’m really not sure. I think it’s really different to adoption. 
I think in adoption people want to know why did you give me up? What 
were the circumstances? 




In contrast, donors felt they could offer offspring support not only in extending their 
narrative but also by offering a positive story (an expression of help, sometimes 
friendship) in which their life was embedded. For this reason they did not expect 
their relationship with offspring to be problematic, as long as they understood their 
motivations for donating. Here recipients too had a role in explaining to offspring the 
prologue to their life: 
And like I said I would hope that their parents had said to them that it was 
done out of love. We desperately wanted to have you as a child so somebody 
was kind enough to give us eggs and you guys came along. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
 
In addition to knowing the prologue, donors also imagined that their relationship 
with offspring might also help to move the story along, either finishing it or making 
space for another chapter. For example, some donors considered that offspring might 
like to contact them in order to thank them for helping their parents or to show them 
how they’d turned out. It was usually left open whether this might be an opportunity 
to build a longer-term relationship: 
I think it’s more likely a curiosity or a wanting to tidy up loose ends or 
wanting to know who the biological parent is. Which I could 
understand……If it was me, I would. Just to know. Just to you know close 
the, open the door, either way. Just to know. Just so it was done. I’m not 
very big leaving secrets unexplored. 
(Zara, egg donor, my emphasis) 
If somebody come to the door and said, you know, I’m here because of you. 
They’re not necessarily gonna come to the door and say, you’re mine. They 
could be coming to the door and saying, thanks very much. 
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
In contrast to the interest in bio-information, the interest in finding out how things 
turned out was very often reciprocated by donors. For them too, contact with 
offspring could be a way of concluding or extending the story of their donation:    
LG: Would you like to be contacted by the donor conceived children?  
L: Yeah. I’ve no objection at all. If they want to come and say hello, come 
and say hello. 
LG: But would you want it? 
L: Yes. Curiosity. I want to know how the story ends. It’s that kind of thing 
(Liam, sperm donor) 
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However, when they started to think of the donation and consequences in terms of a 
narrative, finding out “how things turned out” very often involved, and usually 
prioritised, the recipients, as well as their donor-conceived offspring. This is because, 
as described in Chapter Five, the (sometimes imagined) recipient was fundamental to 
donors’ motivations to donate. It was the potential parents who donors were aiming 
to help. Donors therefore usually wanted to know how things had worked out for the 
whole family. They speculated that in the future they might meet parents who had 
been able to raise the child they so wanted, along with a child who (having been so 
wanted) had had a full and happy life. This, donors imagined, would give them a 
sense that it had been worthwhile, that their actions had made a difference. 
 
There is quite a marked difference here with descriptions of the donor as a bio-
information resource. In this context, recipients are rarely mentioned and the 
relationship is very much between donor and offspring. When recipients are 
mentioned in the context of the bio-informational discourse, it is usually because the 
donor comments on the importance of ensuring recipients do not feel excluded or 
threatened by the role they are enacting in relation to their child. In contrast, in the 
examples below, as well as the words of Eve (p.211) and Bridget (p.210), the 
relationship of donor to offspring is fundamentally intertwined with the donor’s 
relationship to the recipient and the recipient’s relationship to their child. Who is the 
donor in relationship to offspring? In these extracts, they are simply someone who 
helped their Mum or their parents: 
[Describing how her recipient has told her first child about his IVF 
conception and her plans to tell her second, donor-conceived child about 
Hannah’s role]. And she just was really matter of fact and said, well you 
came about because they needed to take Daddy’s sperm and Mummy’s egg 
and mix it and then put it back in to make you. That made you stronger and 
healthier ‘cos Mummy and Daddy couldn’t do that mixing by ourselves. 
And she said we want to be as frank with [second child] but from the outset 
just say that we had to borrow an egg from somebody else. Or take. And she 
said where I come from is that I would like to just say to her, it’s you. 
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
I mean, one of the things I said to [recipient] was, you know, how are you 
gonna explain this? And she said, I’m gonna use your egg story with the 
baking, in the cake. And [child] will always know that you gave me a 
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present that nobody else could. And I’m like, that’s fine. He’s gonna grow 
up knowing that I’m not his Mum, I just helped his Mum. That’s all I am.  
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
 
Donors as a link between networks 
Some donors also depicted their relationship with offspring as a link to a wider 
familial network of potential connections. In this sense, contact between the donor 
and offspring was presented as a means of offspring making further connections and 
achieving a sense of belonging in an alternative or extended network. It was also a tie 
via which donors and their own families could make connections with the family of 
the offspring.  
 
For example, contact between donors and offspring was often discussed as a means 
of facilitating contact between half siblings. Donors imagined that offspring might 
have a particular interest in knowing about or meeting their own children and this 
was therefore something they often wrote about in their goodwill message: 
I think we said a little bit about [son]. Because obviously they would be 
related. You know there would be a relationship there.  
(Nina, known egg share donor) 
They might want to know if you’ve got other children. So have they got, 
technically, a brother, a half-brother or a sister? These are the things if it was 
me that I would want to know. 
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
 
Donors themselves were often also intrigued by the link between their own children 
and their offspring. For example, Debbie explains, if she were to meet her offspring, 
she would enjoy comparing her own children with her offspring and Rachel wonders 
aloud whether her son might similarly enjoy looking for resemblances with a 
potential (half) sibling: 
[Describing what might happen if she was contacted by her donor offspring, 
Debbie described, amongst other things…] Stand them next to my children 
and see if they look alike. Don’t know.  It would be fun! 
  (Debbie, egg donor) 
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And I think, [son] will be maybe quite intrigued when he’s older. You know, 
to find out he’s maybe got a brother or sister. Maybe he’d want to know if 
they’re like him. 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
 
Nearly all the donors who were parents at the time of interview explained that they 
planned to tell, or had already told, their own children about their donation. Most 
parent donors saw disclosure as a moral responsibility but it was not generally 
perceived as an onerous or daunting task, nor something that their children were 
likely to have any difficulties with: 
So I actually if [my children] know, they’ll all be fine with it. My eldest 
especially would really get the point of trying to help. I donated an egg to 
them ‘cos they were so sad they only had one [child] and they really wanted 
another and they couldn’t. And she’d be like, ooh OK. I do think it’d be fine. 
They’d be fine if they know. 
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
Once they [my children] are old enough to understand then we’d kind of let 
them know as well. So it wouldn’t fuss us. It wouldn’t fuss me, anyway. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
Instead, this connection between offspring and their own children was generally 
perceived positively, as either a source of intrigue or something to celebrate: 
And maybe when they meet, I should say to [son], the eldest, they’re kind of 
like a brother to this person. Be curious to see how they take that.  
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
 
When donors imagined that their own family members might be interested in 
meeting their donor offspring, this was not limited to those who would be genetically 
related. Faye explained that her step-daughter was also interested in the potential 
donor offspring and imagined she might like to meet them, if that was a possibility in 
the future. She explained that her step-daughter, Jenny, had a very flexible and 
expansive definition of family which had accommodated changing family forms over 
the years. Jenny’s parents had divorced when she was younger. Her father had since 
re-married (to Faye) and her mother also lived with a new partner – a man who had 
children from a previous relationship. Faye explained that,  to Jenny, any donor 
offspring conceived from Faye’s eggs would be a sibling to her brother and sister 
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(twins born to Jenny’s father and Faye) and so, by extension, they would be a brother 
or sister to her too and perhaps also her step brothers
14
: 
Yeah Jenny knows yeah. Yeah she’s just like, that’s just too weird! Do you 
mean to say I could have like brothers and sisters out there? More than I’ve 
got at the minute. ‘Cos she’s got step-brothers. And she’s very, they’re just, 
as far as she’s concerned, they’re just her brothers. Doesn’t see any 
[difference]. 
‘Cos genetically they’d be absolutely nothing to do with her. ‘Cos they 
would be mine. But they would be [the twin]’s. And I kind of remember like 
when [the twins] were born, her brothers, who genetically are absolutely 
nothing to do with [the twins], they were fascinated. ‘Cos they’re like your 
brother and sister Jenny, like properly. And she said, well technically they’re 
almost [your] brother and sister as well. I’m like, we’re kind of stretching it 
there Jenny! But you know, it’s all kind of, we’re all kind of part of the same 
movable feast that is your life. But Jenny has got, she’s always been 
incredibly practical and pragmatic about life and the situation. And I think 
she’s endured quite a lot of change. When you think, her parents separated 
when she was only two and a half. And she had this conjoined family. And 
she’s just always managed. She’s brilliant actually. 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
In the examples cited in this section, the donor provides a link through which new 
connections can be made. In Faye’s example, these links can then be interpreted by 
others in order to create connections across previously disconnected networks. As 
she told me, the making of certain links were perhaps “stretching it a bit” but 
ultimately these links were something to celebrate since they make up the “movable 
feast” of Jenny’s kinship network.  
 
A small number of donors also commented on the need for half-siblings to be able to 
identify one another in order to prevent accidental incest. It is interesting how rarely 
this point was raised by donor participants, given previous research which suggests 
the risk of consanguineous relationships are a key concern of publics (Edwards 2004) 
and donor-conceived individuals (Blyth et al. 2012) in relation to donor conception. 
However, when it was discussed, the bridge which the donor-offspring relationship 
represented was seen as an important means by which appropriate relationships 
between two genetically linked groups could be maintained. If people were not aware 
                                                 
14
 Meaning the children (from a previous relationship) of her mother’s new partner. 
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that this link existed, perhaps where recipients had decided not to disclose their use 
of a donor to their child, this was perceived to cause potential problems because 
inappropriate relationships could be unwittingly developed: 
But then of course going back to the reason why people have that access to 
your details is so you don’t marry your sister. Then perhaps it would be an 
obligation of the parent [to tell them about their donor conception]. But it’s 
not for me to [decide]. 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
So yeah [daughters] know. And we decided that we would tell them from 
fairly early on. ‘Cos there’s always a remote possibility that they might meet 
a guy from [city] area who turns out to be their half-brother. And that would 
be bad [laughs]. So they kind of need to be a bit aware about finding out, 
you know, potential partners’ backgrounds and where they come from and… 
Knowing that at some point you’ll have to talk to them and… if she’s 
looking to settle down with somebody, she’s going to have to actually say to 
them, look do you mind I’m going to have to actually search the register to 
see whether you exist on it? Even if you don’t know you do, I need to search 
just to guarantee because that has to be cleared.  
(John, sperm donor) 
 
In addition to facilitating contact between half-siblings, some donors imagined that 
offspring would be interested in finding out more about, or potentially meeting, 
others in their own familial network or community. Daniel, speculated that in the 
event that he died before any offspring contacted him, they might contact his sister 
instead as a means of making a connection with his wider family, something his 
sister was keen to make possible: 
My sister’s very probing and practical. And then she’s like, what if there is a 
child but you pass away, can her name go on the register, like at HFEA, to 
say, for them to still find the family member for them to trace? I haven’t got 
a definite answer on that yet but what I’ve found out, I don’t think it’s an 
issue. I think as long as I just keep addresses updated.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
 
The donors saw themselves as a link through which offspring might make 
connections with living relatives, but also one through which they could connect 
themselves to their ancestors and to places where they had lived. Three donors talked 
specifically about the current popularity of genealogy and imagined that offspring 
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might contact them with the aim of further mapping their family tree or discovering 
more about their ethnic ancestry.  
But I think in a way it would be nice, because a lot of people get interested 
in their family tree and their biological family tree as well. So just for these 
reasons it should just be made open. 
(Sarah, egg donor) 
Well I think there’s that [finding out about their potentially inherited traits] 
but there’s also that whole genetic...history…thing. So once they’ve found 
out where I’ve come. Where does my family come from? And do those 
roots… Where do those genetic root come from? So I am one quarter Polish. 
So there’s, you know, some of my facial… my looks and my height come 
from my Grandfather’s side. He came here during the war. So I guess at 
some point they might think, I don’t look quite the same as the rest of my 
family. Where does that come from? Oh that comes from that Polish line 
somewhere down there. 
(John, sperm donor) 
 
John and Sarah implied that there was something intrinsically pleasurable about 
investigating and making these connections with past people and places. Based on 
data collected via a Mass Observation Directive
15
, Kramer (2011) argues that people 
enjoy tracing their family histories as a means of rooting themselves in times and 
place but also as a ways of exercising kinship agency over whether such roots and 
connections matter to them. Her analysis suggests that people take as much pleasure 
in the process of making themselves connected in these ways as they do in the 
resulting feelings of belonging. My participants seem to draw on similar assumptions 
when talking about their role as a genealogical link. Their connection to offspring 
was a means by which they could share family histories (potential connections to 
places and people in the past) which donor offspring might take pleasure in 
negotiating – figuring out if these things mattered to them and the ways in which 
they belonged. It is interesting that, of the two participants who shared their goodwill 
messages with me, both included information about significant places as well as 
significant other people in their lives. In telling their life stories, both these men 
                                                 
15
 A Mass Observation Directive is a request sent to hundreds of volunteer “observers” to write on a 
particular topic or open-ended question. Directives are issued by the Mass Observation Project to 
volunteers in the UK and researchers can access data from past directives and/or collaborate with 
the project in order to issue directives which relate to their own research questions.  
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weaved in information about the places they had lived, particularly where they had 
grown up, and moves they had made in their lives. Kramer’s (2011) work, which also 
draws on Edwards (2000), suggests that belonging can be mobilised through 
connections to places as well as people and furthermore connections to places can 
reinforce connections to people, as well as the other way around. By including this 
information, donors were offering their offspring another way in which they might 
belong or construct belonging. 
 
The donors depicted their relationship with offspring as a link into an alternative or 
additional network of belonging. As in the above extracts, this could be seen as a 
valuable source of connections but could also be seen as problematic where it blurred 
boundaries between different family networks or if crossing that bridge was 
experienced as intrusive or threatening by others. Of all the donors interviewed, Faye 
talked about such scenarios at greatest length, emphasising both the positive and the 
potentially problematic. Echoing the words of Konrad’s egg donor participants 
(2005), she speculated that if either her or her potential donor offspring were to lose 
their family through some tragic accident, this link might start to take on greater 
significance, as it would then become a link to an alternative family, the only one 
they now had: 
F: I think it works both way. If that child had experienced a situation that 
left them without family and then he would look, he would find that he had 
potentially another family. But at the same. So he, they, the child that’s 
conceived, would then have access to a donated family. Now whether or not 
that’s a good thing, and whether or not the parent who donated the egg has 
the ability to salve that broken person. 
LG: How would you cope with that? Say that did happen. 
F: How would I? Do you know, I think I would be glad I would be there. 
But that’s because you know maternally you would have that. You know, if 
you knew somebody that that happened to and you maybe think. I wish I 
could, if you could do something for that person, you would do. Just as 
another human being. So I think you know, you know genetically you’re 
there as a, you know, if there’s no life boats left, then I’m your last ditch. 
I’m your last kind of bid for some kind of, you know, salve, I guess. So I 
think it’s probably. I wonder if I thought that at the time? Yeah I probably 
did. 




A latent instant connection 
A few donors talked about the potential for there to be an instant emotional 
connection with donor-conceived offspring, in the event that they were to meet. 
Reminiscent of Mason’s (2008) theorisation of the ethereal as one facet of kinship 
thinking, this connection was conceived as intangible, almost magical. It could not be 
fully explained but was linked to a mutual recognition of similarity in one another or 
some feeling that they were “part of” each other. These donors speculated that they 
might therefore “just click” with their offspring or feel drawn to one another:  
I think it’s more like if the child was very like me. I don’t mean looks-wise 
but like personality-wise, and there was some kind of. You know the way if 
you meet people sometimes, there’s something that’s just there and you 
click with them and suddenly you’re their best friends and you’ve only just 
met them type thing. I think it was more like if that was there.  
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
You have an idea in your head about how the situation might be and then the 
situation happens and it’s nothing like you imagine it to be. So you’ve got 
no way of knowing. I did wonder about. I mean gene pools are pretty strong. 
And I did wonder about how I might feel, you know meeting someone that 
might feel like a member, feel like I might instinctively or intuitively know 
and understand. Which happens with your family. You know. And not, 
maybe because you’ve grown up with them? I don’t know. I mean there are 
stronger ties than just nurture. 
(Nina, known egg share donor) 
 
Daniel speculated that perhaps this specific type of emotional connection might be 
lacking in his offspring’s relationship with their non-genetic parent. His relationship 
to his offspring might therefore be one in which he could provide, and might also 
feel, this instant connection. He explained this through reference to a story he had 
read online about a donor-conceived person’s search for their donor. In the story, the 
woman explained that, although she loved both her parents, her Dad had always felt 
like a “stranger”. This had led her to seek out the sperm donor who had enabled her 
conception: 
LG: And did the opposite happen there? Did she feel some kind of 
emotional connection to the sperm donor? 
D: Yeah she said she had the emotional connection that she was after. As 
much as she loves her parents, she still has this other separate sort of [pause] 
relationship, with the sperm donor. 




These donors did not present this potential connection as a maternal or paternal bond. 
However, they recognised that it could be experienced as threatening by recipients: 
I wanted to know if it worked but I think it was more I wanted to know is, is 
there somebody out there that’s like part of me? Which isn’t nice for the 
Mum and Dad of that child but maybe that’s, I don’t know I’m the kind of 
person that would maybe want too much out of it? Do you know what I 
mean? 
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
It is perhaps therefore telling that, of the three donors who talked about their 
relationship to offspring in this way, two knew that no children had been born of 
their donation (Daniel was still in the process of donating). Notice also how, in the 
previous quotation, Nina stopped short of stating that her offspring might have felt 
like a member of her family. I think donors were aware that this was a slightly risky 
way to make sense of their relationship to offspring, in the sense that it could be 
viewed as threatening the status of the recipient parents, and they were careful not to 
take this way of articulating their role too far. 
 
Just as it would have been 
A few known donors, particularly women who had donated to their sisters, presented 
their role in relation to both actual and potential offspring as “just as it would have 
been” had the recipient not required donor-assistance to conceive. So the two women 
who had donated eggs to their sister defined their role in relation to offspring as that 
of an aunt, and this, they explained, would be their role whatever the route via which 
their sister had children:  
[Sister] did say a few times you know, you will be ok with this? If I got 
pregnant, how would you feel? And I said, I'd be delighted. But I'd be 
delighted if you got pregnant on your own. I just want a niece or a nephew. I 
want another child in the family that's not mine to look after. ‘Cos I've got 
my hands full with the two that I've got. I'd like a niece or a nephew that I 
can spoil and look forward to seeing them when you come up or when we 
come down to visit. That I can phone and speak to on the phone like, and 
Skype, like you do with the boys. That's what I would like. 
(Maya, known egg donor) 
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I don’t feel like her mother. I feel like her aunt. That’s how I feel. 
(Grace, known egg donor) 
 
Similarly, some of the women who had donated to friends also presented their 
relationship to offspring as that which it would have been had their friends conceived 
without their help: They were friends with the recipient and therefore, of course, it 
was normal that they would meet and take an interest in their children: 
[Recipient] had a little girl, called Clare. So she’s lovely. And we went to 
see her, me and [partner]. I think she was back home probably about a week. 
I mean, [partner] said, will we go to the hospital? And I said, well no, ‘cos 
we wouldn’t have gone to the hospital if I wasn’t a donor. You know, she is 
a good friend but I wouldn’t have done. I would’ve waited till she’d gone 
home. So there’s no difference, at all. 
(Laura, known egg donor) 
So where we’re at, then it means we’re just back to being a normal crowd of 
pals with our normal dynamics. And we just, for the first time in all those 
years, had a conversation about it. We saw them last weekend. And we were 
all laughing about it. It’s just so nothing now. We don’t even think about it. 
She doesn’t look like me. She looks like her Dad and she’s got brown hair. 
And actually I only look at her and see [child]. I don’t look at her all and. I 
don’t even remember. And I think they’re exactly the same. 
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
 
For some known donors, their pre-existing relationship to recipients provided a 
means of effectively screening out the significance of their connection to offspring; 
being a donor parent had no social significance, they were simply their aunt of 
mother’s friend. Laura most strongly expressed this view and she therefore 
positioned herself similarly to known donors donating in studies conducted prior to 
the introduction of identity-release legislation (Winter and Daniluk 2004; Kirkman 
2003).  
 
At other times, rather than trying to screen out the role of “donor parent,” known 
donors suggested that their position in this regard simply blurred with that which 
they would have taken on without the donor conception. Several of these donors 
suggested that, by being an aunt or family friend, they would automatically be able to 
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enact some of the roles described in this chapter; if the child wanted to know about 
the backstory to their life, and the people who had made it possible, there would not 
need to be a special meeting with the donor – they would already know who it was. 
If they wanted to know what their donor was like in order to consider whether they 
had inherited any traits, they would be able to draw on their existing knowledge and 
memories of that person: 
Already me and my sister are very close. So there’s [laughing]. As my 
husband says, she’s one baby with two Mums. He already says. So I’m 
already very very close to [offspring]. So she will not have the need to look 
for me ‘cos I’m there already! And also, that need to look for the real 
parents doesn’t arise because I’m there already. You know what I’m saying? 
So it won’t happen ‘cos the need is not there. 
(Grace, known egg donor) 
 
Deconstructing family discourses and practices 
The donors I interviewed were in a novel and unusual situation. They rejected the 
role of parent to offspring but, in the context of identity-release legislation and the 
wider idealisation of openness (Smart 2010; Crawshaw et al. 2012), neither did they 
want to ignore or dismiss the significance of this connection. Donors constructed 
donor parenthood in the context of these dual pressures, to both distance themselves 
from and connect with offspring. They had no previous experience of enacting this 
role and, in line with other researchers (Orobitg and Salazar 2005; Klotz 2016; Mohr 
2015), I argue that there is no established script which might have guided their 
imaginings. Clinic information leaflets made the law clear – they might be identified 
or contacted by offspring in the future and they had no parental rights or 
responsibilities. However, these leaflets did not give any idea as to why the law had 
changed nor what role they might be expected to fulfil in relation to any child 
conceived. 
 
If clinic texts and interactions offered no clear narrative of donor parenthood, where 
did donors draw their ideas from? As I have described, donors talked about their role 
as a bio-information resource, a narrative support, a link to wider networks and as an 
emotional connection. These ideas were not selected at random. Instead, donors were 
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drawing selectively on their own experiences of “doing family” (Morgan 1985 
1996). Whilst never quite defining themselves as kin in any straightforward sense, 
and certainly not parents to donor offspring, donors selected and played with aspects 
of family practices and discourses to enact and, more often, to imagine their role as 
donor. They thought about what families do and what these practices provide and 
adapted this experiential knowledge to make sense of their relationship to offspring. 
They described how, in their own lives, recognising similarity with kin and learning 
family histories had provided them with a sense of belonging, of rootedness in time 
and place. They told me how their relationships with parents and children had helped 
them to understand the (sometimes haphazard and unpredictable) role of genetic 
inheritance in identity formation. They described the reassurance and enjoyment they 
had found in looking for resemblances between themselves and their own children, 
parents or (in Liam’s case) his birth family. They drew on their knowledge of 
genealogy as a pastime to explain why making connections with other people and 
places, both living and past, could be pleasurable. Donors used these experiences to 
articulate what it was they might offer offspring, trying to extract particular ways of 
“doing family” which might appropriately be offered by ones genetic or donor 
parent. It should be noted that this did not only involve selecting aspects of “doing 
family” which could be linked to genetic substance, such as providing bio-
information or identifying resemblances. Donors also identified particular family 
practices which would be supported by sharing their stories – why they had donated 
and the stories of their own lives, including their own family histories. They did not 
think of themselves as “really” family but they imagined they might be able to 
provide some aspects of these family-like processes. 
 
Many interview excerpts in this chapter have demonstrated the frequent comparisons 
donors made with their own family relationships in order to make sense of their 
connection to offspring. Liam drew on his own experiences meeting his birth parents 
to explain why looking for and discussing resemblances could provide a sense of 
“groundedness.” Adam considered how looking for similarities and differences 
between himself and his daughter had helped him to better understand the process of 
identity formation generally, including his own identity. Faye drew on her 
224 
 
discussions with her step-daughter to think about how both genetic and non-
genetically related persons could act as links which enabled others to make ties and 
celebrate their connectedness to others.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that participants often found it initially 
challenging to articulate quite what kind of relationship they might have with 
offspring or to explain why offspring had a “right to know” them. Perhaps because it 
was challenging, participants were often thinking aloud during their interviews. As a 
result, they often seemed to be figuring things out as they went along. Their 
narratives therefore offer a real insight into the creative ways in which donors first 
deconstructed and then applied their own kinship experiences. As Edwards argues, 
developments in biotechnology and the novel situations they create, force us to 
deconstruct the previously “black-boxed” category of nature and to be more explicit 
about what this concept has do with kinship thinking (2009, 3).  By virtue of the role 
they found themselves figuring out, my participants had to pick apart what exactly it 
was about the reproductive process that matters to personhood and to social 
relationships. If a “donor parent” script was more firmly established, perhaps my 
data would not have elucidated, to quite the same degree, the creativity of this 
endeavour. I will add just three more examples which demonstrate the ways in which 
donors were thinking aloud, picking apart their own experiences of “doing family” in 
order to imagine and articulate what doing donor parenthood might involve. 
 
In this first example, I asked Rachel whether she expects donor offspring to contact 
her in the future. At first she was unsure but then she drew on her relationship to her 
mother in order to put herself in the shoes of her offspring. She explained how, 
following the birth of her son, she started to think about her own ties with previous 
generations – something which, following the death of her mother in her teenage 
years, left her feeling “completely lost:”  
But now that I’ve had [son], I’m just very aware of the fact that I could even 
get paralysed and be of no use to him whatsoever…..When I was 15, my 
Mum died and it just totally left me lost, completely lost. And I obviously 
don’t want that happening to him. I think maybe when the donor, the child 
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has kids of their own, that’s when they might start thinking about these 
kinds of things. And know that time will run out one day. And they don’t 
want to leave it to the stage where it’s too late to track me down ‘cos I might 
have died, you know, and they’d never have found me. 
(Rachel, egg donor) 
The “kind of things” that Rachel imagined offspring thinking about in relation to her, 
the donor, revolved around a desire for connection between the generations as well 
as the risk of their rupture. Just as the birth of her son and the creation of a new 
generation had reminded her of the passing of her mother, Rachel imagined that 
donor offspring might similarly think back to their previous generation (her) if they 
were to have their own children in the future. She did not want her donor offspring to 
experience the same rupture as she had, the same feeling of being lost, and hoped 
they would contact her before “it’s too late.” Whilst she clearly distanced herself 
from a parental role at many other points in the interview, in this passage at least, her 
own relationship to donor offspring is compared with her relationship to her own 
mother. 
 
A second example from my interview with Daniel similarly demonstrates how 
experiences of family enabled donors to imagine their relationship to offspring. 
Having read online about a donor-conceived person’s experience, he explained that 
donor offspring might want to meet him in search of an “emotional connection,” 
potentially absent in their relationship with their father. I then asked him whether he 
imagined he might also experience such an emotional connection with his offspring, 
if they were to meet in the future. In order to answer my question, he drew on a 
memory of meeting his nephew for the first time: 
I imagine, if it’s anything. I don’t know. If it’s anything like having a 
nephew or a niece, as soon as you meet them, you feel that. I remember the 
first time I ever met my first [nephew], my nephew, I remember the first 
time I ever met him. It’s like you just feel this instant connection. So 
whether it’s like that and, I’ve never had a child before, so I suppose it’s 
gonna be one of these things where I’m just gonna have to wait and find out, 
if and when it happens. 




Donors also drew on second-hand knowledge of family relationships. In particular, 
donors often talked about the impact of “family secrets” (Smart 2007) and hidden 
adoptions or unknown or misattributed paternity on previous generations. For 
example, Tom drew on his father’s feelings about not knowing his father:  
LG: Do you think that it’s likely to be important to a donor conceived child 
to have that contact with their donor? 
T: Yeah at some point I would have thought so. If just for a brief moment, 
you know, when they’re going through that phrase.  
LG: And do you know where you might have got that idea from? Is it from 
your own experience growing up? Have you done a bit of research about 
donor-conceived children? Is it just sort of intuition? 
T: Well all three. All three? All two? Yeah all three. So my Dad didn’t know 
his Dad. And I think that’s affected him quite a bit in his life. I think he’s 
sought to find out who that person is.  
LG: What was the sort of circumstances of that? 
T: Erm that was a world war two bunker moment for my grandma, shall we 
say, I think. So she’s not sure who it was. Well if she does, she’s not telling. 
But she claims he was an American. I think that was quite a burden for my 
Dad really. So in that sense it’s like an anonymous donation right? You 
know, he’s fine, he’s not like. But I think he would just really like to know 
and he’s spent quite a lot of time trying to find out. 
 (Tom, known sperm donor) 
 
These extracts demonstrate the creative, piecemeal and “on the hoof” manner in 
which donors deconstructed and applied their knowledge and experience of family in 
order to make sense of their role in relation to offspring. During the interviews, there 
was a sense of things being figured out as they went along – my questions prompting 
donors to make further analogies and comparisons in order to imagine how this 
relationship might play out in the future. However, it is important to emphasise that, 
although experiences of family provided an important resource for making sense of 
this connection, donors were careful to qualify these comparisons, to make clear that, 




In this chapter, I have demonstrated that, although donors emphatically rejected the 
role of parent, the vast majority perceived their connection to offspring as socially 
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significant.  As was frequently stated, offspring had “a right to know where they 
came from,” and donors had a responsibility to remain open to contact and 
potentially developing a “real life” relationship with them.  
 
What role did donors imagine enacting in such relationships? Using my interview 
data, I described five ways in which donors articulated their role: Firstly, I 
demonstrated how donors presented themselves as a source of bio-information – 
someone who could help offspring to understand and validate their own identity. 
Secondly, I analysed the ways in which donors depicted themselves as a narrative 
support, someone who could help offspring to extend and embed their biographies. 
Next, I described donors perceptions of themselves as a link to a wider network of 
potential connections with people and places and then as a latent emotional 
connection, which could be activated if they were to meet their offspring. Finally, I 
described how some known donors felt their role was “just as if” the child had been 
conceived without their gametes – as an aunt or family friend. 
 
In the final section of the chapter, I analysed where these ideas were drawn from. I 
suggest that clinic interactions and texts provided very little guidance as to what role 
donors ought to play in relation to their offspring. Wider cultural discourses and 
media representations similarly provided very few representations of the role these 
donors were inhabiting. In short, there is no established social script for making 
sense of donor parenthood (Orobitg and Salazar 2006, Mohr 2015). Some known 
donors were able to draw on their pre-existing relationship to recipients in order to 
define their role as one of aunt or family friend. Unknown donors had to be more 
creative. In order to make sense of their relationship to offspring, they made 
comparisons with other relationships where shared substance and conception stories 
were attributed significance – namely those considered family or kin. Donors 
frequently borrowed ideas and practices associated with families generally, and their 
families specifically, in order to make sense of their connection to offspring. By 
deconstructing their own kinship experiences, as well as those learned about via 
others, they selected particular aspects of what families do or provide for another in 
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order to imagine a role for themselves. However, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 
Eight, these kinship references were always limited or qualified in some way to show 
that they were not quite family in any straightforward sense and certainly not the 




Qualifying Kinship: Managing Risky 
Connections 
 
“…it is the interdigitation of diverse kinds of linkages that gives English kin 
reckoning not just an expansive but also a self-limiting character, and that 
this self-limiting character is fruitfully regarded as part of kinship thinking.” 
(Edwards and Strathern, 2000, 158) 
In this chapter, I analyse the ways in which the kinship narratives of donors were 
“self-limiting” in the way Edwards and Strathern describe. Doing kinship involves 
processes of claiming and including but therefore also necessarily entails disowning 
and exclusion. As Chapter Seven demonstrated,  in order to make sense of their role 
in relation to offspring, donors drew selectively on kinship discourses and practices, 
often making comparisons with their own experiences of “doing family.” However, 
in this chapter, I demonstrate the ways in which these references were always 
qualified and limited. Such qualification was necessary because, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, these men and women did not want to be parents to donor offspring 
and instead reserved that role entirely for the recipient(s). As explained in Chapter 
Five, their primary aim in donating was to enable others to experience parenthood, 
for these recipients to have their own family, and they were therefore careful to 
protect the status of the recipient or the recipient couple as the “real” parents. Too 
explicit or unqualified adoption of kinship discourses or practices would risk 
“treading on the toes” of the recipient(s). References to family practices, useful a 
resource as they were for making sense of their situation, were therefore risky and 
had to be carefully managed. 
 
In the most basic sense, donors qualified kinship discourses by simply stating that 
they were not the “real” parents to offspring. They did this frequently and 
emphatically (see Chapter Seven). However, in this chapter I focus on the more 
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creative, sometimes subtle, discursive means through which donors renegotiated and 
qualified their connections with offspring. I describe six ways in which donors did 
this limiting work. Firstly, they depersonalised gamete donation by interweaving 
particular discourses into their narratives. Specifically, donors used discourses 
associated with public, civic life and also presented donation as a pure, detached gift. 
In both cases, this had the effect of tempering the intimacy and emotional connection 
associated with familial analogies and kinship idioms. Second, donors avoided 
constructing direct kinship connections with donor offspring but instead “re-routed” 
kinship ties such that links were presented as indirect, routed via the recipients or 
their own children. Thirdly, donors told their donation stories in ways which 
reinforced their position within their own family and sometimes articulated 
boundaries between “their” family and “our” family. Fourth and fifth, one sperm 
donor deployed humour to undermine the kinship potential of his connection to 
offspring and many limited connections through reference to geographical or 
temporal distance. Finally, donors assigned kinning agency to others to activate, 
deactivate and shape their relationship to donor offspring, thereby sidestepping the 
need to either make or break a kinship connection themselves. Having analysed these 
various strategies employed by donors, I demonstrate how donors moved between 
different approaches in order to adapt, or imagine they would adapt, to changing 
circumstances, new information and particularly future interactions with recipients 
and donor-conceived offspring.  
 
As becomes clear throughout the chapter, the ways in which donors conceived their 
role in relation to their recipient(s) and the wider community both constrained and 
enabled their adoption of different limiting strategies. So, for example, framing 
donation as a civic act, a gift to the wider community, provided a means of diluting 
their connection to offspring and tempering the intimacy associated with their 
kinship references. In addition, a pre-existing or imagined personal connection with 
their recipient enabled donors to talk about their connection to offspring indirectly, 
“re-routed” via their relationship with recipients. As Chapter Five explained, cultural 
barriers limited sperm donors’ ability to articulate connections with recipients and I 
suggest it is for this reason that no male donors “re-routed” connections in this way. 
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In short, donors’ circumstances and their identities created both resources and 
constraints on the ways in which they narrated their donation as a particular kind of 
gift and this in turn shaped how they constructed and qualified their connections to 
offspring. 
 
I should highlight here that very often the kinship work that I describe here is 
imaginative. That is to say, most of the donors were talking about potential, future 
scenarios in which they might be contacted by their donor offspring and perhaps the 
recipient family. Four of the known donors (Grace, Hannah, Anna and Laura) were 
in contact with their recipients who had had children as a result of the egg donation. 
In addition, Tom’s recipient was pregnant at the time of the interview. However, 
even in cases where the children had been born, all were still young (under three at 
the time of interview) and, though all but Laura’s recipient planned to disclose the 
circumstances of the conception, none had yet done so. For this reason, much of what 
the donors said about their role in relation to offspring was speculative, imaginative 
work which may not have been undertaken or articulated if they had not agreed to 
talk to me. However, I do not think this makes their narratives any less interesting or 
relevant. As others have highlighted (Smart 2007; Auksuole 2009; Carsten 2004), 
imaginative work is often key to the construction of kinship. That said, it is important 
to consider that the roles donors imagined for themselves may not play out as they 
envisage and, although they emphasised their flexibility, such adaptability may not 
be so straightforward in the future. At that stage, they will be negotiating 
relationships with specific rather than abstract people – not only their donor-
conceived offspring and recipients but also perhaps their own partners, children and 
other family members – who will bring with them their own histories, personalities 
and motivations. Of course, it is also possible that eighteen years will go by and they 






Before detailing the ways in which donors qualified and limited their relationship to 
offspring, I provide some context to their kinship creativity. The donors I 
interviewed were all experts in “doing family” (Morgan 1985, 1996). By this I mean 
that they, like all of us, had learned how to do kinship in their specific cultural 
contexts. Through lived experience they have developed an understanding of the 
ways in which culturally legitimate kinship claims are made and unmade. Over their 
life courses, donors had negotiated and constructed kinship in different ways, 
responding to changing circumstances and coordinating with others. In addition to 
relationships with parents, siblings and extended families, just over two thirds of 
donors were parents at the time of interview, Sarah was pregnant and Rob was a 
foster carer. Liam was adopted and had developed relationships with his birth family. 
Several had step or half relations and others, like Zara and Daniel, counted close 
family friends as kin. There were a few stories of family feuds, estrangements and 
“family secrets,” hidden paternity or unofficial adoptions (usually a generation or 
two removed from the donor). The donors were therefore well-practiced in doing 
kinship in myriad ways, negotiating changing relationships and contexts.  
 
Rachel’s experience offers a good illustration: 
Och well I’m not massively close to my lot. I mean we were all right up 
until Mum died and she’d remarried. So I’ve got a step-Dad. So he took it 
really, really badly. It’s cancer she had. They, I’ve got a half-brother. He’s 
15 now. So he was very much of the impression that, you know, that’s his 
son to my Mum. And ‘cos he’s not blood related to me and my sister, we 
didn’t matter that much. And we now know it was just grief that was doing 
that. ‘Cos we’re fine, we get on fine now. And he did actually kick me out of 
home because of it. He couldn’t deal with, you know, I needed to grieve and 
things as well but he didn’t want me to. You know, he didn’t understand that 
I’d lost something as well. He thought he’d only lost something. And my 
sister ended up throwing a strop and she moved in with her friend’s family. 
And my brother was so wee, how old was he? Two, three at the time? [Step-
dad] wasn’t capable of looking after him because he was so devastated so 
my aunty took him in. So it was really just me left in the house with [step-
dad] and he just had enough and kicked me out. So certainly the family’s 
really fallen apart since Mum’s gone. She was very [much] of the whole 
idea that families are about getting together. You know, we all had to sit 
down together at meal times. And Christmas was a massive issue. You 
know, it was a huge thing. Everybody had to come down and family from 
far and wide had to come over. You know, and we all had to stick together. 
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So when she died all that just went. Completely just went. Nobody bothers 
anymore. The family are all split up over Christmas and things.  
(Rachel, egg donor) 
In this description, we can see that Rachel’s experience and understandings of the 
relationships between herself, her step father, sister and half-brother have changed 
markedly over her life course, with the death of her mother being a key precipitating 
factor for change. Before her mother died, they were a “family” who had to “stick 
together,” as demonstrated by their regular “get togethers” and sharing of meals. 
However, after the death of her mother, the lack of “blood” connection between 
herself and her step-father became significant and is here used to explain their 
deteriorating relationship and his apparent abandonment of her. Whilst the 
relationship has since improved and her step-father and half siblings are still “[her] 
lot,” Rachel’s story suggests they are no longer really a “proper” family – her 
mother, as primary kinkeeper (Rosenthal 1985) and key mediator (Edwards and 
Strathern 2000), is no longer able to link everyone together.  
 
In donors’ narratives, understandings of kinship, the bases on which connections 
could be claimed and dismissed, were not static but continually reproduced and 
renegotiated. Rachel’s is a relatively lengthy example but the themes of change and 
negotiation were reiterated throughout the interviews. Whether in Faye’s depiction of 
her step-daughter’s concept of family as “a movable feast” or Rob’s contention that 
he and his brother are now “just strangers,” donors’ narratives showed continual 
change and renegotiation of who counted as family and why. I suggest that these 
lived experiences of kinship as a malleable and changeable relational practice 
provided donors with the discursive skills to qualify their potential kinship 
relationship to offspring. The following sections in this chapter illustrate how donors 
applied these skills in their narratives. 
 
Depersonalising donation 
A key means by which donors shaped the meaning of kinship discourses and 
practices was by using them alongside those more commonly associated with the 
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public world, outside of the home and the realm of family. In doing so, they diffused 
some of the intimacy associated with these ideas. Gamete donation was framed as a 
public or civic act, connecting them to the wider community or public institutions, 
rather than a personal, intimate activity connecting them to specific individuals. 
 
In Chapter Six, I introduced many of these public or civic discourses: Donors 
emphasised their role as one of the good citizen, willing to help others in the wider 
community.  Gamete donation was compared to blood and organ donation, giving to 
charity and undertaking voluntary work. Donors depicted themselves working 
alongside medical staff towards the shared goal of alleviating the suffering of those 
who were involuntarily childless, with some taking on an ambassadorial role in 
relation to gamete donation. These themes are described in detail in Chapter Six. 
Here, I give a few examples which demonstrate some of the more subtle ways in 
which donors interwove these public discourses with kinship discourses in ways 
which temper the intimacy associated with the latter. This discursive mixing enabled 
donors to use ideas associated with kinship whilst also distancing themselves from a 
familial role.  
 
One of the most frequent way in which donors combined kinship and public 
discourses was their talk of “rights.” Echoing the public debates that have preceded 
the introduction of identity-release legislation in the UK and elsewhere (see Frith 
2001; Melhuus 2012), donors frequently spoke about donor offspring’s “right to 
know where they come from” or the “right to know who they are:” 
Everyone should have the basic human right of knowing where you came 
from. I didn’t donate my eggs to be a wee secret. Do you know what I 
mean? I think well if a child grows up and goes, right well I’ve got freckles. 
Who did I get that from ‘cos you don’t have that? I think they should have 
the right to know where they came from, biologically. I am, I’m not their 
parent but genetically we are linked. And they have a right to know that. 
And I think that’s important. The law’s right to change and allow them to 
have that.  
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
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Donors’ adoption of a “rights discourse” reflects the contemporary dominant 
discourse about the importance of knowing one’s biological origins; as Melhuus and 
Howell (2009) have argued, such knowledge is increasingly presented as a self-
evident right. However, I would add that by adopting this discourse, donors were 
able to de-personalise their donation and specifically the kinship trope, “where 
you’ve come from”. There is something quite striking about this phrase, “the right to 
know where you’ve come from,” in the way it juxtaposes that which is assigned to 
presumed autonomous individuals in law (the right to access information) (see 
Reynaert, Bouverne-de-Bie, and Vandevelde 2009; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
2013) and something which is ultimately about personal connections to other people 
(where they’ve come from). Donors’ adoption of a rights discourse can therefore be 
seen as a means of depersonalising their relationship to offspring, positioning it in 
the public, rather than domestic, world and implying boundaries between individuals. 
Usually we talk of “rights” in relation to institutions, nation states and supra-national 
organisations. In contrast, there are social expectations that parents will fulfil certain 
obligations to their children but if they are not met then it is the state who must 
legally step in to ensure that the children’s rights are met. By framing offspring’s 
interest in their donors as a “right to information”, donors therefore make a 
distinction between themselves and the recipient parents. 
 
A further example where we can see public and kinship discourses interwoven comes 
from my interview with Tom who had donated sperm to he and his wife’s friends, a 
lesbian couple, one of whom was pregnant at the time of the interview. Describing 
his future role in relation to the child, he borrowed from kinship discourses – talking 
about the need to “be available” to his donor offspring and his potential role in 
helping them to understand their identity. However, his language was peppered with 
the phrases, “child’s needs” and “child-led” and he specifically frames this 
relationship as “work.” These were not terms he used during our interview to 
describe his relationship with his own two children: 
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Yeah child-led. Helen and Lisa kind of monitor it and then I’ll respond to 
that as needed… 
In this sense, there is, there will be a bit of work because if the child’s needs 
come up in a way that challenge the boundaries between Helen and Lisa and 
myself and Emma then there’s work to be done there, to accommodate those 
needs. 
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
I would argue that these phrases are borrowed from the world of professional 
childcare (not an area which Tom worked in), they are terms we expect from 
teachers, social workers or psychologists. They are words frequently used about 
families but less commonly used to talk about our own families. By adopting this 
vocabulary, he was able to distance himself from a kinship role and instead almost 
professionalised the role of the donor – he will respond to the offspring in order to 
meet their socio-emotional needs but, these terms seem to imply, retain an 
appropriate distance. In this way, he discursively protects the status of the recipient 
parents. 
 
Echoing the findings of Orobitg and Salazar’s (2005) interviews with anonymous 
Spanish egg donors, participants frequently made comparisons between gamete and 
blood donation. Again such references depersonalise donation and position it as a 
civic act, even duty, rather than a procreative act:  
So I think it would just be funny to see if I donated to a friend of mine and 
they had a little boy, it would be funny to see how much did he really take 
from me and how much did he take from Daddy, kind of thing. But it just 
wouldn’t bother me. I think when you’re thinking about adoption or 
surrogacy, it’s maybe really different ‘cos you’re spending a lot more of 
your own time investing in this baby. But when all you’ve done. It’s like 
donating blood really.  
(Yasmin, egg share donor) 
I think at the time I just didn’t really. I preferred the distance of it. I think if I 
knew, especially if I knew it was going to be somebody close, I’d be like oh 
how are they are doing, and sort of need to see them, kind of be there. But 
by not finding anything about it at all, it’s like donating blood on my part. 
So whatever happens happens really. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
Well I know that the reasons [for partner being unsure about her donating] 
are he’s already got children and I think he was thinking about things in 
terms of if I was to donate the eggs and it was a success and they had a little 
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boy or girl, I would then look at this child and think it’s half of me. So then 
we had this discussion at length and I said, I wouldn’t think that at all. I 
would think, you know, my friend Freya and [husband] they’re the parents. 
And I said then and I still think like this now. I see it like donating blood. 
It’s just surplus to me at the minute. So I don’t need it. Somebody else does. 
(Laura, known egg donor) 
In these three extracts, “blood donation” is used to quickly reposition gamete 
donation as a public act of giving. Each donor was initially describing gamete 
donation in reference to kinship discourses and practices. Yasmin talks about her 
interest in resemblances between herself and offspring. Eve talks about the potential 
for an emotional connection, a desire to care for her offspring, if circumstances were 
different, and Laura explains how her partner had struggled to understand how she 
would not view her offspring as “half of [her].” “Blood donation” is then used to 
quickly reframe gamete donation as a civic rather than familial act. Whilst in other 
contexts “blood” and ‘blood donation’ may have kinship connotations (Carsten 
2011), here these donors use “blood donation” or “charity” as a proxy for an attitude 
to gamete donation as a simple way of helping others, emotionally unproblematic 
and straightforward. As Orobitg and Salazar argue, “blood donation” constitutes a 
“familiar discourse,” which donors call on to provide an alternative framework for 
thinking and talking about their donation (2005, 38). Usually this viewpoint was 
explained in detail at some point near the beginning of the interview and then could 
be referred back to if and when the donor wished to re-emphasise this position. 
Blood donation was then used as a way of discursively stepping back from kinship. It 
was used to re-anchor the narrative when discussing practices which we might 
ordinarily think of as denoting family, such as “resemblance talk” (Becker, Butler, 
and Nachtigall 2005). It was also deployed when others, like Laura’s partner, 
challenged their views on their non-parental relationship to offspring. 
 
Donors also mitigated the potentially risky kinship connotations of their donation by 
interweaving their narratives with presentations of their donation as an act of pure 
disconnected altruism. Although gift giving could be a  means of making and 
enacting connections with their recipients (see Chapter Five), donors also drew on a 
particular ideology of “pure” (Derrida 1992; J. Parry 1986) gift-giving to position 
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their donation as a (though other-oriented) distant and impersonal, gift – one given 
freely  and completely, without expectation of return of any kind. In Chapter Five, I 
focussed on the ways in which donors were subject to this idealisation of 
anonymous, distant giving and belief that “impure” gifts are emotionally risky and 
somehow less selfless. However, donors were not only subject to this ideal but were 
also active participants in its recreation – mobilising this particular discourse of gift-
giving in order to separate themselves from their gametes and limit the kinship 
connotations of their donation. To speak of their gametes as a gift could be a means 
of discursively disconnecting them from recipients and offspring. In the following 
extracts, donors emphasised that their gametes have been “given” or “donated” and, 
as such, they no longer have any claim on them or the child that might result (see 
also Edwards 2000; Ragoné 1994). They suggest that in order to really “give” their 
eggs or sperm they must emotionally detach themselves from them: 
 [Asked about how he would have felt if the foetus conceived from his 
offspring had been found to have a disability or health condition] I think, it’s 
up to them. It’s not mine. I’ve given my donation to them to do with as they 
wish. And it’s not my call. I’ve kind of absolved myself of that process. It’s 
something you work on actually. ‘Cos you might think, it’s important I think 
and it must be very difficult for women, for example, who carry other 
people’s babies and stuff. You know, so it’s very simple for a guy, almost, 
compared to that with a sperm. So you’re thinking oh it’s my genetic 
material and so it takes a little bit of a push right from the start, I’ve been 
sort of thinking, it’s not my child. It’s a product of my genes. And just 
making sure, maintaining that sort of mental separation.  
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
You kind of don’t mention it you know. It’s like you’ve given the gift, let it 
go… 
If somebody said to me they [donor offspring] are in [home city], if 
somebody said to me, oh they live in such and such an area. Then you would 
start looking. And you don’t want to do that. You want to just think, that 
was the gift that was given. 
(Faye, egg share donor) 
Yeah. They [the recipients] got permission to do whatever they want. When 
I donated the first time, they had a frozen [embryo], she did phone me. And 
she said, just to let you know, we’re gonna have a go with that frozen egg. 
And I just said to her, see if I bought you a box of cakes, would you tell me 
every time you were gonna eat one. She was like, no. Well, stop phoning me 
then. It’s your gift. 
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
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In these examples, the language of gifts is used to objectify gametes and separate 
them from the self. However, as I explained in Chapter Five, many donors also drew 
on a discourse of gifts as relational, personal activities. Interestingly, to speak of the 
gift in these more personal terms could also provide a means of limiting kinship 
connections with offspring. This is because, as I explain in the following section, the 
gift of gametes could be perceived as connecting donors to recipients and these 
relationships provided a pathway via which kinship could be “re-routed.”  
 
Re-routing kinship 
Another strategy by which donors managed their use of potentially problematic 
kinship discourses was to “re-route” kinship connections. Donors avoided the 
explicit or unqualified use of kinship discourses or terms directly in relation to 
offspring but they would express kinship relationships indirectly via others, such as 
recipients or their own children. 
 
This approach can be seen in the way the two egg donors in this section spoke about 
their children’s relationship to their donor offspring. Both Olivia and Bridget were 
happy to define this relationship as a half-sibling or cousin-like relationship and to 
imagine, even celebrate, that they might behave in a way which would be consistent 
with that relationship: 
LG: Would you be interested in knowing about them then? About the 
recipients? About the child that’s born? 
B: Yeah. Absolutely. I mean not that I feel any, I don’t feel maternally 
towards them. More like for [son] ‘cos it’s someone who’s kind of related to 
him, a little bit.  
LG: Half sibling? 
B: Yeah I think a half sibling, would that be the equivalent of a cousin? 
LG: I’m not sure. I’ve never thought about it like that but maybe yeah.  
B: The same shared heritability or whatever. Yeah. So it’s just, it might be 
nice for them to know each other growing up. If we go back to [home 
country], it would be nice to sort of stay in touch. Yeah so [husband] and I 
both hope that they will get in touch, mainly.  
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
Immediately prior to this exchange Bridget had referred to her donor offspring and 
son as “half siblings” several times. I think she here enjoys re-imagining this 
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relationship as cousin-like because it better matches her positive image of how the 
two boys could interact in the future, or in an alternative present if they were known 
to one another. In particular, she celebrated the fact that these two children are the 
same age as one another and therefore may have much in common, but also that, 
growing up in different homes, potentially different countries, they may also have 
much to compare:  
Yeah one’s probably going to talk with a Scottish accent and one’s not. Can 
you imagine if we go back to New Zealand and if we did get in touch with 
them or they get in touch with us, if the child came over for a gap year and 
he introduced him as his brother, they’d talk completely differently! 
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
Olivia was also very positive about the “wee connection” between her daughter, 
Danielle, and a potential donor-conceived offspring, a relationship which she also 
compared with sibling and cousin relationships: 
And I think for Danielle, unless, we’ve got this other egg, whether we’re 
gonna use it or not I don’t know, she’s gonna be like an only child. And my 
brother, he lives [abroad] and he’s got two kids but he’s [abroad]. So 
Danielle’s got no cousins, no brothers and sisters, you kind of think it would 
be nice if in years to come there was somebody that she had a wee 
connection with.  
(Olivia, egg share donor) 
 
As described in the previous chapter, there were other donors who spoke about a 
connection between their own children and their donor offspring but it was Olivia 
and Bridget who did so at greatest length and who most clearly celebrated this as a 
kinship connection. I suspect it is no coincidence that they are both egg share donors. 
As detailed in Chapter Five, egg share donors were particularly likely to imagine 
their lives in parallel to their recipient’s, largely because they were aware that they 
were both undergoing fertility treatment at the same time and would therefore, if 
successful, both have children of the same age. It is therefore not only the genetic 
similarity which connects their children to (potential) donor offspring; they already 
have an overlapping life story – both conceived through IVF in the same clinic, with 
the help of the same doctors, nurses and embryologists. They belong together not 
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only through being born (genetic similarity) but also being bred (conceived in the 
same place, by the same method) (Edwards 2000). 
 
It would seem that the connection between half or donor-siblings is less problematic, 
less risky, than the connection between donor and offspring. Looking back at the first 
excerpt from Bridget’s interview, she clearly feels the need to clarify that, although 
she would like to meet her recipients and their donor-conceived son, she does not 
feel “maternally towards them.” However, she does not feel the same need to qualify 
her use of the term “cousin” or “half-sibling.” Similarly, whilst Olivia was keen to 
ensure boundaries between herself and donor offspring, she celebrates the possibility 
that any donor-conceived offspring might be a kind of “stand-in” cousin or sibling 
for her daughter. There do not seem to be the same risks and difficulties in naming 
and enacting these connections as kinship ones, as there is for donors to talk directly 
about a kinship relationship with offspring. 
 
However, re-routing did not always render the use of kinship terms unproblematic. 
Hannah explained that her Dad and Step Mum had responded with excitement to the 
news that she was donating her eggs to her friend, stating that it was “like having 
another grandchild.” Hannah clearly found this kinship claim an affront to her own 
view of the donation and challenged their use of kinship terms. In this context, re-
routing kinship via the older generation did not constitute sufficient qualification to 
the risks associated with kinship terms: 
H: And [Dad and Step Mum] they’re older and that was like, I don’t know, 
they were like, ooh ooh, it’s like having another grandchild. And I went, no 
it isn’t. It isn’t at all like having another grandchild…. 
 (Hannah, known egg donor, original emphasis) 
It seems important that this problematic example of re-routing concerns an older 
generation making a kinship claim on a child. Re-routing via grandparents may hold 
greater risks because the more powerful older generation are perceived to be defining 
the relationship at a point where the child can exert little control. Interestingly, 
Bridget described a similar reaction from her own parents when they learned of her 
egg donation. Again, they celebrated the birth of the donor-conceived child and 
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imagined it as an extension to their own family. However, either in their own words, 
or the way in which Bridget re-tells them, they also re-routed kinship via Bridget’s 
son, their grandson. Again, we can view this as a strategy by which feelings of 
connection could be articulated but, by expressing them via children, some of the 
associated risks of these kinship terms and discourses were qualified: 
[Mum and Dad] they’re both supportive, chuffed that there’s another half 
sibling somewhere.  
 (Bridget, egg share donor) 
 
The donor’s connection to offspring could also be diffused by re-routing this link via 
the recipients. This was particularly common for known donors though not limited to 
this group. Anna perhaps sums this up best: 
He’s always going to have a special place in my heart. Not because he’s 
from my egg, just because he’s, I was there with her going through all of 
that as well. You form a bond with somebody who’s, do you know what I 
mean? It must have been so hard for her.  
(Anna, known and anonymous egg donor) 
Anna’s words are reminiscent of Mason’s (2008) contention that kinship involves 
affinities which feel fixed, aligning them with the realm of that which is “given” 
rather than “made” (Carsten 2004). However, as Mason highlights, fixity does not 
necessarily map directly onto biological connection or shared substance. She argues 
that parents’ biographies and relationships may be referenced by their children to 
claim family-like relationships of their own; Children’s relationships with their 
parents’ friends can gain a feeling of fixity, and may be claimed as kin, since the 
child may have been “born into” these relationships – their parents having chosen for 
them (Mason 2008, 35). Anna’s claim for permanence, that the donor-conceived 
child will “always have a special place in [her] heart,” can then be read as a kinship 
claim based on fixed affinity. However, I suggest that Anna felt able to articulate this 
without threatening the parental status of the recipient precisely because the bond she 
feels with the child was depicted as a consequence of her relationship with the 
recipient. The reason she feels close to this little boy is because she knows how much 
he means to his mother. Her connection with him included and prioritised the 
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recipient which I suggest makes it less problematic than if she were to construct a 
direct bond with the child which did not include her friend. 
 
Bridget, an unknown egg-share donor, also re-routed kinship connections via her 
recipient. The flow of our conversation suggests she was also using re-routing as a 
discursive strategy to reinforce the status of the recipient as the “real parent” and 
diminish the threat she herself poses in this respect. Asked whether she would 
consider donating to someone she already knew, she considered that it could be 
difficult if she were to see the recipient very frequently because, as she puts it, she 
would need to be “really careful to not get involved ‘cos you don’t want to seem like 
you’re taking on a motherly role. You don’t want to tread on their toes or make them 
feel funny.” However, she immediately adds: 
But in terms of having a relationship with the person who I donated to, I 
think I wouldn’t want an everyday, let’s go to the park every day. But a, you 
know, an Easter, Christmas, birthdays thing, like extended family contact 
would be great.  And I don’t think I would feel. I couldn’t see any particular 
resentment or anything building up. Yeah it wold be more like a sister-in-
law or something like that. I don’t know. 
(Bridget, egg share donor) 
Whilst explicitly refuting a “motherly role” in relation to offspring, she opted to 
describe her relationship to a recipient as “like a sister-in-law.” By using a kinship 
term for this relationship and not in relation to the donor-conceived child, she 
prioritised her relationship to the recipient and played down that with her offspring. 
The connection between Bridget and her donor conceived offspring is then diffused, 
it is less risky, because they are all, the recipient(s) as well as Bridget’s own husband 
and son, part of this “extended family.” 
 
There are echoes of this re-routing in the narrative role many donors imagined they 
might enact in relation to their offspring. This is described in detail in Chapter Seven 
but, briefly put, donors explained that offspring might want to meet them in order to 
extend the narrative they had of their lives. They imagined they might want to know 
what had made their life possible, what sort of person had donated and why. When 
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they spoke about their role in these terms, donors generally invoked the recipient 
because they were central to this story too – they were the reason they had donated. 
In this sense their connection between the donor and offspring was routed via the 
recipient – they were someone who had wanted to help their parents. 
 
For Maya and Grace, the sister-to-sister egg donors in my sample, there were further 
opportunities to re-route the kinship connections between themselves and offspring 
via their recipients. Firstly, as described in the previous chapter, they both presented 
themselves as an aunt to their (for Maya, hypothetical) offspring. In doing so, they 
acknowledged a kinship connection with their offspring but defined it via their pre-
existing relationship to their sibling. Sister-to-sister egg donors were also able to 
draw on similarities with their sibling to include the recipient in their relationship to 
offspring.  For example, in the extract below, Grace suggests that, since she and her 
sister share “the same genes,” her donor offspring’s genetic traits were not 
necessarily traceable to her. In this way, she was able to include her sister in the 
genetic connection she acknowledges between herself and her donor offspring. 
Rather than presenting the passing on of genes as a direct linear process, she 
emphasised that they all resembled one another, connected through their wider 
genetic networks. In this way, the resemblances between herself and her sister’s 
daughter become less problematic and she distances herself from a parental role: 
Well the more she [donor offspring] grows, you know, the more she grows 
up, the older she gets, you can see, you can see some resemblance [with 
me]. But because I and my sister share the same features anyway you cannot 
say from where she got it from. ‘Cos it’s the same genes.  
(Grace, known egg donor) 
 
It is notable that qualifying kinship by re-routing connections via others, whether 
recipients or their own children, was almost entirely undertaken by egg donors. In 
part, this can be explained through the greater number of egg donors acting as known 
donors. Those that had a pre-existing relationship with recipients were much more 
likely to speak about their connection to offspring as one which flowed through their 
friendship or kinship to the recipient. The children of known donors and recipients 
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might ordinarily (i.e. without any donation having taken place) have grown up 
together and had a kinship or kin-like relationship, particularly in the case of sister-
to-sister donation 
 
However, the relatively high number of egg donors who were known cannot, in 
itself, explain the greater numbers of female participants who qualified kinship in 
this way.  As the extract from Bridget’s interview demonstrates, donors did not need 
to have met their recipient in order for them to imagine a connection with recipients, 
through which kinship could be re-routed. Similarly, imagined relationships between 
their own children and donor offspring could be used to “re-route” this connection 
but this was not something that was emphasised or celebrated in the narratives of 
sperm donors as with Bridget and Olivia. How can we explain this? As I argued in 
Chapter Five, the stigma of donor insemination and male infertility act as social 
barriers to connection-making between sperm donors and recipients and so they were 
much less likely to narrate a connection with recipients via which they could re-route 
kinship. In contrast, female donors, particular egg share donors, who often imagined 
their lives in parallel with the recipient’s, were more open to, and able to talk about, 
the possibility of their two families coming together. As such, the particular risks 
attached to sperm donor-recipient relationships limited the way in which male donors 
were able to manage their connection to offspring.  
 
My family, their family 
Whilst donors often borrowed elements of their own family experiences to make 
sense of their role as donors, their own families were also a discursive resource via 
which kinship connections with offspring could be qualified and limited. Donors 
emphasised their position in their own family and sometimes spoke of boundaries or 
limits around that family unit in ways which positioned the donor-offspring 
relationship as outside the limits of their kinship, or at least outside the limits of their 




One of the clearest ways in which donors distinguished “their family” from “my 
family” was by distinguishing their children from the recipient(s)’ children. This was 
often achieved by stating that they had completed their own families and that they 
did not want any more children, or in Zara’s case that she did not want any children 
at all: 
And you know, if I’ve already got my three and I’m not having anymore, 
I’m not doing anything with them, with the eggs…Three kids under three 
was just, my cup overfloweth. Thank you. Yes. That’s fine.  
(Hannah, known egg donor) 
Other then finding out how many of them there are, the fact that there are 
eleven out there at the last count, you know, I know nothing. I don’t think 
about them again. So it’s not like they’re uppermost in my thoughts. I’ve got 
my own two to worry about. Quite enough of a handful! 
(John, sperm donor) 
Donors who described their families as complete were often emphatic about not 
wanting any more children. As with John and Hannah, this was often elaborated 
further through (joking) reference to the hard work which had gone into raising their 
children so far. In this way, the donors reinforced the boundaries of their family by 
emphasising its completeness and also highlighted the importance of work and care 
in being a “real” parent. This had the effect of both distancing themselves from a 
parental role to donor-conceived offspring and also positioning themselves as a good, 
active parent to their own children. 
 
In most cases, it is not possible to say whether having already completed their 
families was a necessary factor for donation or a helpful discursive resource which 
they just happened to be able to make use of at the time. However, Debbie and Eve 
were conscious that having had all their own children had been a deciding factor in 
their decision to donate and Eve described making a clear decision to wait to donate 
until after she had had her second child: 
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So part of me probably would’ve maybe liked to have pursued it more 
before he [second child] was born. But at that point. It was more selfish in 
that we didn’t know if just wanted one or if we wanted more. So it wasn’t 
till we’d had him and then kind of thought no we don’t want any more that I 
kind of thought well, if I don’t want any more then I have one a month. 
There’s thousands there that are all spare so just help yourself to them really. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
D: I don’t know how I become aware of [egg donation] before [I read that 
magazine article] but it was something that come up as a discussion 
somewhere else. Yes, but I know that when I first heard about it I was very, 
quite anti it. 
LG: In general or just for you? 
D: For me. Yes, yes not just a general thing. I'm very much each to their 
own but for me, it was of case of, that’s my DNA out there. That would be 
someone who was a sort of half of me and I wouldn’t know anything about 
them. But yes, once I’d had my family and made a conscious decision not to 
have any more, it was, I got this thing that it’s essentially a seed that’s not 
going to go anywhere. So if someone else can use it then... 
(Debbie, egg donor) 
As described in Chapter Five, the fact that they were not planning any more children 
enabled these donors to conceptualise their eggs as “spare” and therefore something 
which should be redistributed to those who could make use of them. We could 
explain this repositioning through reference to the medical procedures which egg 
donors undergo. Egg donation could be perceived as “using up” eggs which might 
yet have been needed for future conception or seen to entail medical risks, such as 
bleeding and infection, which could damage the donor’s reproductive ability. The 
perception that eggs could be “used up” by egg donation, whilst occasionally 
reiterated by the donors I interviewed, was not supported by the clinic staff I 
interviewed. The doctors I spoke to explained that in a normal menstrual cycle, many 
ovarian follicles begin to develop eggs but that normally only one would fully 
mature. The others die off before getting to this stage. However, the hormones taken 
by egg donors (and IVF patients) stimulate follicles to develop many more eggs to 
full maturity than would otherwise be the case. In this way, they explained that egg 
donation should not use up any more eggs than an ordinary menstrual cycle. 
However, the risks of bleeding or infection, they said could, in very rare cases 
damage the donor’s reproductive capacity. For this reason, several doctors and nurses 
explained that it would be preferable, though not essential, for an egg donor to have 
already completed their family. This was also stated in the National Gamete 
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Donation Trust advice leaflet for prospective egg donors, available on their website 
at the time of data collection (National Gamete Donation Trust 2012). 
 
However, the importance Debbie and Eve ascribed to completing their families prior 
to donating cannot be explained only through reference to the medical risks of the 
procedure.  Whilst Eve raised the possibility that egg donation could have used up 
some of her eggs, she immediately dismissed that view as inaccurate. It seems that 
whilst the question over whether to have more children remained it was more 
difficult for donors to think of their eggs as “mere cells,” detached from themselves 
and their family. To donate whilst still wanting their own children raised the 
possibility that they would instead think of donor-offspring as “half of” themselves, 
perhaps because it was so viable to think that that same egg could have gone on to 
create a child of their own. The decision not to have any (more) children then serves 
as a discursive resource through which donors can, as Orobitg and Salazar put it, 
extract genes/gametes from a kinship context and “insert them into a biological [read 
scientific] context” (2005, 42). The intention to draw a line under their childbearing 
years divested eggs of their kin-creating potential and enabled donors to construct a 
boundary between their family and the recipient family. They were not their children 
because they did not want any more children, via their donated eggs or otherwise. 
This extract from Maya’s interview most clearly articulates this line of thinking – the 
child would not be her daughter because she did not want a daughter at all: 
Because part of the counselling as well was they said, well you’ve got two 
boys, what if your sister had a daughter? And I said, well I’d be laughing 
and giggling, thinking, ha ha you got the trouble. Because I was happy with 
two boys. I was quite glad I didn’t have girls. When I had two boys, I was 
like, oh thank goodness for that! I says, a niece would be nice but I certainly 
don’t want a daughter.  
(Maya, known egg donor) 
 
There were also more subtle ways in which donors embedded themselves firmly 
within their own families and distanced themselves from the recipient(s)’ family and 
their donor-conceived offspring. Donors often told their donation stories in ways 
which reinforced their position within their own families – as mothers, fathers, 
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children and grandchildren. In this way, donors, like Rob, who had not made such 
clear decisions about the completeness of his family, could also construct boundaries 
between their own family and the recipients. 
 
As described in Chapter Six, for many donors, the decision to donate was articulated 
in relation to a familial disposition (usually learned rather than inherited) towards 
helping others. In this sense, by choosing to help another family they were also 
cementing their identity as a member of their own. Rob perhaps expressed this most 
clearly: 
R: I used to donate blood. My gran used to donate a huge amount of blood. 
And back in those days, you used to get the badges, like bronze silver and 
gold. Well back in the war, she used to donate breast milk for babies and she 
did blood.  
LG: Did she tell you all this? 
R: Yeah. So she’s done the works. She got buried really with holes in her. 
She donated as much as possible. Yeah. And then so I took over donating 
blood when she got too old and frail to do that. So that was, I like that sort of 
moralistic, I’m carrying the sword for my gran type scenario. 
(Rob, sperm donor) 
In Rob’s narrative, donating sperm is framed as means of carrying on his 
grandmother’s legacy. As a gay man, he was no longer able to donate blood but by 
donating sperm he was able to carry on, what is here portrayed as, a family tradition. 
In a similar vein, Nina told me how her Dad had always proudly carried a battered 
old organ donor card around with him and Hannah told me how her own parents had 
always volunteered in the local community (see p. 160). In this way, donation was 
framed as “just the sort of thing we do,” a way of enacting the values which their 
parents (and grandparents) had fostered in them. 
 
This portrayal of gamete donation as a familial act was not only achieved through 
reference to past generations; present and future generations could also be 
implicated. Eve’s partner was present throughout most of her interview. Her frequent 
use of the pronoun “we” included him in the decision to donate, implying that it was 
something they had decided to do as a couple: 
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I just thought… well, at that point I didn’t want any more children so we just 
thought we’ll just go and donate. 
(Eve, egg donor) 
For others, like Anna and Ian, gamete donation, or donating more generally, was 
something they were actively seeking to pass on to their own children: 
It saddens me that I never met [friend] until when I did. Because I’d have 
been doing this all my days, helping. That’s how I’m making sure that my 
boys are gonna do it. I’ve asked them. [Second eldest son’s] not too certain 
but [third eldest son] said he would do it. [Third eldest son’s] 19. And 
[eldest son] said he would do it as well. And they’ll follow me, they’ll not 
take any money for it. The money they get, they’ll give to [children’s 
hospital]. 
(Ian, sperm donor) 
Not only did Ian hope that his sons would also donate sperm but he expected that 
they would do so in the same spirit as him – to help others rather than for any 
financial gain. Anna similarly explained of her sixteen year old daughter, “I think 
I’ve taught her how to give of herself,” and expressed the hope that she would 
consider donating eggs in the future. Whilst this kind of talk does not construct such 
clear boundaries between their family and our family, as described in the first 
examples in this section, it is also a discursive means through which gamete donation 
was repositioned. Emphasising the importance of donation to past and future 
generations had the effect of situating the donor and the act of donation firmly within 
their own family rather than, as might be the case elsewhere in their narratives, on 
the outskirts of somebody else’s. 
 
Making a joke of it 
I mean it is pure comedy really when you think about it. Helen’s Emma’s 
bridesmaid, for example. She’s pregnant with Emma’s husband’s sperm 
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
Humour was a means by which one donor addressed and subverted the problematic 
kinship connotations which he was aware could be perceived in his donation. Tom is 
a known sperm donor, who had donated to his wife’s friend and her female partner. 
Several times throughout the interview he joked about the fact that his wife’s best 
friend was now pregnant with his sperm. He described how he quite enjoyed 
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presenting the news to his mother in this way, so he could see her “jaw drop” at first, 
until he explained the situation properly: 
T: My Mum’s quite open about these things so just. I wasn’t dying to tell her 
because I actually feel it’s more Helen and Lisa’s news. But just because I 
wanted to say that yeah erm, see Emma’s best friend’s pregnant with my 
sperm. Or something like that. I can’t remember how phrased it but it was 
funny to watch her jaw drop for a bit! 
LG: You went with the most shocking way of presenting it? 
T: Yeah [laughs]. You’ve got to really right?! It’s funny. 
(Tom, know sperm donor) 
He highlighted the “soap opera” connotations of this statement and all its 
implications of affairs and betrayals rather than trying to ignore these connotations 
but, by making a joke of it, he parodied such a reading of their situation. By 
reflecting with amusement on how others might perceive the consequence of the 
donation as problematic or strange, he made clear how different the lived reality was 
for him, his wife and their friends. For them, Helen being pregnant as a result of the 
donation was just something to celebrate – their friend was having a much wanted, 
and much planned, baby. Far from being a betrayed party, Emma, Tom’s wife, was a 
key facilitator of this arrangement. 
 
However, there are limits to the extent which humour can undermine risky 
expressions of donor-conceived connections. I wrote an interview summary for Tom, 
as I did for all of the participants, and emailed it to him for comment. In this 
summary, I had mistakenly paraphrased his words inaccurately, writing that he had 
joked that Helen was “having his baby” not “pregnant with his sperm,” as he had 
actually put it. He asked me to change this aspect of the summary. The way I had 
phrased it, was problematic for him. I suggest, this is because my words would have 
implied that he was making a kinship claim on Helen and Lisa’s child. Even said 
with irony, the words, “having my baby,” would have been too risky and when I 
looked back over my the transcript of my interview with Tom, I found that he had 




Keeping their distance 
Temporal and spatial distance between themselves and offspring was a further means 
by which donors qualified the kinship connotations of their connection to offspring. 
This could be both a practical action (actively keeping away at certain times) and a 
discursive act (making reference to the passing of time or geographical separation).  
 
For example, unknown donors often drew on their initial anonymity in order to limit 
their relationship to offspring. Though they stated that they were happy to meet their 
offspring and recipients once the former turned eighteen, many donors expressed the 
belief that, if they were to meet too soon or too often, they might feel, behave or be 
viewed, in an inappropriately familial way. Like John and Faye, most unknown 
donors therefore approved of the age restrictions on donor offspring accessing 
information: 
I’ve never really thought about it. But my gut reaction would be that if they 
are older that would be better in that they are more mature. And they’re 
making decisions and deciding what it means in their lives in a slightly more 
rational fashion than a, erm, hormonally raging fifteen year old, who doesn’t 
necessarily think things through. 
(John, sperm donor) 
LG: If they were to contact you when they were younger would that be 
different? 
F: Yeah. You know children. The actual definition of a child is somebody 
that needs mothered and looked after and things. So eighteen year olds they 
probably need a bit more. Yeah [step-daughter] probably needs a bit. But 
younger, younger children if they were coming to you. For instance, if a 
child, if I knew that a genetic child of mine was like they were orphaned and 
they were younger. And somebody came to me and said, this child’s here. I 
would probably say, I would adopt that child because I would feel, unless of 
course they had a really fabulous home, they had grandparents and aunts and 
things like that, I would step back in preference to somebody who has been 
there for them, you know, if they’ve grown up, if they’ve got life 
experiences, that means more than genetically where they’ve come from. 
But if some tragedy had happened then I would be, and that child still 
needed a home, then I would offer that then.  
(Faye, egg share donor, original emphasis) 
For both John and Faye, meeting an adult (albeit a young one) was less complicated 
and potentially problematic than meeting a child, with a heightened emotional 
response being associated with meeting the latter. Faye imagined that she would 
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respond to the vulnerability of a younger child and feel compelled to care for them or 
take them into her family, in the event that the parents were unable to. John 
considered that a teenager might be more likely to have an irrational, emotional 
response to meeting him and, he implied, might be more likely to view him as a 
parent. However, both John and Faye perceived these scenarios to be less likely if the 
donor-conceived person was older. Young adults, rather than teenagers or children, 
were viewed as less vulnerable and more mature, able to think more rationally about 
a situation in which someone could be their biological father yet not their “Dad.” 
Temporal distance therefore had the effect of limiting kinship. In particular, the 
passing of time was seen to preclude the possibility of a parent-child type 
relationship with offspring since, it is imagined, adult offspring will not need 
“looking after” as a younger child might. It is therefore presumed that meeting them 
would therefore not provoke the same desire to “mother” that person and they would 
not be looking for someone to play that part in their lives. In effect, the time when 
parent-child bonds might be created, when the latter is vulnerable and in need of 
care, would be perceived to have passed.  
 
Many unknown donors said that if they were to meet their offspring at a younger age, 
they might find it more difficult to limit their desire to care for that child. For this 
reason, many stated that donating to someone they knew would be problematic 
because it would not be possible to retain that distance and they worried they might 
start behaving towards, or thinking about, their offspring in ways which were 
uncomfortably parental. As shown in Chapter Five, many donors imagined that 
meeting their recipients and offspring whilst the latter were still young would 
provoke inappropriate feelings and behaviour which would have a negative impact 
on the recipients because they would not be respecting the boundaries of their family 
unit. 
 
However, limiting kinship through distance was not restricted to unknown donors. 
Known donors often also managed their ambiguous kinship position by keeping 
appropriate geographical and temporal distance from the recipient and their donor-
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conceived offspring. In the extract below, Tom thinks aloud about how he and his 
family will respond to the birth of his donor offspring to his wife’s friend. He decides 
to delay his own visit beyond the newborn stage in order to allow the recipient 
couple to completely bond with their baby beforehand:  
I’m curious of course. So but yeah. I think in the first instance, I’d probably 
just hang back. ‘Cos I want to make sure that Helen and Lisa are totally 
bonded with the baby and all that sort of stuff. So I thought it’s probably 
best if Emma just goes up and says hi, first few weeks or whatever’s 
appropriate. And then we’ll all go up later. After that. So it does change your 
relationship from that point of view doesn’t it? 
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
In this statement, Tom seems to be aware that he could be seen as, if not a potential 
threat, then an intrusion, on the mother-child relationship. However, by delaying his 
first meeting with them and their child by just a few months, he feels more 
comfortable that his friends will have established their own parent-child relationship 
sufficiently that his presence would no longer be problematic. 
 
Tom later goes on to say that delaying his own visit was probably also sensible from 
a practical point of view since a full family visit, complete with two toddlers, would 
likely be overwhelming for the new parents of a new-born baby. Many other known 
donors echoed this sentiment - that incidental circumstances which created distance 
between them and their recipients was probably “for the best” anyway. For example, 
Hannah described how both her family and the recipient’s had planned to emigrate to 
different continents not long after the donation process was completed and Nina 
talked about the “nice distance” between her and her recipient – they always got on 
very well but had never moved their friendship much beyond the workplace. 
 
Being adaptable and letting them lead 
I think it was my housemate, we were having this chat a few months ago. 
And I’m thinking [as a donor,] you don’t know how much to say and how 
much to do. Because you aren’t the father, you aren’t responsible for the 
person. But I suppose it’s kind of let them take the lead.  
(Daniel, sperm donor) 
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Like Daniel, donors assigned “kinning power” to others as a means of alleviating the 
risks associated with their use of kinship discourses. By this I mean that it was 
common for donors to talk about their offspring’s relationship to them with reference 
to kinship discourses and practices but less common for them to do so the other way 
around. The child, they explained, might want to know where they had come from, or 
who they were but they did not talk about their own interest in them in the same 
terms. As I explained in Chapter Seven, when donors talked about their own interest 
in their offspring, they tended to frame it in terms of intellectual curiosity, rather than 
something which would be fundamental to their own identity. To meet one’s 
offspring was not described as potentially “grounding” or “reassuring” in the way 
that meeting one’s donor parent could be.  
 
Instead, donors very much assigned agency to the donor-conceived person and their 
parents to decide what it would mean to be a “biological parent” in practice, whether 
or not it would be a kin-like relationship and, if so, of what kind. This seems to be an 
important means of diffusing the potential risks associated with their position. 
Although they were drawing on kinship discourses to make sense of their position, 
they were not claiming a kinship role for themselves but leaving that decision to 
others. 
Because you know we have to sort of look at it from the children’s 
perspective not our perspective. Because ultimately we’re doing something 
which they have no control over.  
(Adam, sperm donor) 
They might just want to see me once and have a coffee and then that’s them 
happy with that. That they know they’ve done it and they’re not left 
wondering what if for the rest of their life. They might not like me or we 
might become great friends. We just don’t know. We just do not know.  
(Rachel, egg donor) 
I would be very much guided by what they wanted to know and how they 
you know if they didn’t want questions, I wouldn’t press for anything they 
wouldn’t want to discuss. So that way I would just take it, what do you want 
to know? What do you want to tell me kind of thing. 
(Debbie, egg donor) 
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Donors presented themselves as very open-minded with regards to what kind of a 
relationship might develop with donor offspring in the future. They described 
themselves as open and adaptable to the needs and preferences of their offspring in 
this regard. They argued that it was the donor-conceived person’s prerogative to 
decide, not only whether to make the initial contact, but also whether or not future 
meetings would take place, how often and what degree of intimacy might develop. 
Some, like Adam, explained that this was the right approach since, unlike the donors 
and recipients, offspring had no say in the circumstances of their conception.  
 
There are interesting parallels here with Carsten’s analysis of interviews with 
adoptees following, or seeking, reunions with their birth parents. She argues that 
reunions enabled adoptees to exert agency over their pasts and to choose for 
themselves who is kin (2000b, 698). Donors similarly framed potential contact with 
offspring as an opportunity for donor offspring to exert agency with regard to their 
own kinship narratives. This was presented as a moral approach because of the 
donor-conceived person’s prior lack of control over the circumstances of their 
conception and the initial anonymity of the donor. “Letting them lead,” redresses that 
balance, as well as alleviating the risk that the donor be perceived as a threat to the 
recipient’s family.  
 
Assigning agency in this way is possible because of a particular model of kinship in 
which people are seen to construct their own versions of family rather than defining 
kin on the basis of pre-defined structures. As Strathern writes,  “individuality of 
persons” can be seen as “the first fact of English kinship” (1992a, 14) Or to put it 
another way, English kinship relationships operate according to the particular 
persons involved much more than the genealogical “positions” they hold  (Finch and 
Mason 2000, 18). Drawing on the work of the historian Macfarlane (1978) as well as 
Stathern (1992a; 1992b), Finch and Mason (2000) offer a cultural model of English 
kinship in which individuals inhabit the centres of their own “kin universes” and so 
“no two individuals have precisely the same kin network” (2000, 19). They add that 
these individualised constructions of family are not necessarily mutual, i.e. a 
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grandparent might include their grandchild as a close family member but the 
grandchild might not include their grandparent. It is because this way of thinking 
about families has cultural legitimacy (not just for the English it would seem but also 
for these participants, some of whom live north of the border) that donors were able 
to assign kinship agency to donor offspring. However, as Finch and Mason (2000) 
are careful to highlight, whilst the English model of kinship allows for a personalised 
definition of who counts as family, this does not mean that people do the work of 
constructing families on their own or that they are entirely free to construct them as 
they choose. Instead, people create kinship relationships through negotiations with 
others, usually involving contact and shared experiences over a period of time. 
Donors were aware of this too and so assigning kinship agency to others also 
involved remaining open-minded as to what kind of relationship might unfold with 
their offspring.  
 
However attempting to assign all kinship agency to offspring resulted in descriptions, 
like Rachel’s, of ambiguous and quite one-sided relationships – “they might not like 
me,” “they might just want to see me once…and then that’s them happy.” Even 
though she elsewhere voices her curiosity and interest in both offspring and 
recipients, she describes herself as entirely subject to the wishes of the donor-
conceived person – she is unable to extend, deepen or end the relationship. It remains 
to be seen whether these relationships, if activated by contact, will play out in quite 
this one-sided manner. It is a moot point whether such relationships would, in fact, 
be possible in practice. Rachel’s account paints herself in an almost objectified, 
emotionally neutral role. She will neither extend nor curtail this relationship herself, 
but how would a person enact such a position? Relationships are built 
collaboratively. If Rachel, and her donor peers, were to disengage from this process, 
leaving the initiative entirely up to the donor-conceived person, then this might 
actually foreclose that relationship rather than leaving it open. In any personal 
relationship, if it is always one person and not the other who makes contact, who 
suggests meeting again, who broaches more intimate topics of conversation, then this 
relationship would likely wither since the other person would be perceived to be 
uninterested. I therefore suggest that “letting them lead” is best interpreted as a 
258 
 
discursive strategy rather than a description of the way donor-offspring relationships 
are likely to be enacted. By assigning greater kinship agency to donor offspring and 
also, as I will now demonstrate, to recipients, donors diminish some of the riskiness 
associated with their use of kinship discourses.  
 
Donors also assigned relationship-shaping power to recipients. This is clearly 
illustrated by the fact that, although the vast majority supported donor offspring’s 
“right to know where they came from,” all donors also believed that it was rightfully 
the choice of the recipient(s) alone as to whether, when and how offspring came to 
learn of the circumstances of their conception. Although donors often argued that the 
best interests of the child were served by openness, none chose to restrict their 
donation only to those who were planning to disclose this information. This was 
despite many voicing their fears that their own relationship with donor offspring 
might be problematic if secrets were kept since they could be viewed as complicit in 
the perceived betrayal. 
 
Known donors often presented themselves as particularly flexible with regard to 
recipients’ wishes and viewed the recipient parents as best placed to decide what 
kind of relationship offspring might develop with them. In the following extract, 
Tom assigns power to the donor-conceived person to shape the character of their 
relationship. However, their best interests are to be interpreted by the recipient 
parents. Helen and Lisa are the mediators who will decide Tom’s role in meeting 
their child’s needs. His duty is primarily to be available: 
T: The point is there’s a channel [between me and the donor-conceived 
child] there. Whatever would be appropriate. 
LG: And how would you know what’s appropriate? 
T: Well you don’t. You just figure it out as you go along, like most things in 
life. It’s up to Helen and Lisa ultimately…I think Helen and Lisa would be 
attuned to that, in a sense. And they might say, maybe, you should come and 
visit. Just have a chat.  




Donors’ narratives, particularly those who did not know their recipients, were 
characterised by adaptability. They did not have a fixed idea of how their 
relationship with donor offspring and recipients would or should develop in the 
future. Although they absolutely rejected a parental relationship, whether or not it 
could be considered familial in some wider sense was often left open, subject to 
future negotiation with significant others, particularly recipients and offspring. 
 
In a few cases, we can see that donors have already, during the process of donation 
or since, changed their views about the extent, and means by, which kinship 
connections need to be curtailed or managed. For example, pre-donation Karen 
writes in her blog that she has decided to proceed with egg donation as an 
anonymous donor:  
I suppose a few of the things which played on my mind were, will the kid 
who is born as a result of my eggs come knocking on my door when they 
fall out with their mum, looking for money or a bed to sleep in? Will I be 
financially responsible in any way for him/her? How would I feel if their 
parents died when they were young? Who would look after them? Would it 
have to be me?? 
And so the decision I have made, is to remain completely anonymous – to 
have no connection whatsoever with anyone who is born from my karry-
eggys. I only want to know if and when there’s a child born. I feel that by 
then, I’ll have done my part and it’s been a success. That’s all. They will 
have a mum and dad. 
(Karen, egg donor, extract from blog) 
This was written just days before Karen was due to start injecting herself with 
Follicle Stimulating Hormone and, at this point seems to be unaware that she will not 
legally be able to remain anonymous. However, by the time I interviewed her, 
approximately two years later, she was aware of the identity-release legislation and 
quite curious to meet her recipient and donor offspring. She embarked on donation 
with the view that the best way to limit the kinship associations of donation (possibly 
feeling obligated to care for, or support the donor-conceived person) was to ensure 
physical distance between herself and the potential offspring – to ensure they don’t 
“come knocking on [her] door.” However, at some point since then, presumably after 
finding out that entirely anonymous donation is no longer permitted, she becomes 
open to, and interested in, possible future contact. Either the familial connotations of 
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her relationship to offspring are no longer problematic for her or she is managing 
those connotations in another way.  
 
Karen’s adaptability echoes Nordqvists’s (2014; 2012) and Dempsey’s  (2010; 2012) 
analysis of kinship narratives amongst lesbian users of donor-insemination. As 
described in Chapter Three, these studies emphasise change and negotiation amongst 
children and adults as to how kinship networks are constructed, including if and how 
genetic connections are attributed social significance in their families. As both 
researchers demonstrate, when circumstances change and “real life” relationships 
develop, people are able to renegotiate the meaning of the donor in their 
constructions of family. The complex and multi-layered nature of kinship discourses 
and practices make them particularly amenable to such flexibility. In the donors’ 
readiness and ability to adapt we can see similar processes at work. The donors I 
interviewed were not renegotiating the way in which they constructed themselves as 
kin but they were ready to renegotiate and change their position in relation to the 
notion of kinship. In other words, they were flexible with regard to whether, and to 
what extent, their connection with offspring might be enacted and defined as 
familial. Depending on how their circumstances might change and the responses of 
others, they imagined negotiating the kinship connotations of their connection with 
offspring differently, perhaps in ways which might allow them to step a little further 
into that kinship space: 
LG: And are there any no-nos. Is there anything that you think that 
definitely wouldn’t be a good idea? Or I wouldn’t do that? 
T: The counsellor said. You know, she was just pushing buttons really. She 
said, what would you do if the child wanted to call you Dad? And I thought, 
ooh that’s a bit of a funny one that isn’t it? I am, Is it a no-no? You can’t 
rule anything out. Because if they’re really, if it’s kind of make or break for 
the child then yeah of course. But I think that would be a bit, probably close 
to a line. Might be the wrong side of the line even. It’s…But I’m very much 
a situationalist. It just depends. I’m pretty flexible and liberal. I don’t really 
mind. I can deal with most things. Got any suggestions what I should think 
about it? 
(Tom, known sperm donor) 
At the time of the interview, Tom thought that being called “Dad” by his donor-
conceived child would probably be too close to a kinship role, specifically a parental 
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role. However, he could imagine a situation where that might change, if it became 
“make or break for the child.”  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the various ways in which donors 
qualified kinship discourses and practices in order to make sense of their relationship 
to donor offspring and the recipient family. The previous chapter demonstrated how 
donors deconstructed their own experiences of “doing family” in order to narrate 
roles for themselves as “donor parents.” In this chapter, I have shown how their 
selective analogies with family practices and discourses were qualified or modified 
in various ways, in order to distance themselves from a kinship claim, particularly a 
parental role.   
 
The discursive means through which donors qualified their connection to offspring 
were both constrained and enabled by the ways in which they talked about donation 
more widely. By situating gamete donation within particular discourses of gift-giving 
– particularly as a communal gift or a “pure” gift – donors depersonalised donation 
and diffused the emotionally intimate connotations associated with their adoption of 
kinship discourses. In addition, donors (the vast majority female) who narrated their 
donation as a more personal gift to a specific recipient were able to manage risky 
relationships with offspring by articulating that relationship as one which was “re-
routed” via their connection to recipients or via their own children.  
 
The other means by which donors qualified kinship were possible because of donors’ 
wider kinship expertise and their experiences of “doing family.” For example, the 
decision that their families were complete enabled donors to divest their gametes of 
kin-making potential and position them in a scientific context, as “just a cell” or 
“DNA.” They drew on their own family traditions to position donation as a 
characteristic practice of their own families. They confronted and subverted, through 
parody, any reading of their situation as problematic and they drew on discourses of 
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caring, vulnerability and bonding to explain why temporal and spatial distance 
precluded any parent-child connection with offspring. Finally, experiential 
knowledge of a culturally-specific person-centred model of kinship (Strathern 1992a; 
Finch and Mason 2000) enabled them to manage risky kinship possibilities by 







I began this project with a key question in mind: How do gamete donors make sense 
of donation? I was particularly fascinated by the position of identity-release donors – 
an apparently novel role, made increasingly common by recent changes in the 
regulatory regimes governing donor assisted conception, in the UK and beyond. The 
potential for future contact makes identity-release donation a markedly different 
undertaking from anonymous donation. These men and women donate with the 
knowledge that their relationship to offspring and recipients may well be enacted and 
negotiated in “real life” rather than only in the imaginary of persons separated by 
anonymity. I wondered how they expected such contact might play out. What kind of 
role do they feel they would or should play in this process? In addition, I was 
fascinated by the potential and suspended character of this relationship. These donors 
may find themselves in a position where they are enacting a relationship with their 
donor offspring, but they also might never be contacted and, in either case, they must 
usually wait eighteen years to find out. In the context of so many uncertainties, I 
wondered how they negotiated their role, in relation to recipients, potential offspring 
and the wider community and how these processes were shaped by the social 
(including regulatory, clinic and wider cultural) contexts in which they donated. 
 
My initial curiosities were gradually distilled into the following research questions, 
which aimed to both describe and explain the ways in which donors made sense of 
donation, including their role as donors and the relationships it set in train: 
1. How do UK identity-release gamete donors view and experience donation? 
a) How do donors describe the role of a gamete donor?  
b) Has the meaning of donation changed for donors over the life-course, if so 
how?  
c) How do donors describe their motivations?  
d) How do donors describe the donation process, in and out of clinic?  
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e) How do donors describe their role in relation to (potential) donor-
conceived child(ren)?  
f) How do donors describe their role in relation to recipient(s)?  
g) How do donors feel about the possibility of contact from donor offspring?  
h) How do donors expect they should or would react if they were contacted 
by donor offspring or recipients? 
2. How are their views and experiences shaped by the social contexts in which they 
donate? 
a) What kinds of experiences and cultural discourses do donors draw on in 
order to make sense of donation and their role?  
b) What are the similarities and differences in the views of different donors 
and how might these be explained? 
c) With whom, and how, do donors discuss their donation?  
d) How do clinic staff view the act of gamete donation and the role of 
donors?  
e) What differences (if any) exist in the way clinic staff perceive different 
donors (i.e. men/women, parent/childless, younger/older) or different types of 
donation (known, patient, volunteer)?  
f) How do clinic staff interact with donors?  
 
Summarising my argument 
As my literature review highlighted, identity-release gamete donors in the UK donate 
in the context of contradictory cultural pressures to both connect with, and distance 
themselves from, recipients and offspring. On the one hand “biological” ties are 
perceived to be “naturally” permanent and genetic connections associated with 
positive identity formation for offspring. On the other hand, a continued ideal of the 
two-parent “sexual family” (Fineman 1995), along with a view of social parenting as 
fragile, positions the donor as a threat to the recipient and their family unit. In 
addition, my literature review identified a tension between the way in which the 
donation of bodily donation is often experienced (as a personal, relational gift) and 
the ideal, particularly evident in medical-ethical discourses, that gifts ought to be 
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given at a distance, without any obligation or expectation of return. As Chapter Three 
demonstrated, these tensions are evident in previous research with (mostly 
anonymous) gamete donors. However, the introduction of identity-release legislation 
and the accompanying idealisation of openness around “genetic truths” (Smart 2009; 
2010) seems to bring these tensions to the fore. Whilst, under anonymous systems of 
donation, donors are encouraged and expected to ignore or screen out the social 
significance of their connection to offspring (Speirs 2008), this is no longer the case. 
Under identity-release legislation, “good donors” are expected to remain open and 
available to contact with their donor-conceived offspring, should that be their wish 
and, by extension, perhaps with their recipient(s) (Graham, Mohr, and Bourne 2016).  
 
As I argued in Chapter Three, legal regulation and organisational (here, usually 
fertility clinics’) practices are two important factors shaping how bodily donation is 
understood. Hence the need for research specifically exploring the experiences of 
identity-release donors. This thesis is one of very few qualitative studies which has 
analysed in-depth what it means to be an identity-release donor, from the perspective 




I have structured the findings chapters of this thesis by examining, in turn, how the 
donors I interviewed perceived their role in relation to recipients, the wider 
community and offspring, examining throughout how perceptions of their role were 
shaped by the regulatory, clinical and wider cultural contexts in which they donated. 
Each findings chapter therefore examined different aspects of the first (descriptive) 
research question, whilst all addressed the more explanatory questions contained 
with the second. However, what I hope has become clear in the course of my analysis 
is that the relationships donors imagine and enact with each of these groups are all 
                                                 
16
 Sebastian Mohr’s (2014; 2015; 2016) and Alison Wheatley’s (2016) research with Danish sperm 
donors constitute the two exceptions I am aware of. However, it should be noted that a key 
difference between the Danish and the UK context is that, in Denmark, donors can choose whether 
or not they wish to remain completely anonymous, complete an extended profile and/or be 
identifiable to adult offspring.  
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mutually implicated. We cannot fully understand one without understanding the 
others. How donors narrated their position in relation one of these groups shaped 
how they could and did narrate their position in relation to the others. The ways in 
which they talked about their role in one capacity (as a giver of a gift, a good citizen 
or a “donor parent”) constrained and enabled different ways of talking about their 
role in another. In this thesis, my particular interest has been in how concurrent 
frameworks for talking about their donation as a particular kinds of gifts provides 
both discursive resources and constraints upon donors negotiating the novel role they 
find themselves in – that of donor parent. 
  
In Chapter Five, I addressed the research question regarding donor’s perceived 
relationship to recipients, which therefore also examined how they presented their 
motivations and led me to explore similarities and differences in the narratives of 
different donor types. I discussed how all donors depicted their role in relation to 
recipients as one of giver or helper. Donors explained their decision to donate in 
relation to an imagined, generalised image of a “desperate” recipient. In this way, 
their donation was conceptualised as a communal gift to a generalised other, an act of 
social solidarity or good citizenship. However, some, particularly female and known, 
donors, also constructed donation as a relational gift, which connected them to their 
specific recipient. Drawing on this framing of their donation as a personal gift, some 
donors, the vast majority egg donors, explained they were interested in finding out 
more about their recipients or meeting them. However, all the donors I interviewed 
were limited in their ability to construct these kinds of personal connections with 
recipients. By examining my data on interactions and practices in the clinic, I show 
that clinic practices, including the maintenance of donor-recipient anonymity, as well 
as a wider cultural ideology of the “pure gift” discouraged such connection making. 
In addition, the desire to give recipient’s a “normal” experience of parenthood meant 
many donors felt some distance was best, in order to avoid “treading on the toes” of 
the recipient. I argued that the stigma of male infertility and donor insemination 
posed particular barriers to sperm donors narrating their donation as a more personal 
gift, connecting them to their specific recipient(s) which explains why such talk was 
limited largely to female donors. As the following chapters demonstrated, the ways 
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in which they both constructed and limited connections with recipients shaped how 
they talked about their role in relation to the wider community and offspring. 
 
In Chapter Six, I discussed how donors talked about their role in relation to the wider 
community, and their donation as an act of good citizenship. This chapter therefore 
continued to focus on the question of how donors presented their motivations, this 
time with a focus on how this was shaped by clinic practices and wider cultural 
discourses relating to money and payment. In addition, this chapter demonstrated that 
how donors negotiated the issue of money was shaped by the way in which they 
perceived their role in relation to offspring and recipients. The idea of “being paid” 
to donate was problematic primarily because of their imagined relationship with 
offspring and the responsibility they felt towards them. To find out that that their 
conception had resulted from financial motivation was perceived to be emotionally 
damaging to offspring. It was therefore of paramount importance that they be 
perceived as altruistic volunteers rather than people who were donating “for the 
money.” However, this did not mean that no payment could be offered or accepted 
by donors. As I demonstrated, egg donors tended to take a nuanced view of payment, 
stating that some payment (depending on the amount and how it was paid) could be 
accepted without undermining the spirit of altruism which should, and did, underpin 
their donation. Another view, most frequently and strongly asserted by sperm donors, 
was that to accept any payment tainted the gift they had given. I argue that these 
gendered patterns arise, in part, because of a stereotype of sperm donation as a job, 
undertaken for “beer money,”evidenced through sperm donors’ reports of their 
interactions with others regarding their donations. However, they also arise because 
male donors tended to rely more heavily on a discourse of “pure” gifts, and an 
absolute opposition to self-interested market exchange, in order to present their 
donation as an other-oriented act. As argued in Chapter Five, cultural barriers limit 
sperm donors’ ability to construct connections with recipients and therefore draw on 
a discourse of personal, relational gifts in order to construct their donation as an 
altruistic act. The way in which donors conceptualised their relationship to recipients 





In Chapters Seven and Eight, I addressed those questions relating to how donors 
negotiated their relationship to offspring, including how they felt about the 
possibility of future contact and how they envisaged their role, including in the past, 
at the time of interview and in the future. Although they entirely rejected the role of 
parent, the donors I interviewed did not dismiss their connection to offspring and 
almost unanimously supported donor offspring’s “right to know where they came 
from.” In Chapter Seven, I showed how donors selectively borrowed ideas and 
practices associated with families in order to make sense of this novel role of “donor 
parent.” They deconstructed and applied their own experiences of, and wider cultural 
knowledge about, family relationships. Throughout their lives, donors had built up 
experiential understanding of the flexible and dynamic ways in which kinship 
connections could be constructed and the ways they could change over time. This 
kinship repertoire provided donors with resources to make sense of the novel 
situation they found themselves in. However, crucially, these kinship references were 
always qualified in some way to show that this relationship was not quite family, in 
any straightforward sense, and certainly not parental. Such qualification was 
necessary in order to protect the status of the recipient(s) as the “real” parents.  
 
In Chapter Eight, I analysed the various ways in which donors qualified their 
references to kinship discourses. Often qualifying kinship in this way relied on 
shifting perspective – framing the donation as a public act or communal gift (often 
likened to blood donation) or a “pure” gift which ought to be entirely given up. 
These were both discursive means by which donors could depersonalise gamete 
donation and also position it as a public rather than personal act. Donors also drew 
on their relationship to recipients in order to “re-route” their connection to offspring 
– presenting their link to offspring as indirect, something which flowed through their 
pre-existing or gift relationship to their mother. In a similar way, donors narrated 
their connection to offspring via their own children, in this way bringing the two 
family units together rather than talking about their relationship to offspring as 
something which was direct or special. Again, this particular strategy was limited, 
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amongst my interviewees, to egg donors. I argued this was because of the barriers to 
sperm donors talking about specific connections with recipients. These ways of 
limiting connection relied on donors invoking their role as givers, either to specific 
recipients or to the wider community. However, these were not the only ways in 
which donors qualified kinship. They also drew on their kinship expertise to dilute 
their connection to offspring by constructing boundaries between their own families 
and the recipients’, through the use of humour, references to spatial and temporal 
distance and by assigning kinning agency to recipients and offspring,   
 
To sum up, my donor participants donated in a markedly different ethical and legal 
context to that in which previous anonymous gamete donors have donated. In this 
context, they face heightened and contradictory pressures to both connect with and 
distance themselves from the recipient family. On the one hand, my participants had 
invested in the idea that donor offspring might have a “need” to one day meet their 
donor, they therefore could not simply dismiss their connection to offspring as 
socially insignificant. On the other hand, in light of the ideal of two-parent families 
and a perception of “natural” ties as enduring in contrast to their fragile “social” 
equivalent, donors were aware they presented a threat to the status of recipients as 
the “real” parents. Narrating or enacting connections with the recipient family 
therefore ran the risk that they be perceived as “treading on their toes.” In negotiating 
these dual pressures, donors constructed a position for themselves in which they were 
not-quite-kin to offspring, drawing on elements of kinship discourses and family 
practices to make sense of their role whilst simultaneously qualifying those 
references, in order to protect the boundaries of the recipient family and the status of 
the recipients as parents. They did this limiting work in various active and creative 
ways: In part, kin-like connections with offspring were qualified by repeatedly 
reframing their donation as a an act of giving or helping, something which connected 
them to recipients and/or the wider community (not only offspring). In addition, 
donors drew on their rich and experiential knowledge of the ways in which kinship 
claims can be made, unmade and renegotiated over time, in order to limit their 




Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis contributes to recent sociological work on family and personal life and 
also speaks to an anthropological audience, particularly those with an interest in the 
“new kinship studies.” In both disciplines, recent work on family and kinship has 
emphasised the importance of  “doing” relatedness rather than “being” related, taking 
everyday practices as the starting point for research rather than an assumption that 
relatedness is determined on the basis of preconceived structures. As a result, such 
research has been able to explore the diverse and contingent ways in which people in 
Euro-American societies construct people as kin. As discussed in Chapter Three, this 
diversity and contingency is particularly evident in research with users of ARTs. In 
such cases, persons may be claimed as kin in relation to a discourse of the 
“biological” or on the basis of intention, caring practices or love. What is more, the 
kinds of processes or substances which may be defined or counted as “biological” in 
this context is variable and sometimes surprising. 
 
This thesis both supports and enhances this line of theoretical thinking. In the context 
of such diversity and flexibility, I am looking at the limits of this process of doing 
kinship. When and why are kinship claims not made, screened out, sidestepped or 
diluted? Following Edwards and Strathern (2000), I argue that these limiting 
processes are in fact part of kinship thinking and constitute the necessary counterpart 
to a, theoretically infinite, model of kinship in which kinship claims may be made on 
the basis of diverse kinds of linkages. However, despite Edwards and Strathern’s 
insight, little empirical attention has been paid to exactly how potential kinship 
connections are deactivated, diluted or suspended in practice. Previous work has 
tended to focus on inattention to the relationship as a means of truncating kinship, 
either via a gradual process of forgetting a familial relationship (as Edwards and 
Strathern 2000 describe) or a process of screening out (or attempting to screen out) a 
connection, as may be the case in anonymous gamete donation (Speirs 2008). In 
contrast, my thesis examines a case where kinship is qualified in various ways, but 
crucially without denying that a connection, of some kind, exists. The donors I 
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interviewed did this limiting work in highly creative ways, not restricted to forgetting 
or ignoring connections. My study therefore demonstrates that not constructing 
kinship claims can be as active a process as making them.  
 
Within Sociology, recent work on the family has often begun from Morgan’s (1985, 
1996) assertion that families are something which is “done” rather than something 
which simply “is.” Families are actively and continually reproduced through, often 
routine and taken-for-granted, practices. Finch (2007) has extended this concept of 
“doing family” by adding that family practices also need to be displayed. That is, 
they need to be recognised as family practices by significant others. My own 
findings complement the examples she gives, by illustrating how family can also be, 
quite actively and carefully, not done. I have shown that not constructing kinship 
connections can be as active a process as constructing them and that “not really being 
family” or “not being the real parent” also needs to be continually reproduced 
through practices and discourses. 
 
In Chapter Eight, I offered a typology of different processes by which kinship can be 
actively qualified. In some cases, this involved re-framing the donation as an act of 
giving, either depersonalising connections by reframing procreative choices as a 
communal or pure gift or by “re-routing” connections with offspring via their gift 
relationship to the recipient(s). At other times, it involved drawing on wider 
knowledge of family practices and discourses: drawing boundaries between families, 
parodying stereotypical or simplistic understandings of kinship relationships, 
referencing spatial and temporal distance or assigning kinning agency to others. I do 
not expect that this list is exhaustive. There may well be further processes via which 
kinship is limited in different contexts. However, I believe that there is scope for 
both application and extension of the concepts I describe in future research. They 
may be a helpful means of understanding how kinship is done (and undone) in 
different circumstances beyond the realms of donor-assisted reproduction. I have in 
mind circumstances in which the making of (overt) kinship claims may be avoided or 
in which the process of doing kinship may be actively undone or diluted: foster 
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children leaving foster families, adoption breakdowns, family estrangements or 
friendships following divorce, for example. 
 
My analysis also suggests that lived experiences of “doing kinship” can encompass 
“grey areas” – relationships that cannot easily be categorised as familial or not. This 
is quite consistent with the theory that kinship is something we continually reproduce 
through practices of relatedness. It is by imagining, enacting and displaying (Finch 
2007) such practices that we come to think of ourselves as family. If we think of 
kinning as a continual process, negotiated over time, it follows that someone can be 
more or less like kin, that some people might be firmly established as family 
members whilst others can be perceived as “not quite”, “only just” or on the 
boundaries of our families. The donors I interviewed occupied such a liminal 
position in their kinship imaginings. In their words, they were “not really” parents to 
offspring but, in some circumstances, kinship practices or terms were considered 
appropriate. Their occupation of this “grey area” had to be carefully managed; To 
step too far away from a kin-like relationship with offspring would be seen as 
irresponsible, potentially abandoning offspring to a life of genetic bewilderment 
(Sants 1964), of not “knowing where they came from.” However, to make an overt, 
unqualified kinship claim ran the risk of presenting a threat to the recipient family 
and undermining the gift of parenthood which had motivated their donation in the 
first place.   
 
Identity-release donors are not unique in occupying this liminal space in relation to 
kinship practices. In fact, there are many more everyday situations in which it is not 
clear to people whether, and when, a relationship should be imagined, enacted or 
defined as kin. Separation and re-partnering following the birth of children, as well 
as couples cohabiting outside of marriage, provide the clearest examples where this 
might be the case. For example, imagine that a person begins a romantic relationship 
with someone who already has a child from a previous relationship. They may 
eventually come to think of that child as part of their own family. However, as part 
of that process of becoming kin, they may temporarily occupy a “grey area,” where 
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they are conceived as not quite kin, kin-like or kin in particular circumstances. Such 
situations may be temporary, a stepping stone en route to a more secure conception 
of the relationship as familial, or alternatively they might be a long-term or 
permanent state of affairs. “Doing kinship” in such circumstances might need to be 
carefully managed to avoid being seen to over-step one’s role or, conversely, as 
overly distant or shirking one’s responsibilities. This is just one example but already 
we can see how such “grey areas” might provide fruitful contexts for enhancing our 
understanding of how kinship is done and undone.  
 
Transferability and limitations of this study 
To what extent are my findings generalisable beyond the limits of my sample? 
Whilst clearly I have not interviewed a statistically representative sample of the 
wider donor population (at either the clinic or a national level), my findings are 
theoretically transferable (Lewis and Ritchie 2003) to wider populations and other 
contexts.  
 
The tensions which my donor participants face and the way in which they negotiate 
them are shaped by the legislative contexts in which they donate, organisational 
practices in clinics and culturally-specific understandings of the ways in which 
kinship is constructed as well as norms relating to gift giving. Where these 
contextual factors are broadly similar it is likely that similar tensions will arise and 
donors, as a general rule, will negotiate these in similar ways.  On this basis, my 
findings have implications for the views and experiences of identity-release donors in 
the UK and in other culturally similar countries, such as Australia, Canada and other 
European countries, where such legislation has also been introduced in recent 
decades.  
 
That said, my research also demonstrates that clinic practices and interactions, 
particularly regarding payment and connections with recipients, were also significant 
factors shaping how donors made sense of donation. We cannot assume that, just 
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because regulatory regimes may be broadly similar in these countries, that 
organisational practices will also be uniform. This also applies to clinics in the UK. 
Whilst HFEA rules regarding payment may apply nationally, the way in which these 
payments are offered, made and talked about, may vary from clinic to clinic. In 
addition, we should remember that payment regimes had recently changed at the time 
I had carried out my research (with fixed payments being introduced in 2012) and 
clinic practices may therefore have changed since data collection. 
 
There were also particular groups of donors missing from my sample. Firstly, I was 
not able to interview any egg-share donors who had not conceived themselves 
following their donation. This is a significant limitation because such donors may 
face the possibility that they remain childless, whilst one or more of the eggs they 
donated has resulted in a birth to another woman. I was also unable to interview a 
significant proportion of donors who had declined to be contacted for research 
purposes (see Chapter Four). Whilst staff in Hillbrook did comment that this was 
perhaps due to a misunderstanding about what “research” meant in this context, this 
may mean that my sample excludes those for whom discussing their donation or 
being identifiable is problematic in some way. When viewed in conjunction with my 
recruitment of donors via the NGDT, it is possible that my sample is biased towards 
those with a “rosier” view of identity-release gamete donation. 
 
Future research is needed to explore how different subgroups of the donor population 
might make sense of gamete donation differently. This should include those who my 
own recruitment strategies failed to reach – such as unsuccessful egg sharers. It could 
also include comparisons between different clinics, particularly those who are known 
to take varied approaches to donor recruitment and management. Studies in different 
clinics might also be able to recruit donor participants from a wider range of ethnic 
and religious backgrounds, something which was limited in my own study by the 




Of course, one key limitation of this study is that, for many of the donors I 
interviewed, their relationships to recipients and offspring are only imagined. We do 
not yet know how they will enact these roles if and when they meet in person and 
whether donors’ imaginings will meet with recipients’ and offspring’s expectations 
of how this relationship might play out. Further research will be needed in the future 
to analyse how the roles of donors are negotiated in practice.  
  
Implications for policy and practice 
My research has implications for policy-makers and practitioners who aim to support 
donors, donor-conceived persons, recipients and others implicated by gamete 
donation. It may also be of interest to those seeking to increase the numbers of sperm 
and egg donors coming forward in the UK. However, I am aware that, as a result of 
the time I have spent with donors, listening to their stories, reading and re-reading 
their words, I very much see the situation from their perspective. Any policy and 
practice implications should be worked out in conversation with other stakeholders, 
medical practitioners, those seeking and gametes and, of course, donor-conceived 
people and their families. The following suggestions are therefore to be read as 
starting points for these conversations rather than definitive proposals.  
 
Firstly, my thesis supports the findings of studies which demonstrate that, contrary to 
some gloomy predictions, there are people who are prepared to donate gametes 
without absolute anonymity (Daniels, Curson, and Lewis 1996; Daniels 2007a; 
2007b; Riggs and Russell 2011; Mohr 2015; Scheib and Cushing 2007). Whilst it is 
quite possible that identity-release legislation discourages some potential gamete 
donors, it does not deter others. The donors I interviewed were, almost unanimously, 
supportive of this legal amendment. They expressed few concerns about meeting 
their offspring and were often curious about what the future would bring. However, 
we need to acknowledge the particular relational and discursive work which is 
required of identity-release donors. They are negotiating an ambiguous, unscripted 
role, facing contradictory pressures to both distance themselves from the recipient 
family and to connect with offspring. My findings demonstrate that donors 
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negotiated these dual imperatives with quite remarkable creativity and adaptability, 
constructing a role for themselves in relation to offspring which limited their 
symbolic threat to recipients. However, most participants had not yet met their 
offspring or recipients. The role of “donor parent” may be more challenging to enact 
in practice, if and when donors meet with their offspring and their parents. At this 
time, donors, donor-conceived persons and both their families may benefit from 
access to counselling services to explore possibilities and discuss any difficulties as 
to how this relationship might play out. 
 
Secondly, my findings show that we cannot treat identity-release as an “add on” 
policy. By this I mean that it is important to understand that the ways in which 
donors make sense of their relationships to recipients, offspring and the wider 
community are all inter-connected. If policy changes such that donors are re-
positioned in relation to one of these groups, then it will have consequences for how 
they conceptualise their relationships with the others. Furthermore, if policy 
decisions are made without thinking through how they position donors in relation to 
each of these groups, contradictions may arise which place challenges on those 
negotiating the role of donor and could impact on the numbers coming forward. So 
for example, any decision to increase payment or to advertise existing payments as 
financial incentives could pose challenges to donors presenting their donation as a 
civic act or a gift to recipients. Aside from the ethical issues with such a change, 
since these frameworks for understanding donation provide donors with discursive 
means of qualifying their kin-like connection with offspring, changes with payment 
might also pose difficulties for donors making sense of their relationship with 
offspring. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis raises the question as to whether donors and recipients should be 
able to make contact, prior to their offspring turning eighteen, if that is what both 
parties prefer. My interviews show that, despite pressures to distance themselves 
from recipients, several egg donors were interested in finding out more about, and 
sometimes meeting, their recipients. Furthermore, connections with recipients 
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provided a means for donors to talk about their relationship to offspring in a way 
which minimised the symbolic threat they presented to the recipient parent(s). 
Currently, the system of anonymity and clinic practices, as well as wider cultural 
discourses, discourage connections between recipients and donors, particularly in 
cases of sperm donation. Further research and discussion on the benefits and risks of 
changing policy and practice in this area would be worthwhile.  
 
Finally, this thesis raises the question as to whether it is desirable or necessary for 
policy makers to provide donors, and potential donors, with an established narrative 
of what it means to be an identity-release donor. As I have explained, in the absence 
of any cultural script, the donors I interviewed were figuring out what donor 
parenthood meant as they went along. Perhaps if there was a more established script 
then greater numbers of people would be willing to donate gametes. I would argue 
that any attempt to impose one single way of understanding donor parenthood would 
run the risk of excluding the experiences of some. However, what may be helpful is 
to share more widely stories of how different donors enact or imagine “donor 
parenthood.” These men and women are negotiating new kinship terrain. If their 
stories are heard, pathways for navigating this new space can emerge and perhaps 
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